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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed by three chapters presenting different topics in interna-
tional macroeconomics. The first chapter focuses on the role of private information
in the dynamics of sovereign debt yields. I propose a model of sovereign debt and
default where information is incomplete: Investors receive private noisy signals about
the current state of the economy, resulting in heterogeneous information sets across
the investors and the government. I show that having a large enough signal noise is
a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium. The main empirical contribution
of this chapter is proposing and implementing a structural estimation strategy for
the private information noise. Using forecasts data about real GDP growth in the
euro area, available since 1999, I measure private information noise at a quarterly
frequency, by insuring that the informational structure of my model implies statis-
tics of forecast dispersion and uncertainty consistent with those observed in the data.
Private information noise in the euro area shows two interesting characteristics: It
peaks during crises and it has remained persistently larger than before since the
Great Recession. I calibrate my model to be consistent with observed moments of
the euro area economy, and I show it is successful in accounting key untargeted statis-
tics of sovereign spreads. By means of counterfactual exercises, I assess the impact
that a change in private information noise has on the spreads’ statistics. First of all,
I investigate what are the implications of the private information noise having re-
mained at the lower levels prevalent before the Great Recession. I find that spreads
would have been on average lower and less volatile. Then, I simulate my model
for various levels of private information noise, and this exercise uncovers a hump-
shaped relation between private information noise and the average spread level, and
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the spread volatility: While spread levels and volatility are initially increasing with
private information noise, for large enough levels of the latter the relation becomes
negative.
The second chapter, written in collaboration with Joao B. Duarte and Luis Felipe
Sa´enz, studies the divergence in aggregate labor productivity between Europe and
the U.S., observed since the 1990’s, from a sectoral standpoint. In particular, we are
interested in explaining differences in sectoral labor productivity levels in the service
sector, by large the most important industry in both European and U.S. economies.
An issue in accounting for sectoral contributions to aggregate labor productivity is
that the sectoral composition of the economy is endogenous with respect to sectoral
productivity dynamics. To tackle this endogeneity, we employ a model of structural
transformation portraying an economy with thirteen different sectors, corresponding
to agriculture, manufacturing and eleven service industries. By means of our model,
we measure cross-country comparable productivity levels in the U.S. and in eight Eu-
ropean countries. Then, through a set of counterfactual exercises we identify which
sectors are mainly accountable for the falling behind of European labor productiv-
ity. We find that the most serious problems are in the service sector, and, more
specifically, in wholesale and retail trade, business services, and financial services.
Finally, we decompose our measures of labor productivity in total factor productiv-
ity and contributions stemming from traditional and ICT capital. We uncover that
the underperforming sectors in Europe experienced a significant fall in ICT capital
endowment per hour worked with respect to the U.S. Also, total factor productivity
accounts for a large share of labor productivity in these services, suggesting that the
ultimate cause of the European falling behind has to be found in limitations to TFP
growth.
The last chapter, written in collaboration with Luis Felipe Sa´enz, is about the
Ricardo Effect, namely the substitution of capital for labor in the production pro-
cess at the expense of workers’ income, when cheaper capital becomes available. We
employ a unique plant-level longitudinal dataset for Colombian manufacturing es-
tablishments for the period 1982-1998 to document the existence and quantify the
Ricardo Effect in the Colombian manufacturing industry. Moving from a theory of
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production based on a CES technology, we estimate that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is significantly larger than one. This finding proves the
existence of the Ricardo Effect. We take into account the fact that Colombia went
through a profound transformation in the early 1990’s, by the introduction of im-
portant market-oriented reforms. Our empirical investigation points out that these
reforms did not significantly alter the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor. However, they accelerated the fall in the price of capital relative to the price
of labor, which has been occurring since 1986. We extrapolate the average decline
in the relative price of capital between 1986 and 1998, and, given our preferred esti-
mate of the elasticity of substitution in the production, we conclude that the Ricardo
Effect can account for half of the reduction in the labor income share observed in
Colombia between 1994 and 2014.
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CHAPTER 1
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES WITH
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
1.1 Introduction
In the study of economic dynamics under uncertainty, an aspect that has been often
discussed and taken into account in various different contexts is what Angeletos
and Lian (2016) define as incomplete information. Let us consider an economy
with a stochastic state component, in which economic agents need to make optimal
decisions conditional on their expectations about the uncertain event. In this case,
information is incomplete if the information sets they use in forming expectations
are heterogeneous. In other words, incompleteness of information arise when at
least a subset of agents has some sort of private information, unknown by other
agents. With incomplete information, agents differ in their subjective probability
distributions over the uncertain states of the economy. As a consequence, they
may have different expectations and make different choices. However, this is not a
departure from the rational expectations hypothesis: Each agent’s expectations are
rational, in the sense that they are optimally based upon all the information the
agent possesses, but this information is not the same for all the agents.
What are the implications of incomplete information for the dynamics of sovereign
debt yields and the occurrence of sovereign debt crises is, to the best of my knowledge,
a still unanswered question in the existing literature of sovereign debt and default.
This chapter intends to fill this gap by investigating, in particular, the effects of
incomplete information on the pricing of government debt. The main quantitative
finding is that, for low initial values of information heterogeneity, incomplete infor-
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mation has an amplification effect on sovereign spreads’ level and volatility as well
as on the long run probability of sovereign default. The result is obtained from a
counterfactual experiment based on a model of sovereign debt with incomplete infor-
mation, calibrated to the euro area economy. If we identify the degree of information
incompleteness as the level of noise in private information, which I structurally es-
timate from forecast data of the euro area, the average level of sovereign spreads
would have been 27 per cent lower and the volatility 8 per cent lower, had the noise
remained at the relative low average level prevailing before the Great Recession. The
probability of default would have been 25 per cent lower. However, when the ex-
tent of information incompleteness becomes very large, its effect on spread level and
volatility is reverted. Intuitively, too much private information noise lead investors
to pay less attention to it.
The model of sovereign debt and default that I develop inherits much of the prop-
erties of the original model proposed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). However, the
assumption about government’s credible commitment follows Cole and Kehoe (2000).
In a nutshell, this assumption implies that the government must issue new debt be-
fore deciding whether to serve or not outstanding debt falling due. This specific
timing of events is well known to generate the possibility of rollover crises, that is
sovereign defaults triggered if the government fails to optimally issue new debt, but
avoided otherwise. In the standard Cole and Kehoe (2000) model with complete in-
formation, the possibility of rollover crises is the direct consequence of the existence
of two equilibria in certain states of the economy: One in which the rollover crisis
takes place, the other in which it does not occur. In the existing literature, the selec-
tion between these equilibria is driven by the realization of a sunspot variable, which
constitutes a reduced form representation of investors’ belief coordination. In this
chapter, the standard model a` la Cole and Kehoe (2000) is modified by introducing
information incompleteness, in the form of private noisy signals about the uncertain
state of the economy received by prospective investors. A theoretical result deriving
from the novel informational structure is that uniqueness of equilibrium is restored,
under certain conditions. The mechanism leading to this finding is in a very similar
spirit to the one discussed by Morris and Shin (1998). More recently, Szkup (2018)
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proved how private information leads to uniqueness of equilibrium in a model very
similar to mine, but consisting of only two periods.
I calibrate the model to match moments of a set of financial and economic variables
in the euro area. The test of the theory is whether the calibrated model can account
for key statistics of sovereign spreads in the euro area, a variable not targeted in
the calibration. The model is successful in accounting for the average level and
volatility of spreads, and the negative correlation between spreads and real GDP
growth. It is quantitatively less successful in accounting for the positive correlation
between spreads and maturing debt to GDP ratio, although the model correlation
is qualitatively correct. Having passed the test of the theory, the model is used
as workhorse for the above mentioned counterfactual experiment that uncovers the
relation between incomplete information and sovereign spreads. A central step in the
present calibration exercise is measurement of private information noise – the degree
of information incompleteness – in the euro area. The methodology proposed and
the resulting measures represent the main empirical contribution of this chapter.
One should notice that direct observation of private information is impossible by
definition. On the other hand, there exists a variety of sources reporting forecast
data. In this chapter, I look at forecasts about annual real GDP growth in the
euro area, available through the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) run by
the European Central Bank (ECB). My identification assumption is that observable
forecasts reflect unobservable private information in a well defined manner, based,
in essence, on the informational structure of my model. This structure delivers two
moment conditions binding private information noise to the dispersion and average
uncertainty of forecasts, two statistics that we easily compute in the data. I measure
private information noise by means of a GMM estimation strategy that combines
these two moment conditions.
Figure 1.1 displays the time series of private information noise resulting from my
measurement strategy, with a quarterly frequency. We notice that private informa-
tion noise increases quite sharply at the inception of recessions or periods of turbu-
lence1, in particular during the Great Recession (2008 - 2009) and the European Debt
1In 2001, the U.S. entered in recession, while this did not occur in the euro area.
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Figure 1.1: Private information noise
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Crisis (2011 - 2012). Also, after these two events, private information noise has re-
mained persistently higher than before. It appears that the Great Recession created
a structural break in the time series, an hypothesis supported by standard statistical
tests discussed in the empirical section. Exploiting the difference of pre-2008 noise
mean is the main idea at the base of the counterfactual experiment.
The research presented in this chapter talks to a vast existing literature. Since the
seminal theoretical research on sovereign debt of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Cole
and Kehoe (2000), Calvo (1988), and Bulow and Rogoff (1989), many scholars have
developed quantitative applications of this class of models, such as Arellano (2008),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Mendoza and Yue (2012), and Chatterjee and Eyigun-
gor (2012). The methods for the quantitative analysis in this chapter follow closely
the ones of these papers. Examples of quantitative applications of models a` la Cole
and Kehoe (2000), allowing for rollover crises, are given by Aguiar, Chatterjee, Cole,
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and Stangebye (2017) and Bocola and Dovis (2018). The latter studies the dynamics
of Italian sovereign spreads during the European Debt Crisis, the same crisis event
considered here. My research is particularly close to models of sovereign debt that
include some form of information and learning. In particular, Durdu, Nunes, and
Sapriza (2013) studies the effect of a public signal that shifts the expectations of
all the agents in the economy. Gu and Stangebye (2018) introduce costly informa-
tion that investors might optimally choose whether to use or not. Models of soverign
debt have been extensively used to study crisis episodes in emerging economies, while
their calibration to mature economies, like in this chapter, is more recent. Bocola,
Bornstein, and Dovis (2018) address what the latter implicates. This chapter is also
related to empirical research on information and forecasts, such as Giordani and
So¨derlind (2003) and Patton and Timmermann (2010).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model and
the theoretical results, with emphasis on the characterization of the equilibrium and
the effects of incomplete information on pricing government debt. Section 1.3 enters
into the details of the measurement of private information noise from the ECB SPF
data. Section 1.4 is about the quantitative analysis performed, from the calibration
of the model and the way the model is solved numerically to the findings of the
counterfactual experiment. Section 1.5 contains the conclusive remarks.
1.2 Theoretical setup
In this section, I describe a model of sovereign debt and default with incomplete
information. I characterize the equilibrium of a simplified version of the model. The
simplifications are necessary to obtain an analytic representation of the equilibrium,
and I remove them later when the model is solved numerically for the quantita-
tive analysis. I discuss under which conditions the equilibrium is unique. Finally,
by means of a comparative static exercise, I uncover the channels through which
incomplete information influences the equilibrium price of government debt.
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1.2.1 Description of the model
In a small open endowment economy, there is a benevolent infinitely-lived government
with full control over the endowment in each period (time is discrete). The govern-
ment spends the endowment in transfers to the identical households populating the
economy. The households enjoy felicity from consuming. They are risk-averse, i.e.
they have a preference for a smooth intertemporal consumption. Since the govern-
ment is benevolent, it shares the same preferences of the households: Its objective
is an optimally smoothed plan of intertemporal spending. To achieve this objective,
the government can borrow or save in a financial asset maturing in one period. When
an outstanding debt is due to reimbursement, the government may choose to default
on its obligations. In case of default, the government is temporarily excluded from
future financial transactions. Moreover, it suffers an endowment loss in each period
until readmission to the markets.
The counterpart of the government in the financial transactions is given by a
continuum of investors. Investors are active for two periods: In the first period, they
lend to or borrow from the government, and in the second period they settle their
positions. Hence, in any period two cohorts of investors coexist: “Young” investors
taking a position and “old” investors getting repaid or repaying. In contrast to most
applications of this class of models, I do not restrict investors to be foreigners. This
assumption is common in existing research because the vast majority of it has studied
sovereign debt crisis in emerging economies, where most of government debt is indeed
held by international investors. However, this is not the case for a developed economy
like the euro area, the object of the present study. Therefore, I do not specify the
origin of investors, and this does not change the main mechanisms of the model, as
discussed by Bocola et al. (2018). They prove that, by a theoretical point of view, the
relevant state variable in an advanced economy is the total amount of government
debt, and distinguishing between domestically or internationally held debt does not
really matter. In terms of investors’ origin, the only assumption that I impose is
that the government does not consider profits made by domestic investors when it
chooses the optimal spending plan.
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Endowments. In each period t, the government has access to a stochastic endow-
ment Yt, which is log-normally distributed according to
yt ≡ log Yt ∼ N (yˆt, σ2y) ∀t. (1.1)
Let Y t represent the history of endowment realizations up to Yt included. I assume
that yˆt = yˆ (Y
t−1). Hence, the stochastic process of endowment is, in general terms,
history-dependent.
Each cohort of investors has the same size W . In the second period of activity,
investors receive an endowment large enough to meet any liabilities they may owe.
This means that they are perceived as safe borrowers, and they are charged the
international risk-free rate r on any amount they borrow.
Preferences and Budget Constraints. The only action of households is
consuming all the income they have. I do not explicitly specify households’ utility
and constraints. However, their risk aversion is reflected in the concavity of the
government’s utility function.
The government has preferences over the intertemporal spending plan {Gt}, with
Gt ≥ 0 in any period, represented by the additive utility function
U ({Gt}) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu (Gt) ,
with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The intratemporal utility function u is strictly
increasing, concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Also, u(Gt) tends to −∞ as
Gt tends to 0 from above. In any period of time in which default does not occur,
government spending Gt satisfies the constraint
Gt ≤ Yt −Bt + qtBt+1,
where Bt is the amount of government debt issued in period t− 1 and due to reim-
bursement in period t, and qtBt+1 are the proceedings received by the government
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from issuing new debt Bt+1 at price qt. A negative value of Bt or Bt+1 is interpreted
as a saving balance. On the other hand, if the government defaults in period t, the
constraint on spending is given by
Gt ≤ h (Yt) ,
where the function h introduces an endowment loss associated with default, if h (Yt) <
Yt. Notice that the latter budget constraint is in place also in any period following a
default, until the government regains access to the financial markets. In any of these
periods, readmission may occur with a probability λ.
Investors are risk-neutral and aim at maximizing their profit. Given that they are
endowed in the second period of activity, an investor that wants to purchase units
of government debt in the first period has to borrow the funds needed, and pay
them back with accrued interest in the second period. In present value, the profit
an investor makes by purchasing one unit of government debt is thus{
1
1+r
− qt if repayment
−qt if default
.
Informational structure. At the beginning of period t, the endowment Yt
is realized, but it is not immediately revealed to the economic agents. Both the
government and the investors become aware of Yt only at the end of the period.
Initially, the agents know the history Y t−1 and the stochastic process of endowment
defined in equation (1.1). Let ft−1(Yt) denote the actual probability distribution
function of Yt, conditional on the past endowment realizations.
Before becoming aware of Yt, each investor receives a private noisy signal about
the current endowment realization. Let the signal received by investor i be
xit = yt + ε
i
t ε
i
t ∼ N (0, σ2x) ∀t.
In this setup, information is incomplete exactly because of the existence of these
signals. Notice that, having observed their own signals, the investors “know more”
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than the government, who does not receive any signal. One may justify this by saying
that the government is transparent and releases all information in its hands to the
public. Moreover, from a technical point of view, I do not need a government’s signal
to create information incompleteness: Every information set is different from each
other even if one of the agents does not receive a signal.
In light of the signal received, investor i updates her beliefs about the probabil-
ity distribution over the possible realizations of endowment. Applying the Bayes’
theorem, investor i perceives that yt is distributed according to
yt|xit ∼ N (ξit, ω2) ∀t,
where
ξit =
σ2y
σ2y + σ
2
x
xit +
σ2x
σ2y + σ
2
x
yˆt,
ω2 =
(
1
σ2y
+
1
σ2x
)−1
.
Let pit−1(yt) denote the perceived probability distribution function of yt, conditional
on the endowment history and on receiving signal xit. Notice that the perceived
distributions differ across investors in terms of the perceived mean ξit but they have
the same variance. Given that ξit is increasing in the signal received, we have that a
perceived distribution induced by a signal xit has first-order dominance over all the
perceived distributions induced by signals smaller than xit.
An important remark about the role of σx in the model is necessary. This param-
eter quantifies the noise in the informational content of every signal. Intuitively, it
tells how precise a private signal is. For this reason, σx determines the weight at-
tached to the signal in the expression of ξit, and influences the perceived uncertainty
given by ω2. At the same time, signals are drawn for infinitely many investors. Be-
cause of this, σx measures also the dispersion of signals across investors. We will
often return to the duality “precision-dispersion” later in the chapter.
9
Debt Auction. Government debt is issued through a marginal price auction. For
the sake of tractability, I impose the following institutional rule: Every investor
presents a bid for one and only one unit of government debt. The auction works as it
follows. The government announces the face value of the new debt Bt+1 to be issued.
Any investor i bids the price qit for one unit of Bt+1. The units of Bt+1 are allotted
to the investors sequentially, following the descending rank of the bids {qit}, until the
supply of debt is exhausted. The market clearing price qt is the price bidden by the
last investor to receive one unit of Bt+1, the marginal investor. Every investor who
has been allotted a unit of debt is charged qt.
Because of the institutional rule, in each period the total demand for government
debt is by construction equal to W , the measure of investors. Hence, letting χt
represent the share of investors who bid a price at least as high as qt, the market
clearing condition for the debt auction is
Bt+1 = Wχt ∀ t.
Clearly, a technical constraint is that Bt+1 ≤ W .
Timing Protocol. As in Cole and Kehoe (2000), I assume that the government
faces a time inconsistency. The optimality of reimbursing outstanding debt Bt de-
pends on the outcome of the issuance of Bt+1, i.e. qtBt+1. Given a lack of credible
commitment, the government must follow a timing of events in which the issuance
of new debt occurs before the reimbursement of outstanding debt. Following the
literature, I adopt the typical assumption that, if default occurs in period t, both Bt
and Bt+1 are repudiated, and the proceedings qtBt+1 forfeited. This implies that a
default hurts not only “old” investors that hold Bt, but also “young” investors that
have just purchased Bt+1. The flow of information intersects the timing of events.
When the government issues Bt+1, it is unaware of Yt, but it observes the latter be-
fore deciding whether to default or not. Investors have already received their signals
when they present their bids, but they are unaware of the actual endowment level.
Figure 1.2 is a graphical representation of the timing protocol. In terms of decision
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Figure 1.2: Timing protocol
Endowment Yt is realized
but not revealed.
Investors receive signals
{
xit
}
.
I. Government chooses Bt+1 and
announces the issuance to investors.
II. Auction: Investors bid prices
{
qit
}
.
Market clearing price qt is determined.
Government and investors
observe endowment Yt.
III. Government reimburses Bt
or defaults.
making, let us define three distinct interim stages within any period t: In stage I, the
government issues new debt; in stage II, investors present their bids and the market
clearing price is set in the auction; in stage III, the government decides whether it
reimburses the outstanding debt or not.
1.2.2 Recursive equilibrium
Definition. In this model, a recursive equilibrium consists of a pricing function
q (Y t−1, Yt, Bt, Bt+1), value functions V D (Yt) and V R (Y t−1, Yt, Bt), and policy func-
tions B′ (Y t−1, Bt) and b (Y t−1, xit, Bt, Bt+1), such that
1. The government optimally issues Bt+1 = B
′ (Y t−1, Bt), given outstanding debt
Bt and the endowment history.
2. Any investor i optimally bids the price qit = b (Y
t−1, xit, Bt, Bt+1) for one unit
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of Bt+1, given outstanding debt, endowment history, and the private signal
received.
3. The market clearing price qt = q (Y
t−1, Yt, Bt, Bt+1) is the price bidden by the
marginal investor in Bt+1, given outstanding debt, endowment history, and the
current endowment Yt.
4. By defaulting on Bt, the government receives the value V
D(Yt), which depends
only on current endowment. By reimbursing Bt, the government receives the
value V R (Y t−1, Yt, Bt), which depends on the current endowment, the out-
standing debt, the issued debt, and the auction’s proceedings.
5. The government defaults if and only if V D (Yt) > V
R (Y t−1, Yt, Bt).
Characterization. In order to characterize the equilibrium analytically, I sim-
plify the model in two dimensions. First, I set h(Yt) = Yt for any level of endowment,
and λ = 0. This implies that there is no direct cost, in the form of endowment loss,
associated with default and that the only “punishment” for a defaulting government
is a perpetual exclusion from future borrowing or lending. Second, I let the endow-
ment to be identically distributed in any period, by imposing yˆt = yˆ ∀ t. Under
this simplification, endowment history is no longer a relevant state variable and this
argument drops out from all equilibrium functions. These simplifications are relaxed
in the quantitative analysis of Section 1.4.
I characterize the equilibrium by backward induction, starting from the interim
stage III of period t. At this stage, endowment Yt has been revealed and the issuance
of new debt has been realized, i.e. Bt+1 and qt are given. The value that the
government receives in case of default is given by the function V D that solves
V D(Yt) = u (Yt) + β
∫
V D (υ) f(υ)dυ,
and it depends on Yt only. Given the set of predetermined variables St.III = (Bt, Bt+1, qt)
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and the just revealed Yt, the government obtains the value
V˜ R(Yt, St.III) = u (Yt −Bt + qtBt+1) + β
∫
max
{
V R (υ,Bt+1) , V
D (υ)
}
f(υ)dυ,
if it decides to reimburse Bt. Notice that V˜
R(Yt, St.III) = V
R(Yt, Bt+1) if and only
if St.III = (Bt, B
′ (Bt) , q (Yt, Bt, B′ (Bt))). At stage III of period t, the government
defaults if and only if V D(Yt) > V˜
R(Yt, St.III).
At this point, it is useful to introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique threshold log endowment y¯t ∈ (−∞,∞) such that
Default occurs in t⇔ yt < y¯t,
where yt = log Yt, if and only if the variables in St.III are such that Bt > 0 and
qtBt+1 −Bt < 0.
Proof. The partial sufficiency and necessity of Bt > 0 is trivial: If the government
has no outstanding debt, default is impossible and no threshold exists.
When qtBt+1 − Bt < 0, the value function V˜ R(Yt, St.III) tends to −∞ as Yt tends
to − (qtBt+1 −Bt). This derives from the properties of u, and the fact that the
continuation value in V˜ R does not depend on Yt thanks to the second simplification.
At the same time, V D(Yt) is finite for Yt = − (qtBt+1 −Bt). Hence, there exists a
non empty set of low enough Yt realizations for which the government chooses to
default. On the other hand, it is the case that ∂V˜
R(Yt,St.III)
∂Yt
= u′ (Yt −Bt + qtBt+1)
and ∂V
D(Yt)
∂Yt
= u′ (Yt), given the simplifications. When qtBt+1−Bt < 0, V˜ R increases
faster than V D as Yt increases, by the concavity of u. Therefore, there exists a
non empty set of high enough Yt realizations for which the government chooses to
reimburse. By the monotonicity of u, V˜ R crosses V D from below at one and only one
endowment level Y¯t, establishing the uniqueness of the threshold. The properties of
Y¯t are invariant to the logarithmic transformation y¯t = log Y¯t.
To prove the partial necessity of qtBt+1−Bt < 0, suppose ab absurdo that qtBt+1−
Bt > 0. Then, V˜
R(Yt, St.III) > V
D(Yt) for any level of Yt, and a default will never
occur.
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Lemma 1 establishes under which predetermined variables a default may occur,
and for which realizations of yt it occurs. The threshold log endowment is a function
of the variables in St.III : y¯t = y¯ (qt, Bt, Bt+1). In particular, for any Bt, Bt+1, the
threshold is decreasing in qt, because larger proceedings qtBt+1 reduce the incentives
of defaulting on Bt.
At interim stage II, each investor i bids a price qit for a unit of Bt+1. Given the bids,
a market clearing price qt for Bt+1 is set. The government announces the amount
Bt+1 in advance, so that the set of predetermined variables is St.II = (Bt, Bt+1). Also,
at this stage investors have already incorporated the signals in their beliefs. Each
investor assesses the expected return from investing in one unit of Bt+1. An investor
is reimbursed if default does not take place in the next period and in the current
period. Conditional on no period t default, the probability of default in period t+ 1
corresponds to the probability that V R(Yt+1, Bt+1) ≥ V D(Yt+1). According to the
simplifications, the endowment is identically distributed in each period, implying
that a signal received in period t is not informative about endowment realizations in
period t + 1. As a consequence, all agents assign the same probability to the event
V R(Yt+1, Bt+1) ≥ V D(Yt+1). Let
Rt =
Prob
(
V R(Yt+1, Bt+1) ≥ V D(Yt+1)
)
1 + r
represent the expected present value return of investing in a unit of Bt+1, conditional
on no period t default. Clearly, Rt is the same for any investor and it is a function
of Bt+1 only: Rt = R (Bt+1).
Investors are aware that at the next stage the government will opt to default if
and only if yt < y¯ (qt, St.II). The probability assigned to this event by each agent
depends on the signal received. In summary, the present value investment return
expected by investor i is given by
vi(qt, St.II) =
(∫
y¯(qt,St.II)
pi(υ)dυ
)
R (Bt+1) ,
where pi is investor i’s perceived probability distribution over the realizations of yt.
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Notice that the expected return of any investor depends on the equilibrium price
qt set in the auction: There is an essential strategic complementarity in investors’
bids, making this problem a global game. Higher qt reduces the likelihood of default
ceteris paribus, and this increases vi(qt, St.II). Moreover, by the first order stochastic
dominance property of pi, it is the case that
vi(qt, St.II) > v
j(qt, St.II)⇔ xit > xjt ,
for any qt, St.II .
Any investor i decides the optimal bidden price qit in order to maximize her ex-
pected profit, which is equal to
piit(qt, St.II) = v
i(qt, St.II)− qt.
The following propositions characterize the outcome of the auction in terms of in-
vestor’s behaviors.
Proposition 1. If investors bid according to a monotonic strategy profile, there exists
a unique price qt that clears the market.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose investors’ bids satisfy
qit > q
j
t ⇔ xit > xjt .
Then, the rank of the bids corresponds to the rank of the signals. By the market
clearing condition, there exists a unique marginal investor who receives a signal xmt
satisfying
Bt+1 = WΦ
(
yt − xmt
σx
)
,
where Φ represents the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random
variable. By the distribution of signals, Φ
(
yt−xmt
σx
)
is the proportion of investors who
bid higher prices than the marginal investor.
The price bidden by the marginal investor is the unique market clearing price
qt.
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Proposition 1 establishes a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique equi-
librium, which is that investors’ bid are monotonic in the signal received. The next
proposition establishes a sufficient condition for the investors to follow a monotonic
strategy profile.
Proposition 2. If the standard deviation ω of the perceived probability distribution
of yt satisfies
ω > φ
(
ξit − y¯ (qt, St.II)
ω
) ∣∣∣∣∂y¯ (qt, St.II)∂qt
∣∣∣∣R (Bt+1)
for any qt ∈ [0, R (Bt+1)] given St.II , then investors’ optimal bids are increasing in
the signal received.
Proof. First, notice that the feasible values of qt are constrained to [0, R (Bt+1)],
since no investor would ever bid more than R (Bt+1) (she would expect a loss) and
a negative price is meaningless. The condition of the proposition guarantees that
∂vi(qt,St.II)
∂qt
< 1 at any feasible value of qt, and that the expected investment profit is
decreasing in qt. Moreover, it implies that, for any investor i, there exists a unique
indifference price q¯it at which the investor expects zero profits, i.e. pi
i
t (q¯
i
t) = 0. Figure
1.3 graphically represents a function vi having these properties. Notice that investor
i expects a loss (profit) for any qt larger (lower) than q¯
i
t.
It turns out that bidding q¯it is the unique dominant strategy for investor i. I show
this in two steps. First, notice that bidding qit = q¯
i
t weakly dominates any other
strategy. Indeed, if qit > qt, investor i is allotted a unit of Bt+1, and expects a
profit since qt < q¯
i
t, while, if q
i
t < qt, investor i does not receive any unit, but it is
hedged from an expected loss, given that qt > q¯
i
t. Second, bidding q
i
t = q¯
i
t is the
unique dominant strategy because any other strategy is dominated for some specific
realization of qt. For instance, consider the case in which q
i
t > qt > q¯
i
t: Investor i is
allotted a unit of Bt+1 on which she expects a loss. On the other hand, if q
i
t < qt < q¯
i
t,
investor i foregoes an investment with an expected profit.
Therefore, under the condition of the proposition, any investor i bids the unique
q¯it. It is straightforward to show that q¯
i
t > q¯
j
t if and only if x
i
t > x
j
t . Indeed, if x
i
t > x
j
t ,
then vi(qt) > v
j(qt) for any qt. Hence, v
i(q¯jt )− q¯jt > vj(q¯jt )− q¯jt = 0. vi(q¯jt )− q¯jt > 0
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Figure 1.3: Expected return and profit
qt = qt
vi(qt)
q¯it
R(Bt+1)
R(Bt+1)
0 qt
vi(qt)− qt > 0 vi(qt)− qt < 0
implies that q¯it > q¯
j
t . Suppose q¯
i
t > q¯
j
t , and take any q
′
t such that q¯
i
t > q
′
t > q¯
j
t . Then
vi(q′t)− q′t > 0 > vj(q′t)− q′t, and vi(q′t) > vj(q′t). But this is the case only if xit > xjt .
This proves that the optimal bids are increasing in the signal received.
The equilibrium pricing function q (Yt, Bt, Bt+1) delivers the market clearing price
of Bt+1, given Yt, Bt. A corollary from the proof of Proposition 2 is that every investor
bids the unique price making her expect a zero investment profit. Therefore, under
the condition of Proposition 2, the equilibrium price qt = q (Yt, Bt, Bt+1) is implicitly
defined by pimt (qt) = 0, that is
qt =
(∫
y¯(qt,St.II)
pm(υ)dυ
)
R (Bt+1) ,
where the superscript m indicates that the relevant probability distribution is the
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one perceived by the marginal investor. This is the investor that receives the signal
xmt solving
Bt+1 = WΦ
(
yt − xmt
σx
)
.
At the interim stage I, the government decides the amount of new debt Bt+1 to
issue. It is strategic, in the sense that it foresees the price at which the auction
will clear for any realization of Yt, given the outstanding debt Bt. In other words,
the government knows the mapping induced by the equilibrium pricing function
q (Yt, Bt, Bt+1). Then, the government chooses the optimal amount Bt+1 by solving
max
Bt+1
∫ ∞
0
[
u(ϑ−Bt + q (ϑ,Bt, Bt+1)Bt+1) + β
∫ ∞
0
]
max
Bt+1
∫ ∞
0
[
+β
∫ ∞
0
max
{
V R(υ,Bt+1), V
D(υ)
}
f(υ)dυ
]
f(ϑ)dϑ
In summary, uniqueness of equilibrium is ensured by the fact that the auction
of government debt delivers a unique market clearing price for any Bt+1, given any
state Yt, Bt. Proposition 1 presents a sufficient condition for that, and Proposition 2
states a sufficient condition to identify the unique equilibrium price as the indifference
price of the marginal investor. In the rest of the discussion, I assume that the latter
condition is satisfied.
1.2.3 Signal noise and the pricing of debt
At this point, I intend to explore the theoretical linkages between the level of sig-
nal noise and the pricing of government debt in the model. Based on the analytic
characterization of the equilibrium, I do a comparative static exercise to study how
a change in σx, the signal noise parameter, translates into a shift of the equilibrium
price qt. We see that the dual role of σx is important. Indeed, it is possible to
identify two distinct channels through which σx affects qt: A dispersion channel and
a precision channel.
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Using the functional forms of the perceived moments and probability distribution
of yt, the equilibrium price qt of some Bt+1, given Yt and Bt, is defined by the
equations
Bt+1 = WΦ
(
yt − xmt
σx
)
,
qt = Φ
(
ξmt − y¯(qt, Bt, Bt+1)
ω
)
R(Bt+1),
ξmt =
σ2y
σ2y + σ
2
x
xmt +
σ2x
σ2y + σ
2
x
yˆ,
ω =
(
1
σ2y
+
1
σ2x
)− 1
2
,
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random
variable. Notice that σx enters directly into the first equation, which is the market
clearing condition, and into the third and fourth equations, defining respectively
the mean and standard deviation of investor m’s perceived probability distribution.
Through these moments, σx affects indirectly the second equation, that establishes
the zero expected profit condition for investor m.
The market clearing condition pins down xmt , the signal received by the marginal
investor. To this end, given the issued amount Bt+1 and total demand W , relevant
statistics are where the distribution of signals is centered and how dispersed signals
are around their mean. In essence, the role of σx in the first equation is quantifying
the dispersion of signals across investors. On the other hand, in the last two equa-
tions, σx determines the optimal weight assigned to the signal in the perceived mean
of yt, relative to the actual mean yˆ, and how the perceived variance of yt differs from
the actual one, σ2y . In this regard, the role of σx is that of measuring the precision
of the signal.
By means of implicit differentiation, the mathematical expression of how σx affects
qt is
∂qt
∂σx
= Ωt
[
− σ
2
y
σ2y + σ
2
x
Φ−1
(
Bt+1
W
)
+
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+
2σxσ
2
y(
σ2y + σ
2
x
)2 (yˆ − xmt )− σ2yσx (σ2y + σ2x) [ξmt − y¯(Bt, Bt+1, qt)]
]
,
where Ωt is a positive term. The first term in the brackets quantifies the change
in qt caused by the fact that σx shifts the marginal investor’s signal. Then, this
term captures the impact of the signal noise on the price of debt by affecting signals’
dispersion. The other two terms measure, respectively, how qt is affected by the
re-balancing of xmt and yˆ in the perceived mean and by the change in the perceived
variance, as a consequence of a shift in σx. Jointly, these two terms assess the effects
of signal noise on the price of debt by changing signals’ precision.
Can we reach some qualitative conclusions about the directions of these effects?
With regard to the dispersion channel, the effect is negative for Bt+1/W > 1/2.
In other words, for large enough debt issuance, the increase in private information
dispersion associated with an increase in σx reduces the price at which the debt
can be sold. Intuitively, this is related to the extent of “pessimism” characterizing
the marginal investor, i.e. how low xmt is. The larger Bt+1, the more pessimist
the marginal investor has to be for the market to clear. For large enough Bt+1, an
increase in σx means that the marginal investor has to be even more pessimist, for
the same Yt, and this reduces the market clearing price. Notice that the empirical
counterpart of Bt+1/W is the reciprocal of the bid-to-cover ratio. The analysis of
Beetsma, Giuliodori, Hanson, and de Jong (2018) on debt auctions of main European
countries suggest that the bid-to-cover ratio is less than 2 on average. Moreover, it
tends to be lower during crisis, due to flight to safety phenomena. Heuristically, the
condition for a negative dispersion effect seems to hold in the data.
Conclusions about the sign of the precision channel are more ambiguous, because
they depend on the endogenous solutions for the marginal signal xmt and the threshold
log endowment yˆt. Intuitively, this ambiguity rests on the fact that an increase
in signal precision makes the marginal investor more confident about her private
information. The latter acquires more influence on the investor’s expectations, and
the investor perceives less uncertainty around her expectations. The effect of all of
this on the price of debt depends on how “positive” the private information is, and
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how “optimistic” investor’s expectations are. Re-balancing the perceived mean may
have a positive effect on qt if σx increases and x
m
t is lower than yˆ. Indeed, in this
case the marginal investor attributes less importance to her relatively “bad” signal
xmt and more importance to the relatively “good” prior yˆ. As a result, the perceived
mean becomes more optimistic, and the market clearing price increases. At the same
time, an increase in σx enlarges the perceived variance. Whether this has positive or
negative effects on qt depends if the marginal investor’ posterior means is smaller or
larger than the threshold yˆt. In the quantitative analysis, the ambiguity about the
effect of signal noise on the price of debt will be clarified through the counterfactual
experiment.
1.3 Empirical analysis
The main focus of this section is the measurement of private information noise in the
euro area. This measure will serve as a base for the calibration of the signal noise pa-
rameter σx in the quantitative analysis. The measurement is based on forecasts data
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters run by the European Central Bank. The
strategy consists in reading these data through the lenses of the model. In essence,
I maintain the informational structure of my model, and from the latter I derive the
model implied dispersion and uncertainty of forecasts. Not surprisingly, these model
statistics depend on σx. On the other hand, I can observe forecast dispersion and
uncertainty in the data. By means of a generalized method of moments, I estimate
the value of σx that minimizes the distance between the model and data statistics.
1.3.1 Data description
The ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters reports forecasts about real GDP growth,
inflation, and unemployment in the euro area, on a quarterly basis. In general, sur-
vey participants are financial institutions, industrial organizations, and research in-
stitutes. For any variable of interest, various forecasting horizons are reported. The
21
survey has run since 1999-Q1 and it is still ongoing.
For the purpose of the present study, I consider the quarterly forecasts of real GDP
growth over the four quarters since the last quarter for which an official GDP figure
is available. Given that the survey is presented at the beginning of every quarter,
the last GDP release refers to two quarters back. For instance, in the survey dating
2019-Q1, participants has reported their forecasts of GDP growth over 2018-Q4,
2019-Q1, 2019-Q2 and 2019-Q3. In this sense, to some extent these forecasts reflect
the contemporaneous uncertainty of professionals about the current GDP growth.
Each respondent discloses two pieces of information. First, she gives a point forecast
of the growth rate. Second, she expresses her subjective probability distribution:
Given a set of growth rate brackets coming with the survy, she assigns the probability
that the growth rate will fall in any one of those brackets. Forecasts are about annual
growth rates, while one period in my model corresponds to a quarter in the data. I
transform the annual rates in quarterly rates by assuming homogeneous growth over
the four quarters.
Other data that I use in this section are sovereign yields, sovereign debt levels and
GDP of the euro area countries. The sources of these data are the Global Financial
Database (for the yields) and the OECD (for all the rest).
1.3.2 Forecast dispersion and uncertainty in the data
Forecast dispersion quantifies the extent of disagreement in forecasters’ opinions.
In order to assess the dispersion of the observed forecasts, I compute the cross-
section standard deviation of point forecasts across respondents, for each quarter
from 1999-Q1 to 2018-Q3. Forecast uncertainty reflects the degree of confidence a
forecaster has on her forecasts. The measurement of forecast uncertainty is based on
the subjective probability distributions reported. Intuitively, an extremely confident
forecaster should assign probability one to the bracket containing her point forecasts
and zero probability to all the others. Hence, forecast uncertainty is related to how
widespread across brackets the reported probability mass is.
Patton and Timmermann (2010) discuss various methods to infer a measure of
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dispersion from a discrete histogram-like probability distribution, as the one we have
here. The strategy that I follow is slightly different, and it is based on non-parametric
smoothing and Monte Carlo sampling. First, I smooth each reported probability dis-
tribution over the brackets by means of a kernel density estimator. The bandwidth
of the estimator is selected in order that the probability mass assigned by the esti-
mated density to each bracket matches the one indicated by the forecaster. For the
smoothing, I have to deal with the fact that the two growth brackets at the extremes
are open brackets. I assume that the mid growth rate in these bins is distant twice
the length of each bracket (the same for all of them) from the defined closed bound.
Second, I simulate multiple samples out of the estimated kernel density, and I com-
pute the average standard deviation of the simulated samples. I take this moment as
the measure of the uncertainty associated with any forecast reported in the survey.
In conclusion, I measure quarterly forecast uncertainty by repeating this process in
each quarter between 1999-Q1 and 2018-Q3, and averaging the uncertainty measures
across the respondents of the quarter.
The quarterly measures of forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty are plotted
in Figure 1.4. The two series present different properties in terms of dynamics.
Forecast dispersion is more volatile and it suddenly increases in periods of crises.
This has occurred during the Great Recession (2008-2009), the European Debt Crisis
(2011-2012), and, to a lesser extent, at the time of the 2001 U.S. recession. However,
forecast dispersion reverts to lower levels in “normal” times. Dispersion deflation
took place after all of those crisis episodes. On the other hand, forecast uncertainty
is less volatile, but it had a behavior similar to forecast uncertainty during the
European Debt Crisis and the 2001 recession: it increased and it slowly reverted to
lower levels later on. However, the dynamics of the two measures around the Great
Recession is very different. Forecast uncertainty went through a structural break as a
consequence of the Great Recession. Indeed, the levels of uncertainty has fluctuated
at levels persistently higher than before since 2008-2009. In particular, the “normal”
levels of uncertainty post-European Debt Crises are significantly higher than the
levels of uncertainty observed during the first years of the series.
At this point, it is interesting to explore the correlation between the dynamics
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Figure 1.4: Forecast dispersion and uncertainty
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of the two forecast statistics and the dynamics of sovereign spreads, which is what
a model of sovereign debt and default is ultimately meant to account for. If any
significant correlations are encountered, this exercise will also motivate why we should
not overlook private information in studying sovereign debt. After all, forecasts are
significantly influenced by private information. I explore these correlations by means
of a panel regression in which the dependent variable is the sovereign spread of each
country belonging to the euro area, except Germany. I define the sovereign spread as
the difference between the yield paid by a country’s government bond with five year
maturity and the yield paid by the corresponding German government bond (this
is why Germany is excluded from the sample). Among the independent variables, I
include the forecast dispersion and uncertainty as well as real GDP growth and the
government debt to GDP ratio, which are the typical explanatory factors of spreads
in the existing empirical research on the topic. I control for country fixed effects and
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for quarter effects, to control for any seasonality in the series.
The estimated correlations are reported in Table 1.1. My findings confirm that
Table 1.1: Panel estimates
Dependent: Spread 5 year maturity (basis points)
Debt to GDP (%) 8.236∗∗∗ 8.375∗∗∗ 7.870∗∗∗ 8.632∗∗∗
(1.249) (1.268) (1.344) (1.441)
GDP Growth (%) −64.432∗∗∗ −58.125∗∗∗ −62.671∗∗∗ −58.768∗∗∗
(22.844) (21.867) (23.485) (22.614)
Fct. Dispersion (%) 194.179∗∗ 210.749∗∗
(96.052) (87.082)
Fct. Uncertainty (%) 120.722 -80.932
(206.725) (188.231)
Fixed effects:
Quarter × Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 753 753 753 753
Adj. R-sq. 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Notes. p−value: ∗ < 0.1, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01. Robust standard errors.
spreads tend to increase with the debt to GDP ratio, and they are on average lower
when GDP growth is larger. These are well known stylized facts. The novelty of my
analysis rests on the inclusion of forecast statistics. There is a significant positive
correlation between sovereign spreads and forecast dispersion. Specifically, a one
per cent increase in the dispersion of forecasts is associated with sovereign spreads
that are approximately 200 basis points higher, on average. On the other hand,
forecast uncertainty does not show any significant correlation with the spreads. The
takeaway is that private information has the potential to help us understanding
spread dynamics better, since the level of disagreement among forecasters - forecast
dispersion - is likely explained by differences in the private information they have.
Also, we may try to relate the empirical findings with the theoretical conclusions of
Section 1.2. The model predicts that the price of debt decreases if the dispersion of
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private information increases, for the levels of bid-to-cover ratio typically observed in
Europe. This prediction is consistent with the observed positive correlation between
forecast dispersion and spreads. With regard to the precision of private information,
the model does not have clear-cut predictions of its effect on the price of debt. This
is not at odds with the empirical result that spreads are uncorrelated with forecast
uncertainty, a measure clearly influenced by the precision of private information.
1.3.3 Structural estimation of private information noise
The first step of the estimation strategy is taking the informational structure of the
theoretical setup and deriving the expressions for forecast dispersion and uncertainty
in the model. Let us consider all the investors as forecasters, and let us think at yt as
real GDP growth. Recall that any investor i believes that yt is distributed according
to
yt ∼ N
(
ξit, ω
2
)
.
Hence, investor i’s forecast of yt is the perceived mean
ξit =
σ2y
σ2y + σ
2
x
xit +
σ2x
σ2y + σ
2
x
yˆt.
The dispersion of forecasts across investors is fully accounted for by the dispersion
of signals, σx. Hence, the cross-sectional standard deviation (sd) of forecasts is given
by
sd
(
ξit
)
=
σ2y
σ2y + σ
2
x
σx
in the model. On the other hand, the uncertainty associated with a forecast has been
measured in the data as the average standard deviation of forecasters’ subjective
probability distribution over growth realizations. Clearly, its counterpart in the
model is given by
ω =
(
1
σ2y
+
1
σ2x
)− 1
2
.
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The next step is to use a GMM strategy to estimate the value of σx that minimizes
the distance between the model based and the observed statistics. I slightly modify
the setup by allowing both σx and σy to be time-varying. Let
Gt =
 ˆsd (ξit)− σ2y,tσ2y,t+σ2x,tσx,t
ωˆt −
(
1
σ2y,t
+ 1
σ2x,t
)− 1
2
 ,
where the hat superscript denotes data moments. Then, I estimate σx,t by solving
min
σx,t
G′tWGt
quarter by quarter. I set W equal to a 2 × 2 identity matrix. Obviously, I need to
assign a value to σy,t in each quarter beforehand. I estimate an AR(1) specification
on real GDP growth of the euro area since 1995-Q1, modeling the volatility as an
ARCH(1) process. I set the series of σy,t equal to the series of the conditional volatility
predicted by the empirical model.
The series of σx measured through this strategy is plotted in Figure 1.1, in the
introduction. Not surprisingly, one may recognize that the dynamics of σx shares the
properties of both observed forecast dispersion and observed forecast uncertainty. In
particular, σx peaked during the crises and moved down afterwards, but remained at
levels persistently higher than before since 2008. In order to establish the existence
of a structural break around the Great Recession in a more rigorous way, I perform
statistical test to check significant differences in the mean and variance of σx pre- and
post-2008. I rely on a Welch’s t-test for equality of means and on a F -test for equality
of variances. Table 1.2 summarizes the results of these tests. Both the null hypotheses
that mean and variance are equal before and after 2008 are rejected at standard
significance levels. This evidence supports the thesis that private information noise
experienced a structural break at the time of the Great Recession.
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Table 1.2: Structural break tests
Equality of Means Equality of Variances
Test Stat. 8.0295 2.9555
p-value < 0.0001 0.0007
Notes. Testing equality of moments based on sub-samples pre- and post-2008. The null
hypothesis of each test is that the moments are equal.
1.4 Quantitative analysis
In this section I bring the model to the data, I show that it is able to account for key
statistics of the sovereign spreads in the euro area, and I study the impact of private
information noise on spreads’ dynamics. I start by parametrizing the functional
forms of the model and by giving some details about the algorithm used for the
numerical solution. Then, I explain the way parameter values are assigned. I test
the theory using untargeted moments of the average sovereign spreads in the euro
area between 1999-Q1 and 2018-Q3. Finally, I perform counterfactual exercises to
assess the role of signal noise on sovereign spreads.
1.4.1 Parametrization and numerical algorithm
To solve the model numerically, first I need to define the parametric specification of
the stochastic endowment process, the utility function, and the function h controlling
the direct default costs. I assume that log endowment is serially correlated: It follows
the autoregressive process of order one
yt = ρyt−1 + νt νt ∼ N
(
0, σ2y
)
.
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The intratemporal utility function belongs the the CRRA class:
u (Gt) =
G1−ηt
1− η ,
where the parameter η measures the constant relative risk-aversion of the households,
which the government takes care of. For modeling the direct costs of default in terms
of endowment loss, I adopt the typical assumption in this literature since Arellano
(2008) that default costs are asymmetric. Specifically, let
h(Yt) =
{
Yt if Yt ≤ Y¯
Y¯ if Yt > Y¯
,
for some threshold parameter Y¯ . The implication of this choice is that the cost of
default increases with Yt more than proportionally for endowment levels above the
threshold. Hence, the government’s incentive to default falls quickly when endow-
ment realizations become larger. This helps the model replicating the stylized fact
that defaults tend to occur when the state of the economy is bad.
For the numerical solution, the variables Yt, Bt, and x
i
t are discretized: They
take values from finite grids. The probability distribution induced by the AR(1)
process of endowment is also discretized in a Markov chain. Because of the serial
correlation in endowment, a state consists of the triplet (Yt−1, Yt, Bt). The previous
period endowment is relevant to compute the transition probabilities of the Markov
chain. Also, any state and level of Bt+1 are associated with a specific marginal
investor through the market clearing condition. The marginal investor’s perceived
probability distribution determines the equilibrium price. Hence, I build different
transition probabilities for any signal that may be received by a marginal investor
(recall that the signal only shifts the center of the distribution). The grid lengths for
endowment, debt, and signals are respectively 25, 50, and 1000. The algorithm for the
numerical solution consists of two nested iterations: The first on the pricing function
and the second on the government’ value functions. In practice, for any pricing
function obtained in the last iteration, I iterate over the value functions until they
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converge to a solution conditional on the pricing function. Then, I use the solution
for the value functions to update the pricing function using the zero expected profit
condition for the marginal investor, where the latter differs for anyBt+1 and any state.
I repeat this process until the pricing function reaches convergence. Notice that the
numerical algorithm incorporates the equilibrium concept defined by Proposition 1
and 2: The marginal investor is pinned down by the market clearing condition given
a bidding strategy increasing in signal, and the equilibrium price makes the marginal
investor indifferent.
1.4.2 Calibration
As a first step, I need to define consistent empirical measures for the variables in
my model. Following the existing literature, I choose real GDP as the empirical
counterpart of Yt. This choice poses an issue. In my model, the stochastic process
of yt = log Yt is stationary. On the other hand, I run different statistical tests on log
GDP of the euro area and the conclusion is that this series has a unit root, which
rejects stationarity. In order to reconcile the model with the data, I normalize the
variables of my model as relative to previous period endowment. Hence, the empirical
counterpart of yt = log Yt− log Yt−1 is logGDPt− logGDPt−1, the quarterly growth
of real GDP. With the normalization, any debt level Bt is interpreted as an actual
debt to GDP ratio. In the model, Bt is the amount of debt maturing in each quarter.
Then, the correct measure is not the entire debt to GDP ratio of the euro area in a
given quarter, but rather the maturing debt to GDP ratio. As reported by European
Commission (2018), the average maturity of government debt in the euro area is
6.8 years, or 28 quarters. Hence, approximately 1/28 of the entire stock of debt
is due to reimbursement in each quarter. Let Bˆt denote the quarterly value of the
government debt to annual GDP ratio of the euro area, available from the OECD
database. Assuming that annual GDP is produced homogeneously in the 4 quarters,
the correct measure for Bt is Bˆt/7. The average value of the latter is 10 per cent,
indicating that in each quarter the euro area reimburses liabilities approximately
amounting to 10 per cent of its GDP. Finally, given the normalization, I assume that
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investors’ measure W is constant in relative terms to last period endowment, rather
than in absolute terms. This permits to keep interpreting Bt+1/W as the reciprocal of
the bid-to-ask ratio. In the analysis, I compare model and data statistics of spreads.
With regard to the model, I define the sovereign spread in period t as
sprt =
(
1
qt
− 1
)
− r.
From the data, I build a measure of average sovereign spreads in the euro area by
averaging the spread series of euro area members countries defined in Section 1.3,
weighted by the country’s share of euro area government debt.
In Table 1.3, I display the values assigned to the 9 parameters of my model. The
calibration of 7 of them is disciplined by external statistics, and it does not involve
model simulation. The parameters governing the endowment process are calibrated
Table 1.3: Calibration of parameters
Parameter Value Target
Endowment process Real GDP in euro area
ρ 0.643
σy 0.43%
Government preferences
η 2.000 Standard in literature
β 0.897 Debt service to GDP
Default costs
λ 0.062 Length of bailout programs
Y¯ /E(Y ) 0.990 Historical default probability
Risk-free interest rate
r 0.007 Yield of German government bond
Measure of investors
W 0.230 Bid-to-cover ratio
Signal noise
σx 0.12% ECB SPF statistics
based on the estimates of an AR(1) model fitted on quarterly real GDP growth of
the euro area, between 1995-Q1 and 2018-Q3. The persistence of the process is
controlled by the parameter ρ, set at 0.64, and the volatility σy is set equal to 0.43
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per cent. The risk-free rate r is measured as the average quarterly yield of a German
government bond with a five year residual maturity, between 1999-Q1 and 2014-Q4 (I
cut the horizon shorter to avoid the effects of the ECB’s asset purchasing program).
This value is 0.7 per cent. The value 0.23 of W targets an average bid-to-cover ratio
of 1.9, based on data reported by Beetsma et al. (2018), given an average maturing
debt to GDP ratio of 10 per cent. The parameter λ represents the probability that
the government is readmitted to the financial markets after a default. As a target,
I take the average length of the financial assistance programs put in place for the
bail-out of five euro area countries between 2010 and 2018. The average length of
these programs has been 16 quarters. A value of λ equal to 6.2 percent insures
that the average government’s exclusion from markets lasts 16 periods. The risk-
aversion parameter η is set equal to 2, as standard in this literature. The parameter
constituting the novelty of my framework - the signal noise parameter σx - takes the
average value of the private information noise measured in Section 1.3 and displayed
in Figure 1.1, that is 0.12 percent. Finally, the calibration of the last two parameters
- the discount factor β and the threshold Y¯ - is based on model simulation, in order
that model predictions match the average maturing debt to GDP ratio of 10 per
cent and a default probability of 0.15 per cent. I compute the latter based on the
historical data of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), considering the default frequency of
the euro area member countries since 1900 (war time defaults excluded). As a result,
calibrated parameters are β = 0.897 and Y¯ = 0.99E(Y ). The performance of the
model with respect to the targeted moments is reported in the upper panel of Table
1.4.
1.4.3 Test of the theory
Let us judge the model by verifying if it can account for some statistics in the data.
I base the test on untargeted moments summarizing important properties of the
sovereign spreads’ dynamics. In particular, I consider spreads’ mean and volatility,
and the correlation between spreads, GDP growth, and maturing debt to GDP ratio.
Table 1.4 presents a comparison between these moments as computed in the data and
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as resulting from model simulation. Overall, the model is successful in accounting
Table 1.4: Moments - Simulation vs. Data
Simulation Data
Targeted moments
m(Bt) - Avg. Maturing Debt to GDP 9% 10%
Probability of Default 0.12% 0.15%
Other moments
m(sprt) - Avg. Spread 11 bps 16 bps
sd(sprt) - Std. Dev. Spread 0.24% 0.18%
ρ(sprt, yt) - Corr. Spread, GDP growth −0.38 −0.28
ρ(sprt, Bt) - Corr. Spread, Maturing Debt to GDP 0.13 0.27
for the key statistics of sovereign spreads in the euro area. In particular, the model
does a good job in terms of spreads’ mean and standard deviation, by predicting an
average level of spreads of 11 basis points (16 in the data) and spreads’ volatility
equal to 0.24 per cent (0.18 per cent in the data). With regard to the correlations,
the model is slightly imprecise in quantitative terms, but it is able to capture the
negative correlation between spreads and GDP growth, and the positive correlation
between spreads and maturing debt to GDP ratio.
I want to highlight the volatility of spreads obtained from the simulations. A well
known problem with the standard model of sovereign debt and default is that it
hardly generates enough spread volatility, as compared to the data. In their chap-
ter for the Handbook of Macroeconomics, Aguiar, Chatterjee, Cole, and Stangebye
(2016) discuss this point with some examples, showing that the standard model
underestimates the spread volatility experienced in Mexico even if it features asym-
metric default costs. On the other hand, Arellano (2008) shows that this type of
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costs is sufficient to capture the spread volatility of Argentina. According to Aguiar
et al. (2016), the cause of the failure has to be identified in the low volatility of
endowment, reflecting the relative stability of the Mexican economy with respect to
Argentina. The present volatility of endowment is also quite low, being calibrated
to relatively stable advanced economies. Nevertheless, the model is able to generate
a level of spread volatility in fact larger than the one observed in the data. The
only component making the present model really different from the ones in the cited
studies is the incomplete information. Hence, this is a preliminary indication that
including noisy private information in the model amplifies the volatility of spreads.
I will address this point more in depth when I discuss the counterfactual exercise.
1.4.4 Properties of the numerical solution
Before moving to the counterfactual experiment, I present and discuss some prop-
erties of the equilibrium solved numerically. Figure 1.5 visualizes a partition of the
state space {(Yt, Bt)} depending on whether a default occurs in each state (Yt, Bt).
The third state variable, Yt−1, has been averaged out using the invariant probability
distribution associated with the actual Markov chain of Yt. The properties of the
default region are similar to the ones obtained in existing quantitative applications
of this class of models. A default is more likely for lower levels of Yt, i.e. govern-
ments tend to default during recessions, which is a fact supported by a vast empirical
evidence. Also, there is a quite narrow interval of debt levels for which a default is
neither excluded nor expected with certainty. These levels are between 9 per cent
and 14 per cent of GDP approximately. However, this narrowness does not seem in
contrast to the findings of similar research, for instance Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
The solution of the policy function B′ (Yt−1, Bt) is pictured in Figure 1.6, where
the first state variable is again averaged out using the invariant probability. Notice
that, for low levels of Bt, on average the government chooses to accumulate more
debt. On the other hand, when outstanding debt becomes excessively large, the
government has a strong incentive to deleverage its passive position. As a result,
in the long run the maturing debt to GDP ratio is expected to fluctuate within a
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Figure 1.5: Default region
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neighborhood of 9 per cent. Notice that the latter corresponds to the upper level of
Bt for which there is a zero probability of default. Hence, these properties suggest
that the government tends to dislike risky debt positions, probably because they are
heavily discounted with lower prices by the investors. If the outstanding debt has an
even small probability of default, the government scales it down toward debt levels
perceived as safer. In light of this behavior of the government, it is not surprising
that the model predicts low average spreads (11 bps) and low probability of default
(0.12 per cent), in coherence with the data.
Let us consider the numerical solution of the pricing function. In the quantitative
applications of the standard model, the equilibrium price of Bt+1 is usually a function
of Bt+1 itself and Yt, to the extent that the latter is informative about next period
endowment because of serial correlation. In the present setup, the pricing function
has four arguments: Yt−1, Yt, Bt and Bt+1. The first and last ones have the same
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Figure 1.6: Policy function
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
Bt
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
B
t+
1
role as Yt and Bt+1 in the traditional pricing function (Yt−1 matters only because
of serial correlation). The novelty of this pricing function rests on the role of the
arguments Yt and Bt, absent in the traditional pricing function. Here, Yt does not
matter for the equilibrium price because of its informational content. Indeed, neither
the government nor the investors are aware of Yt when the price is set. However,
Yt determines the center of the signals’ distribution, which pins down the marginal
investor through the market clearing condition. Hence, Yt has an impact on the price
of debt by affecting the selection of the marginal investor’s signal. The effects of Yt
on the price of debt are showed in Figure 1.7. In this figure, the pricing function
is plotted against values of Bt+1. Again, the argument Yt−1 is averaged out using
the invariant probability distribution. Maturing debt to GDP ratio Bt is set at
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Figure 1.7: Pricing function - Changing current endowment
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the average level of 9 per cent, and different realizations of current endowment are
considered. As Yt falls, the pricing function moves leftwards: For the same Bt+1
the price is lower or, at best, unchanged. The intuition is straightforward. Being
the center of the signals’ distribution, a decrease in Yt means that the entire mass of
signals is displaced toward lower levels. On average, all investors are more pessimistic,
and so does the marginal investor. On turn, this depresses the equilibrium price.
Also, outstanding debt Bt is a new argument of the pricing function. This result
is driven by the assumptions a` la Cole and Kehoe (2000) of the present model.
A default may occur only after investors have purchased Bt+1, and these investors
will suffer a loss if default indeed occurs. Given that the amount of Bt is key in
establishing the probability of a default at time t, this becomes a relevant variable
in pricing Bt+1. Figure 1.8 plots pricing functions similar to those of Figure 1.7,
but instead I fix Yt at its average level and I consider two different levels of Bt.
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For any level of Bt+1, the equilibrium price is lower when the maturing debt Bt is
Figure 1.8: Pricing function - Changing outstanding debt
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larger. Clearly, a larger Bt increases the chances of a default in the current period,
and this reduces the equilibrium price of Bt+1. A more interesting result is that,
for large enough Bt, the pricing function becomes non-monotonic in Bt+1. In this
aspect, the present pricing function is remarkably different from the traditional one.
In the standard models, the pricing function is monotonically decreasing in Bt+1,
since the probability of a default on Bt+1 is monotonically increasing in Bt+1. The
last assertion is valid also in the present setup, as one might infer from the shape of
the default region in Figure 1.5: Low values of Bt+1 create less incentives for a default
in period t+ 1. However, low values of Bt+1 mean less resources and less spending in
period t, and that actually creates more incentives to default in the current period.
As a consequence, the price of Bt+1 decreases. In summary, the intuition is that a
safe level of Bt+1 should be low enough to reduce the chances of a default in the next
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period, but also large enough to minimize the risk of a default in the current period.
To conclude the discussion about the pricing function, I want to point out the sharp
steepness over some intermediate debt levels. These levels roughly correspond to the
interval of Bt with probability of default strictly in (0, 1), described when discussing
the default region. When Bt+1 leaves the safe region with boundary at 9 per cent and
moves to the right, the price tumbles very quickly. Investors appear really sensitive
to the size of Bt+1 and they discount a lot the risk coming with larger debt issuance.
This behavior explains the government’s choice of low risk debt discussed above.
Facing borrowing conditions becoming quickly harsher, the government is better off
by remaining at debt levels perceived as safe by the investors.
1.4.5 The amplification effect of private information noise
Having established that the model gives a good representation of the actual spread
dynamics, we can use it as a lab environment for experiments. By means of a coun-
terfactual exercise, I intend to establish if and how the level of private information
noise affects the pricing of government debt, and thus the sovereign spread (recall
that the model predictions derived analytically are ambiguous). In practice, I use
the model to answer the following question: How different would the spread statis-
tics have looked, had the private information noise remained at the level prevailing
before the Great recession? In essence, I exploit the structural break occurred after
2008 in my measurement of private information noise in the euro area, and I explore
how different the model simulations look like under the hypothesis that there is no
structural break. This exercise also sheds light on the contribution of the increase in
private information noise toward the spread dynamics observed during the European
Debt Crisis.
In the counterfactual experiment, I simulate the model keeping all the parameter
values as in the baseline model but one: Signal noise σx, which is set at the pre-
2008 average level of 0.10 per cent. I seed the random number generator in such a
way that the realizations of endowment shocks in the counterfactual simulations are
identical to those used to generate the baseline simulations. Hence, any difference
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between the counterfactual and baseline simulations is entirely driven by the change
in σx. Table 2.5 shows the key spread statistics obtained from the counterfactual
simulations along with the baseline statistics from Table 1.4. Under the counterfac-
Table 1.5: Moments - Simulation vs. Data
Baseline Counterfactual
σx = 0.12% σx = 0.10% Change %
m(sprt) 11 bps 8 bps −27.3%
sd(sprt) 0.24% 0.22% −8.3%
ρ(sprt, yt) −0.38 −0.28 −26.3%
ρ(sprt, Bt) 0.13 0.07 −46.1%
Probability of Default 0.12% 0.09% −25%
tual hypothesis, the values of all statistics are slightly less than the baseline ones.
In absolute terms, the differences are small, and this is not surprising: The baseline
values of spread mean and volatility are already quite little in the first place, and
the counterfactual shift in σx is also very small. Taking this into consideration, we
should read the counterfactual findings in relative terms, as summarized in the third
column of the table. The percent changes are not minimal. If private information
noise had remained at pre-2008 levels, the euro area sovereign spreads would have
been 27 per cent lower and less volatile by 8 per cent. These findings demonstrate
that there exist an amplification effect on spreads, stemming from the noise in private
information. Interestingly, with less noisy information, spreads are also less sensitive
to GDP growth shocks and movements in the debt to GDP ratio. Indeed, in the
counterfactual simulations the correlation between spread and GDP growth is 26 per
cent lower and the correlation between spread and maturing debt to GDP ratio falls
by 46 per cent, with respect to the baseline moments. Finally, the overall probability
of default is lower when private information is less noisy: With the counterfactual
σx, defaults are 25 per cent less frequent than in the baseline case.
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In summary, the takeaway of the counterfactual experiment is that there exists
an amplification effect of private information noise on sovereign spreads. With lower
private information noise, sovereign spreads are on average smaller, less volatile, and
less sensitive to fundamental shocks. The default probability is also lower. These
conclusions have important policy implications. As an extra tool to reduce sovereign
risk, a fiscal or monetary authority should focus on dissipating the noise of private
information. Releasing more transparent and more reliable public information seems
an effective strategy, to the extent that precise public information is able to “crowd
out” noisy private information. The findings have implications for investing too. The
profitability of investing in sovereign debt does not depend only on the realizations
of random events, but also on the general disagreement about the likelihood of such
events among investors. This is the essential consequence of incomplete information:
Agents find themselves in a global game, characterized by strategic complementari-
ties. Therefore, a successful investor in the sovereign market should not only gather
as much private information as possible, to have the best forecast of the state of the
economy, but she should also get a sense of how different her view is from that of
other investors, since this is in itself a determinant of sovereign debt pricing.
1.4.6 Sensitivity of simulations to information parameters
In the next paragraphs, I intend to deepen the analysis of what happens to the spread
statistics simulated by my model when the properties of information change. First,
I focus on private information noise, and on its dual role of defining dispersion and
precision of private information. Then, I explore a different assumption about the
information which is common to both the government and the investors, specifically
the knowledge of the actual stochastic process of endowment. I suppose agents’
believes about endowment volatility depart from the actual one and I investigate the
effect of changing in these believes on model simulations.
To study the sensitivity of model simulation to private information noise, I con-
sider a grid of fifty values of σx, contained within the extremes of my measurement
(0.084 per cent and 0.245 per cent respectively). I repeat the simulation of the model
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varying the value of the parameter in question over this grid, recording the spread
statistics and other variables of interest. Figure 1.9 displays the relation between
the simulation results and the values of σx, whereby the pairs of signal noise and
simulation result values are also smoothed using a polynomial approximation2. It
appears clear that my model captures a hump-shaped relation between the level of
private information noise and all the aggregates considered, which are the long run
average level and volatility of sovereign spreads, the average of maturing debt to
GDP ratio, and the default probability. As signal noise increases, the government
holds more debt on average. Not surprisingly, this calls for a larger default proba-
bility and a higher average level of spreads. However, when σx becomes very large,
the trend is reverted: The average stock of debt is reduced, and both spreads and
default probability falls with it. Notice that spread volatility follows the same dy-
namic. Why does the government’s borrowing decision react in such non-monotonic
fashion to signal noise? A hint is to be found in the last panel of Figure 1.9, giving
a representation of the equilibrium pricing function for each σx value in the grid
considered. For each of these values, I solve numerically my model and I quantify
the “average” equilibrium price by a) setting the previous period endowment at the
unconditional mean and the outstanding debt at the average maturing debt to GDP
ratio in the data, b) averaging out the levels of current endowment using the invari-
ant probability distribution, c) computing the average of equilibrium prices over the
range of debt levels obtained in the various simulations. In this way, the plot gives
an idea of how signal noise influence the terms of borrowing faced on average by
the government. Also in this case, we notice a slightly hump-shaped relation, which
reflect the conflicting forces uncovered when discussing the comparative statics of the
model. Hence, we observe that the government increases (reduces) its stock of debt
whenever the terms of borrowing improve (deteriorate). Interestingly, the impact on
the spread level induced by the change in the amount of debt offsets the opposite
effect associated with movements in the terms of borrowing.
We may want to see whether in the data there is evidence in support of a hump-
2The simulation findings have discontinuous patterns, due to numerical reasons. In light of this,
I choose to use a smoothing technique
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Figure 1.9: Signal Noise and Model Simulations
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shaped relation between spread levels and private information noise. To this purpose,
I compare the averages of observed spreads and measured noise for well-defined sub-
periods of my data: The Great Recession, the European Debt Crisis, and the quarters
before, after and in-between these events. A graphical representation of this exercise
is provided for in Figure 1.10, along with the hump-shaped curve already showed
in the first panel of Figure 1.9. Similar to the findings from model simulations,
Figure 1.10: Signal Noise and Spread: Model Simulations vs. Data
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the sub-period averages suggest the existence of a non-monotonic relation between
sovereign spreads and private information noise in the data as well. In particular,
the largest spread level has been observed during the European Debt Crisis, a period
characterized by a medium size of noise. On the other hand, private information
noise reached its maximum during the Great Recession, when the spread has been
larger than in the previous quarters but below the levels reached afterwards. In non-
crisis periods, both spreads and noise levels have been generally small. However,
the comparison between model simulations and the averages in the data should be
taken with a grain of salt. Indeed, the former refers to equilibrium predictions of
the model in the long run, while the latter are averages over short periods of time
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that can hardly be seen as stationary. Nevertheless, I think that the exercise and
the findings are evocative.
In Section 1.2, I have described the peculiar dual role the signal noise σx plays
in the model. One the one hand, this parameter controls how dispersed the private
signals are among the investors. On the other, it characterizes the precision of
private information and, consequently, the weight investors attach to it in forming
their expectations. I want to highlight the specific contribution of each of these
aspects in driving the hump-shaped relation evidenced in the previous paragraph.
To this end, I do the following. First, in the numerical solution I vary the value of
σx over the grid defined above only where it affects the distribution of signals and
the selection of the marginal investor, but I keep the value of σx as in the calibration
of Table 1.3 where the moments of investors’ perceived probability distributions are
defined. Then, I do the opposite, changing σx where it affects the perceived moments
and keeping it at the baseline value where it matters for the dispersion of signals.
Let us consider how σx affects model simulations through the dispersion channel.
Figure 1.11 shows a summary of the findings, in the same fashion of Figure 1.9. We
immediately see that the hump-shaped relation is not present. Instead, the average
levels of spread and maturing debt to GDP ratio are monotonically associated to
the extent of signal dispersion. Also in this case, it appears that the mechanism
leading to these results is moved by the average terms of borrowing. As visible in
the last panel, the average equilibrium price strictly increases with signals’ dispersion,
inducing the government to accumulate more debt. However, the level of spread falls
even though the stock of debt increases, hinting that the improvement in the terms
of borrowing is not offset by the extra borrowing. This is reflected also in the fact
that the default probability is decreasing in signals’ dispersion as well. Nevertheless,
it seems that the larger stock of debt eventually generates a higher spread volatility.
When signals’ precision in considered, the findings are rather different, as pictured
in Figure 1.12. The average spread level has a hump-shaped relation with precision,
which is mirrored by the probability of default and the spread volatility. The average
terms of borrowing and the average maturing debt to GDP ratio show, with some
approximation, a co-movement similar to the one described above, although on the
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Figure 1.11: Signal Dispersion and Model Simulations
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Figure 1.12: Signal Precision and Model Simulations
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opposite direction. The equilibrium price tend to decrease as private information
becomes more imprecise, and overall the government follows this decline by reducing
the stock of debt. In summary, the hump-shaped sensitivity of model simulations
to signal noise is a synthesis of the sensitivity to private information dispersion and
precision. With regard to terms of borrowing and debt stock, the latter channels
operate in opposite directions: An increase in dispersion (precision) induces better
(worse) terms of borrowing and more (less) borrowing. The hump-shaped relation in
the third and fourth panels of Figure 1.9 is given by the balance of these channels. On
the other hand, the hump-shaped relation of average level and volatility of spread,
and default probability with signal noise appears mainly driven by the precision
channel, which dominates over the different effect of signals’ dispersion.
At this point I change the focus of the analysis, departing from the private infor-
mation noise. Instead, I entertain the possibility that both the government and the
investors do not know exactly the actual probability distribution of endowment. In
particular, I assume they hold the belief that endowment volatility is σˆy, potentially
different from the actual volatility σy. Hence, both the government and the investors
have a prior view that log endowment yt is distributed according to
yt ∼ N
(
yˆt, σˆ
2
y
)
.
I experiment by varying the value of σˆy over a fifty-point grid and looking at the
implications for model simulations. Notice that a change in σˆy modifies government’s
expectations about endowment realizations and investors’ perceived probability dis-
tributions. However, the generation of random endowment paths in simulating the
model reflects the actual endowment volatility σy, which is kept fixed at the value
of Table 1.3. Figure 1.13 presents the findings of model simulation sensitivity to σˆy.
One can see that average level and volatility of spread and default probability are de-
creasing in the level of perceived endowment volatility. The borrowing terms and the
average debt to GDP ratio follow an approximately hump-shaped path with respect
to σˆy, in general respecting the regularity that better (worse) terms of borrowing are
associated with more (less) government debt. To reconcile the patterns of average
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Figure 1.13: Prior Volatility and Model Simulations
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spread and default probability with those of debt to GDP ratio and equilibrium price,
it should be the case that, as initially the latter two increase, the improvement in
the terms of borrowing dominates the enlargement of the stock of debt, leading to
less risk of default and lower spread on average. On the other hand, when the terms
of borrowing deteriorate, the debt de-leveraging by the government is strong enough
to avoid an increase in default probability and spreads.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter fills a gap in the theoretical and quantitative literature of sovereign debt
and default by studying the impact of incomplete information, i.e. the existence of
noisy private information, on the pricing of sovereign debt. The main conclusion is
that the effects of the noise in private information on the average level and volatility
of sovereign spreads have a hump-shaped fashion. For low initial levels, an increase
in private information noise amplifies spread level and volatility, increasing the risk
of default. However, when noise is very large, a further increase reduces spreads
and spread volatility. This result is mainly driven by how the equilibrium pricing
of government debt reacts to changes in private information noise. Intuitively, an
increase in dispersion and imprecision of private information is self-defeating, because
investors attach less weight to it in forming their expectations. These findings have
important implications from the point of view of a government that intends to reduce
its borrowing cost, and for an investor aiming at maximizing the expected return from
purchasing sovereign debt.
With regard to the theoretical contributions of this chapter, I propose a way to
introduce incomplete information in an otherwise standard infinite-horizon model of
sovereign debt and default. I discuss under which conditions there exists a unique
equilibrium, as opposed to the multiplicity of equilibria resulting in this class of
models with complete information. Quantitatively, the inclusion of incomplete infor-
mation enables my model to generate a level of spread volatility consistent with the
data, something on which standard models with complete information has generally
50
failed.
From an empirical standpoint, I propose and implement a structural methodology
to measure the level of private information noise from observed forecast data. Based
on the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters, this method delivers a time series
of noise with interesting properties. First, private information noise spikes when
the economy is in a bad state. Second, the Great Recession caused a structural
break in the series: Private information noise in the euro area remained at levels
persistently larger than the pre-2008 average ones. I think this latter finding is in
its own very relevant, regardless the application in the present context. It should
definitely deserve further research, to better understand its origin and its different
implications.
In this chapter, private information is modeled in a simple reduced form: Exoge-
nous signals, which are right on average but individually noisy. The next step may
be that of modeling a more realistic process of information acquisition and learning.
An ambitious but interesting extension may see not only the level of noise influencing
the pricing of debt, but also the latter as well as the realization of endowment af-
fecting on the noise itself, creating en endogenous feedback effect that might explain
noise and spread co-movements.
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CHAPTER 2
WHY IS EUROPE FALLING BEHIND?
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND
SERVICES’ PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE U.S.
Joint work with Luis Felipe Sa´enz and Joao B. Duarte
2.1 Introduction
Labor productivity in Europe has been falling behind the United States since the be-
ginning of the 1990s, reversing a previously observed pattern of convergence between
these two economies. Figure 2.1 illustrates how this process of catch-up came to a
halt and later even reversed for the majority of the European countries. Average an-
nual labor productivity (measured as GDP per hour of work) in the U.S. accelerated
from 1.3 per cent in the 1970-1990 period to 1.7 per cent from 1990 to 2009 while the
European countries on average experienced a labor productivity growth slowdown
between these two time periods from 2.9 per cent to 1.5 per cent. The divergence is
a combination of the U.S. taking off together with a European slowdown.
During this period, these economies underwent large scale sectoral reallocations of
labor in a process commonly known as structural transformation (Kuznets (1957);
Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014)). With Europe and the U.S. at their
later stages of structural transformation (the so-called post-industrial era), labor has
reallocated further away both from agriculture and manufacturing toward services.
As Duarte and Restuccia (2010) suggest, through the lenses of structural transfor-
mation it is possible to conclude that the service sector is responsible for most cases
of relative stagnation in aggregate productivity observed at later stages of develop-
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Figure 2.1: Relative aggregate labor productivity
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GDP per hour worked relative to the United States. We used GDP per capita measures from the
Maddison Project to measure the PPP-adjusted aggregate labor productivity of each European
economy relative to the U.S. for 1970. Then, we used the World KLEMS to compute the
remainder of the time series with annualized growth rates of aggregate labor productivity.
ment since almost no other country experienced the productivity gains in the service
sector witnessed in the U.S.
We believe that it is crucial to break down the service sector in order to understand
the relative under-performance of Europe vis-a´-vis the U.S. Services constitute the
predominant (and growing) sector for the vast majority of advanced economies, and
the lack of labor productivity gains in this sector is an increasing cause of concern
for long-run economic growth. In this chapter, we put forth a theory of structural
transformation and decompose the service sector into sub-sectors comparable across
Europe and the U.S. to investigate how changes in labor allocations brought by
changes in sectoral productivity explain the (relative) slowdown of the European
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aggregate labor productivity.
First, using the World KLEMS database, we decompose services into 11 compa-
rable sub-sectors1. We document that the reallocation of labor toward the various
types of services has followed similar patterns both in Europe and the U.S. Moti-
vated by these facts, we develop a theoretical model of structural transformation
that combines the CES non-homothetic preferences crafted by Comin, Lashkari, and
Mestieri (2015) with production functions whose unique input is labor, as in Duarte
and Restuccia (2010). Our model economy includes a total of 13 sectors: agriculture,
manufacturing, and the 11 service sub-sectors. We calibrate the model to account
for the the U.S. development experience, and we then use it to measure comparable
sectoral labor productivity levels for the 13 sectors in all the European countries of
our sample. The tests for our theory are based on the model’s capacity to explain the
structural transformation in Europe and the U.S. as well as the relative differences
in aggregate productivity. We show that the model is quantitatively able to repro-
duce the labor allocation in the vast majority of the sectors in all countries, and the
main stylized fact presented in Figure 2.1. We perform counterfactual experiments to
identify which services have been dragging down the aggregate labor productivity in
Europe, and last, we empirically explore our country-sector panel measures of labor
productivity levels to assess the importance of various input factors in determining
the performance of services’ labor productivity of Europe relative to the U.S. In
particular, we decompose the levels of relative sectoral labor productivity measured
with our model into the contributions stemming from sectoral physical and informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) capital to labor ratios, and sectoral total
factor productivity (TFP).
Our quantitative experiment suggests substantial differences in sectoral labor pro-
ductivity of services between Europe and the U.S. The European countries are in
generally more productive than the U.S. in communication, education, real estate,
and health services. However, the European countries are less productive in whole-
sale and retail trade and business services, with sectoral labor productivity levels of
approximately 20 per cent of that of the U.S. Led by our counterfactual experiments,
1We classify these sectors according to the ISIC Rev. 3 at one digit level.
54
we identify wholesale and retail trade, business services, and, to a lesser extent, finan-
cial services as the sectors responsible for most of the divergence in aggregate labor
productivity between Europe and the U.S. We find that if Europe had experienced
the same gains in labor productivity as the U.S. in wholesale and retail trade and
business services alone since 1990, it would have had a 3.2 per cent and a 2.4 per
cent higher aggregate labor productivity in 2009, respectively. In fact, if Europe had
caught up with the U.S. in the labor productivity of wholesale and retail trade and
business services by 2009, the aggregate labor productivity in Europe would have
been 25.8 per cent and 17.1 per cent higher, respectively. We also show that if the
European financial services had caught up with the U.S. in terms of labor produc-
tivity by 2009, the gains on aggregate labor productivity would have been only 1.5
per cent.
Why the labor productivity in wholesale and retail trade and business services
had a poor performance in Europe? We find that most of the productivity gap in
the various services between Europe and the U.S. is accounted for by differences in
sectoral TFP. This is particularly relevant in wholesale and retail trade and business
services, where relative sectoral TFP represents, on average, approximately 90 per
cent of relative sectoral labor productivity. These two sectors had the lowest average
levels of relative sectoral TFP between 1990 and 2009 among all the services, and
these levels kept falling over this period. In addition, we find that during the years of
the falling behind (1990-2009) the level of physical and ICT capital endowment per
hour worked in Europe, relative to the U.S., fell significantly in the service sector.
This fact clearly contributed to the lower level of services’ labor productivity of
Europe compared to the U.S. We identify that the fall in ICT to labor ratio hurt
more the productivity of wholesale and retail trade and business services. While
employment in these two sectors increased between 1990 and 2009 in Europe even
faster than in the U.S., the level of sectoral ICT utilization actually decreased in
comparison to the U.S., dragging down the labor productivity in these services.
Our first contribution is to document comparable disagreggated services’ labor re-
allocation and labor productivity dynamics across Europe and the U.S. We classify
services industries from the World KLEMS data into eleven sectors that are com-
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parable across a large set of European countries and the U.S. Thus, we extend the
Timmer, Vries, and de Vries (2014) database on productivity from 5 to 11 service
industries for selected European countries and the U.S. Our documentation of labor
reallocation within the service sector is in line with the explanation of the rise in ser-
vices due to the marketization of home production, as shown by Buera and Kaboski
(2012) and also thanks to an important expansion in services oriented to businesses.
Our second contribution is to show that shift-share analysis would underestimate
(overestimate) the effect of productivity gains in wholesale and retail trade (business
services) on aggregate productivity. In the workhorse models of structural transfor-
mation, the labor allocation across sectors is responsive to changes in the level of
income and to changes in the sectoral relative productivity. As productivity changes,
shifts in the sectors’ employment shares occurs endogenously. Our model accounts
for these general equilibrium effects. Hence, our identification of the relevance of
sectoral labor productivity levels based on model counterfactuals incorporates the
endogenous changes in labor shares deriving from considering alternative productiv-
ity paths. In this respect, we argue that our approach is superior to other quantitative
methods, such as shift-share analysis, in which changes in sectoral labor shares and
sectoral labor productivity cannot be studied simultaneously. Indeed we show that
the endogenous changes in sectors’ weights, i.e. labor shares, resulting from our
counterfactual analysis are significant, thus, we show that counterfactuals that disre-
gard general equilibrium effects on labor shares are biased. For instance, in contrast
to Timmer, Inklaar, O’Mahony, and van Ark (2011), we find that manufacturing
productivity growth does not have a sizable impact on aggregate productivity, that
business services had much more important role, and that financial services had a
smaller role in the slowdown of the European relative aggregate labor productivity.
This chapter is related primarily to the literature of structural transformation that
dates back to the works of Kuznets (1957) who documented the sweeping changes
across the different industries in the process of economic development. More recent
contributions to structural change build upon the works of Kongsamut, Rebelo, and
Xie (2001) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007) who emphasized the role of income and
sector-biased productivity channels respectively as the drivers of structural trans-
56
formation. Several attempts have been made to incorporate both mechanisms in
a single framework, such as Buera and Kaboski (2009) and Duarte and Restuccia
(2010) among many others.2 Our chapter uses the long-run Engel curves proposed
by Comin et al. (2015) to study productivity differences in the service sector in a
framework where labor is the unique production input, and shows that the model
is quantitatively successful in capturing the structural transformation across most
sectors and countries in our sample.
The widening of the productivity gap between Europe and the U.S. that occurred
in the last decades has been the focus of many past studies. The large majority of this
literature has studied productivity growth, rather than levels, and relied on growth
accounting techniques and shift-share analysis. van Ark, Inklaar, and McGuckin
(2003), Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark (2008), and Timmer et al. (2011) identify
ICT as a main source of problems for labor productivity in Europe, providing evi-
dence that both ICT-producing and ICT-utilizing sectors performed badly in Europe
compared to the U.S. The different approach to ICT utilization between Europe and
the U.S., and its effects on labor productivity, is the main point of Bloom, Sadun, and
Van Reenen (2012) too. Relative to these studies, we show empirically that the lack
of physical capital investment also played an important role in explaining the pro-
ductivity level gaps between Europe and the U.S. The diversity in levels of sectoral
productivity across countries is also treated by Lewis (2005), based on the case-study
analysis of the McKinsey Global Institute. The conclusion of Lewis (2005) is that
market regulations have been a much greater obstacle to competition in Europe than
in the U.S., and a major factor in creating productivity differences. The role of regu-
lation on labor productivity is also the focus of Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Crafts
(2006), and Cette, Lopez, and Mairesse (2016). In this chapter, given our findings
on the crucial role played by TFP differences in explaining labor productivity gaps,
we cannot rule out the relevance of regulation in explaining labor productivity dif-
ferences found by these previous studies. However, we highlight the need of more
detailed data on services regulation measures and a better understanding of how
2For a detailed survey of the literature of structural change see Matsuyama (2008) and
Herrendorf et al. (2014).
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regulation affects competition in services.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the main styl-
ized facts of structural transformation within services. Section 2.3 develops a simple
conceptual framework that extends the structural transformation model of Comin et
al. (2015) to include service sub-sectors. Section 2.4 calibrates the baseline model.
Section 2.5 uses the calibrated model to measure the first period levels of sectoral
productivity in Europe and tests the model predictions against the data. Section 2.6
presents the counterfactual exercises that quantify the relevance of each sector in ag-
gregate labor productivity. Section 2.7 explores the components of services’ sectoral
labor productivity levels, and how they contributed to forming the productivity gap
between Europe and the U.S. Finally, Section 2.8 provides the concluding remarks.
2.2 Facts on a Disaggregated Service Sector
We use the World KLEMS3 data on hours worked and value added to document
both the process of labor reallocation and the labor productivity growth of disag-
gregated service industries. We make use of the International Standard Industry
Classification (ISIC) Rev. 3 at the two digits level to classify thirteen comparable
sectors. We aggregate agriculture and manufacturing in the same way these sectors
are aggregated in past studies in which the analysis is restricted to three sectors4.
However, our data allows us to disaggregate the service sector into eleven different
comparable sub-services.
Country-wise, our objective is to have the most disaggregated service sector pos-
sible comparable across the largest set of European countries and the U.S. To reach
this goal given data constraints, we restrict our sample to nine countries from 1970 to
2009. The countries that meet our selection criteria in this chapter are Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S. Table 2.1 presents the most disaggregated service sectors’ classification possible
3For more details see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
4See for instance Duarte and Restuccia (2010).
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in order to have comparable measures across the European countries with the U.S.
In the quantitative section and in our counterfactual experiments, for comparison
purposes between Europe and the U.S. we often discuss European averages. By this
we mean the average of the eight European economies weighted by their GDP size.
All data are trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter
λ = 100.
2.2.1 Service Sector Structural Transformation
Our data on labor shares from 1970 to 2009 for the European economies and the
U.S. show that the employment in these economies is dominated by services, as
these countries during our sample period have experienced a large reallocation of
labor from both agriculture and manufacturing into services. We are interested in
Table 2.1: Sectors’ classification
Code Name Section
agr Agriculture, hunting and forestry A
Fishing B
man Mining and quarrying C
Manufacturing D
Electricity, gas, and water supply E
Construction F
trd Wholesale and retail trade G
rst Hotels and restaurants H
trs Transport and storage I(60-63)
com Post and telecommunication I(64)
fin Financial intermediation J
res Real estate activities K(70)
bss Renting and business activities K(71-74)
gov Public administration and defense L
edu Education M
hlt Health and social work N
per Other community, social and personal activities O
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Table 2.2: Structural transformation within services
Emp. Share in Europe: 1970 Emp. Share in Europe: 2009
Sector % Relative Sector % Relative
1 trd 13.53 0.97 bss 14.99 1.08
2 gov 6.14 0.81 trd 14.79 1.09
3 hlt 4.46 0.39 hlt 9.33 0.54
4 trs 4.08 1.18 per 6.98 1.03
5 per 4.04 1.01 gov 6.46 2.08
6 bss 3.91 0.61 rst 5.34 0.81
7 edu 3.19 0.49 edu 5.33 0.68
8 rst 3.05 0.78 trs 4.48 1.32
9 fin 2.05 0.59 fin 2.99 0.68
10 com 1.63 0.6 com 1.39 0.87
11 res 0.36 0.45 res 1.00 0.74
Services’ employment shares in Europe – absolute and relative to the U.S. – for the first and last
year of our sample.
documenting if there is an historical pattern in the way labor is allocated within
services. Our goal then is to document the labor allocation taking place within
services.
Our disaggregated services’ data on labor shares suggest that with the exception
of communication and government, there is a systematic rise in the labor share of
all service industries; additionally, the employment in health and business services is
growing faster than services as a whole.
Table 2.2 presents the average sectoral labor shares of services for the European
average and how these labor shares compare relative to the U.S. in the first and
last years of our sample. Between the two periods, all service industries increased
their labor share, except communication in Europe and government in the U.S. In
addition, we observe that the rise of the service sector was outpaced by the surge
in business and health services. The business services’ labor share evolved from
being the sixth sector with highest labor share in the European economy to being
first, despite the fact that the majority of all other service sub-sectors increased
their labor share during the same period. In contrast, the labor share remained
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relatively constant for some previously large service sub-sectors, such as government
and wholesale and retail trade. Finally, we observe that the ratios of the labor
shares of Europe relative to the U.S. increased for all service industries, indicating a
convergence in the composition of the labor force within the service sector.
2.2.2 Services’ Labor Productivity
From 1970 to 2009, the U.S. annualized labor productivity growth rate in the service
sector was approximately 1.1 per cent. Except for Italy and Spain, all European
countries experienced a higher growth rate than the U.S. in aggregate service labor
productivity for the same period. However, simply looking at the entire sample
hides two very distinct phases – one of strong catch-up (1970-1990) and another of
stagnation and divergence (1990-2009). We perform a sub-sample analysis of these
two periods and we find that the U.S. accelerated from approximately 1 per cent
growth in aggregate services’ labor productivity in the first period to 1.4 per cent in
the second period. At the same time, most European countries experienced a major
slowdown in services’ average labor productivity between the two periods5, with the
European average growth rate in services’ labor productivity falling from 1.6 per cent
to 1 per cent.
The disaggregated data on labor productivity measured as real valued added per
hour worked calls attention to the fact that, relative to the U.S., European countries
had a significantly higher productivity growth in health and personal services while
they had a significantly lower productivity growth in wholesale and retail trade and
business services. Figure 2.2 compares the relative performance of the latter two
sectors in the European economies and the U.S., between the two sub-sample peri-
ods. The scatter plots describe a positive correlation between the labor productivity
growth rate of each of these sectors and aggregate services. In addition, wholesale
and retail trade had strong gains in labor productivity and the U.S. was the leading
country in this sector in both periods. Between the two periods, the U.S. accelerated
5One exception being the United Kingdom which accelerated even faster than the U.S. from
approximately 1 per cent to 2 growth in services’ average labor productivity.
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Figure 2.2: Average growth in services’ productivity
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Scatter plots of value added per hour annualized growth rate of the aggregate service sector with
the value added per hour annualized growth rate of business services and wholesale and retail
trade. The horizontal lines indicate the service sectoral labor productivity growth rates observed
in the United States, and the vertical line indicates the aggregate service labor productivity
growth rate of the United States for both periods. The blue square marker indicates the
annualized growth of labor productivity growth pairs for Europe.
from 3 per cent to almost 4 per cent while the European economies maintained the
same growth rate. On the other hand, business services’ productivity in the U.S.
accelerated between the two periods doubling its growth rate from 1 per cent to 2
per cent, while most European countries suffered a slowdown in this sector.
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2.3 Model
This section presents a model of structural transformation with agriculture, manu-
facturing, and 11 different services, where the process of structural transformation
depends on income and price effects. We choose the number of sectors in the model
to account for the same sectors explored in the previous section. The model bor-
rows the production structure from Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and the preferences
from Comin et al. (2015). By combining these two frameworks, Engel curves and
heterogeneous labor productivity growth rates are sufficient to account for the struc-
tural transformation. The model does not have capital (consistent with Duarte and
Restuccia (2010)), which means that there is no investment sector in this economy,
and that the model has no dynamic component. Therefore, the structural trans-
formation, namely the reallocation of labor over time across sectors, is taken as a
sequence of static optimal allocations.
2.3.1 Environment
In our model economy there is an infinitely lived stand-in household of measure L
that supplies labor inelastically.6 Its only endowment is time. There are thirteen
sectors, and each sector produces its good or service using labor as the unique input.
In addition, labor moves freely across these sectors.
Household
The household has preferences over its consumption stream over time, but since
we are not defining inter-temporal problems in our model (i.e. there are no sav-
ings), there is no need to formalize the structure of preferences toward the inter-
temporal substitution of consumption. Therefore, following Comin et al. (2015), the
intra-temporal choice problem is described by a representative household that has
6Alternatively, one can think of a household of measure one with and endowment of L hours
each period. In this case, the definition of the measure is trivial, in spite of allowing growth of the
labor force, because the structural transformation is a sequence of static choices.
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preferences over the consumption of commodities (or services) produced in different
sectors, represented by
∑
i∈I
Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ c
σ−1
σ
i = 1, (2.1)
where C is the aggregate consumption7, I is the set of sectors of the economy, ci is
the consumption from output produced in sector i, σ ∈ (0, 1) is the price elasticity
of substitution, i ≥ 1 is the income elasticity for good i, and Ωi > 0 are constant
weights for each good i,
∑
i∈I Ωi = 1. Notice that there are no time subscripts
since the model is static. There are three main reasons8 that support the use of
this particular non-homothetic CES preference structure to explain the structural
transformation in our model of 13 sectors. First, it naturally extends for any arbi-
trary number of sectors, which is not a feature of other types of preferences such
as in Boppart (2014), Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013), and Duarte and
Restuccia (2010), among many others. Second, it gives rise to heterogeneous sec-
toral log-linear Engel curves that are consistent with the empirical evidence (Aguiar
and Bils (2015); Comin et al. (2015)). Last, the income effects on the relative con-
sumption of sectoral goods and services do not level off as income rises, contrary
to structural transformation demand-side theories that rely on Stone-Geary prefer-
ences, which is a crucial feature to account for the rise of services in the long-run.
Therefore, these preferences allow the demand channel to have a strong role at later
stages of development. The household’s problem is defined as follows:
Household’s Problem
7In the empirical counterpart of the model C is considered as income per capita since there are
no savings in our model.
8There is greater detail in the exposition of other useful features of the non-homothetic prefer-
ences in Comin et al. (2015). In our chapter, we highlight the most useful ones for our particular
purpose of decomposing extensively the service sector.
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max
ci
C s.t. i)
∑
i∈I
Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ c
σ−1
σ
i = 1
ii)
∑
i∈I
pici ≤ WL
iii) ci ≥ 0,
(2.2)
where W is the wage of the household, WL reflects the total disposable income and pi
is the price of output ci. We assume interior solutions, so the First-Order Conditions
are sufficient. The optimal consumption of goods for each sector i is
ci = Ωi
(pi
P
)−σ
Ci , (2.3)
and the optimal value added share of sector i is described by
pici
PC
= Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ c
σ−1
σ
i , (2.4)
where P is the aggregate price index. Notice that the parameters i and σ describe the
income and price mechanisms of the structural transformation. Whereas i measures
the sensitivity for changes in consumption of goods from sector i with respect of
changes in income, namely the Engel curve for sector i, σ reflects how sensitive the
quantities demanded are toward changes in prices. For the empirical relevant case
of σ < 1, where all goods are gross complements, the price effect illustrates the so-
called Baumol’s cost disease in which, in this context, labor is continuously allocated
toward less productive sectors in the long-run.
Firms
In each period, there are 13 different goods produced in agriculture, manufacturing,
and eleven types of services, as described in the previous section. There is a large
number of competitive firms in each sector i that use a technology of production
linear in labor described by
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yi = Aili ∀i ∈ I, (2.5)
where yi represents the output produced by a representative firm of sector i, Ai
reflects the labor productivity of the firm, and li is the labor input demanded by the
firm, measured in labor hours. The firm in this model economy hires labor at the
prevailing wage W – that is the same for each sector i since labor is perfectly mobile –
and produces output with the combination of labor hours and an idiosyncratic labor
productivity level for each one of the 13 representative firms. The firms’ problem is
described as follows:
Firms’ Problem
max
li
{piAili −Wli} ∀i ∈ I. (2.6)
Again, if one assumes interior solutions the First-Order Conditions are sufficient
to describe the optimal allocations of the firm. The optimal price is described by
pi =
W
Ai
∀i ∈ I. (2.7)
Equation 2.7 shows that increases in sectoral labor productivity reduce the price
of a good produced in sector i, and that increases in wages have a positive impact on
prices. However, notice that wages do not change the relative prices in the economy
since, by assumption, all sectors in the economy pay the same rental rate of labor.
Thus, it is only through heterogeneous dynamics of the labor productivity across
sectors that one gets changes in relative prices. We consider labor as the nume´raire
in our model economy and normalize its price – the wage rate W – to one, taking
advantage that in our construction wages do not have sectoral implications for labor
allocation. The sectoral price then is simply described as pi = 1/Ai ∀i ∈ I, and it is
the inverse of sectoral labor productivity, as in Duarte and Restuccia (2010). Given
the simplicity of the production technology, Ai can be considered as an exogenous
reduced form measure of all of the structural factors that in reality affect labor
productivity. In the empirical section we will address this issue by disentangling
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the effects on the labor productivity coming solely from TFP vis-a´-vis the effects
coming through other production inputs. But for now one can think of these factors
as components implicitly embedded in Ai.
Market Clearing Conditions
At each date, the market for each sectoral good and service clears
ci = yi ∀i ∈ I, (2.8)
and the labor market also clears. The total demand for labor must equal the exoge-
nous supply of labor by the household at every point in time:
∑
i∈I
li = L. (2.9)
2.3.2 Equilibrium
Definition: A Competitive Equilibrium is a collection of exogenous labor produc-
tivity paths {Ai,t} and optimal allocations {ci,t, li,t} such that for each period t and
for each sector i:
i) given prices, ci,t allocations solve the household’s optimization problem defined
in 2.2;
ii) given prices, li,t allocations solve the firm’s optimization problem defined in 2.6;
iii) market clearing conditions defined in 2.8 and 2.9 hold.
Combining equations 2.4, 2.5, 2.7 and the market clearing conditions in 2.8 one gets
Wli
PC
= Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ (Aili)
σ−1
σ ,
and after algebraic manipulation, we reach an expression for the sectoral labor de-
mand
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li =
(
P
W
)σ
ΩiC
iAσ−1i . (2.10)
Equation 2.10 illustrates the two main drivers of the structural transformation in
our model. First, the parameter i defines the Engel curve for sector i, and shows how
this non-homotheticity affects the labor demand for each sector, linking it directly
to the sector’s income elasticity. Second, the parameter σ shows the relation of the
price elasticity of substitution on the labor demand. As long as this parameter is
smaller than one, increases in productivity will reduce the labor hours demanded in
a given sector. Equation 2.10 predicts the levels of labor demand, and shows that
aggregate prices and wages9 also affect the labor demand in absolute terms, but they
are not going to affect the relative labor demand, i.e. the structural transformation.
Using the aggregate market clearing conditions in equation 2.9, the equation that
defines the structural transformation is given by
li
L
=
ΩiC
iAσ−1i∑
j∈I ΩjC
jAσ−1j
. (2.11)
The labor share of sector i is affected by both income effects and substitution
effects: as aggregate consumption rises one to one with aggregate income in our
model economy, the labor share of sector i will rise if the income elasticity of demand
of good i is higher relative to all other sectors and will fall if the elasticity is small
relative to all other sectors. On the other hand, as labor productivity grows, the
labor share of sector i will diminish relative to other sector with slower rates of labor
productivity growth.
9Although we are normalizing the wages in this model economy, we leave them without nor-
malization in the model exposition to illustrate that as long as labor is freely mobile, wages will
not have an impact on the structural transformation.
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2.4 Calibration
The parametrization involves estimating sectoral Engel curves and one price elastic-
ity of substitution based on equilibrium conditions derived in the previous section.
We use a panel for the U.S. and the European economies in our analysis to ex-
ploit variation across sectors and countries, and variation over time. This procedure
assumes that preferences do not change systematically across countries during our
sample period. Therefore, we can exploit the variation at this level of aggregation
to pin down the Engel curves for the U.S. Next, we normalize the initial sectoral
labor productivity to 1 and we calibrate the time-invariant CES weights to match
perfectly the initial labor shares for each sector for the U.S. in 1970. With the
calibrated model at hand, we can then feed in exogenous observable time paths of
sectoral labor productivity levels to generate endogenously sectoral labor shares and
aggregate labor productivity time paths.
2.4.1 Estimation of Engel Curves and the Price Elasticity of
Substitution
Consider the model’s prediction for the absolute labor demand of a sector i, as
described by equation 2.10. One can define a system of labor demand for each sector
i relative to manufacturing to derive the following system of relative labor demands
li
lman
=
Ωi
Ωman
Ci−man
(
Ai
Aman
)σ−1
.
Taking logs on both sides one gets
log
(
li
lman
)
= log
(
Ωi
Ωman
)
+ (i − man) logC + (σ − 1) log
(
Ai
Aman
)
. (2.12)
From equation 2.12 we can derive the following econometric model to estimate the
income and price elasticities
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log
(
li,t
lman,t
)
= (1− σ) log
(
Aman,t
Ai,t
)
+ (i − man) logCt + ζci + νci,t, (2.13)
where i denotes any sector – except manufacturing – in country c and time t. We
control for fixed-effects ζci to capture time-invariant characteristics that can poten-
tially influence our estimates. The error term of the econometric specification is
νcman,t.
Estimating equation 2.13 imposes i − 1 cross-equation restrictions for estimating
one single price elasticity of substitution for the entire economy. Given the simplic-
ity of our production function, we estimate equation 2.13 with prices predicted by
the inverse of the productivity rather than with observed prices directly, because
the econometric model derived from our theoretical framework is not suited for con-
trolling for differences in technology parameters that do have a direct influence on
prices.
Our identification strategy exploits within country-sector and time variation to
identify the income and price elasticities. We use World KLEMS data, which is a
panel disaggregated at the sector level with comparable information for the U.S.,
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and the
Netherlands, from 1970 to 2009. Our measurement for the empirical counterparts
of the model are as follows: Sectoral labor shares are measured by the ratio of
labor hours hired in a sector to the total labor hours demanded in the economy.
The sectoral labor productivity is measured with the real value added per hour
worked. Finally, the aggregate consumption C is measured directly with income per
capita measures since there are no savings in our model economy. Income per capita
measures in real units adjusted by PPP to perform cross-country comparisons are
not available in World KLEMS, so we used the Maddison Project as a source instead.
Table 2.3 presents the estimates for the price elasticity of substitution and the
sectoral Engel curves relative to manufacturing. Our estimate of the price elastic-
ity of substitution is 0.69, which is in line with the findings in the literature. The
null hypothesis of a price elasticity of substitution equal to one is rejected at the 1
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Table 2.3: Engel curves and price elasticity estimates
Sector Parameter Estimate
1− σ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.06)
agr agr − man -0.46∗∗∗
(0.14)
trd trd − man 0.50∗∗∗
(0.08)
rst rst − man 0.65∗∗∗
(0.14)
trs trs − man 0.55∗∗∗
(0.09)
com com − man 0.63∗∗∗
(0.11)
fin fin − man 0.71∗∗∗
(0.12)
res res − man 1.17∗∗∗
(0.17)
bss bss − man 1.76∗∗∗
(0.11)
gov gov − man 0.27∗∗∗
(0.10)
edu edu − man 0.57∗∗∗
(0.10)
hlt hlt − man 0.93∗∗∗
(0.14)
per per − man 0.72∗∗∗
(0.16)
Number of observations 360
Fixed effects Yes
Estimation based on World KLEMS data for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Clustered standard errors at the
country level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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per cent level, in favor a σ below one. Our estimate of the price elasticity of sub-
stitution reflects the presence of a Baumol-cost disease, in line with the analytical
descriptions of Baumol (1967) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007). This means that in
our framework the economy is converging to services, as in the traditional literature
of structural transformation, and also that within services the economy is converg-
ing toward the least productive sectors. This is the supply side explanation of the
structural transformation.
To account for the demand side, Table 2.3 illustrates the Engel curves for each
sector relative to manufacturing. The null hypothesis is that the Engel curve for
a given sector i is the same as the manufacturing Engel curve. This hypothesis is
rejected at the 1 per cent level of significance for each sector in the economy. Consis-
tent with the development literature, the estimate for the Engel curve in agriculture
illustrates that as long as the household grows richer, the resources devoted for the
consumption of agriculture grow less than proportional relative to manufacturing,
whereas for all the services in the economy the consumption grows more than pro-
portional relative to manufacturing. In addition, the estimates of the Engel curve
estimate vary significantly across services. For instance, whereas the difference in the
income elasticity for government relative to manufacturing is of 0.27, for real estate
and business services this difference is above one.
2.4.2 Targeting the Initial Employment Shares in the U.S.
We calibrate the model by targeting the initial labor shares in 1970 for each sector
in the U.S. economy. For this purpose, we normalize the initial productivity levels
Ai to one in each sector. As a consequence of this normalization, the aggregate
productivity is normalized to one as well, and therefore Y/L = A = 1. Since in
our model economy the entirety of income per capita is devoted to consumption, it
follows that C = 1 for 1970. From equation 2.11, the normalization implies that the
labor shares for the initial period of the calibration are given by
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Table 2.4: Parameter values
Value Target/Comment
Parameters
σ 0.69 Price elasticity estimation (Table 2.3).
agr 0.53 Estimate for Engel curve for agr (Table 2.3).
man 1 Homothetic preferences for manufacturing.
trd 1.50 Estimate for Engel curve for trd (Table 2.3).
rst 1.65 Estimate for Engel curve for rst (Table 2.3).
trs 1.55 Estimate for Engel curve for trs (Table 2.3).
com 1.63 Estimate for Engel curve for com (Table 2.3).
fin 1.71 Estimate for Engel curve for fin (Table 2.3).
res 2.17 Estimate for Engel curve for res (Table 2.3).
bss 2.75 Estimate for Engel curve for bss (Table 2.3).
gov 1.27 Estimate for Engel curve for gov (Table 2.3).
edu 1.57 Estimate for Engel curve for edu (Table 2.3).
hlt 1.93 Estimate for Engel curve for hlt (Table 2.3).
per 1.73 Estimate for Engel curve for per (Table 2.3).
Ωagr 0.06 Labor share of sector agr in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωman 0.30 Labor share of sector man in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωtrd 0.14 Labor share of sector trd in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωrst 0.04 Labor share of sector rst in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωtrs 0.03 Labor share of sector trs in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωcom 0.03 Labor share of sector com in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωfin 0.03 Labor share of sector fin in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωres 0.01 Labor share of sector res in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωbss 0.06 Labor share of sector bss in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωgov 0.07 Labor share of sector gov in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωedu 0.07 Labor share of sector edu in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωhlt 0.11 Labor share of sector hlt in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωper 0.04 Labor share of sector per in 1970 for the U.S.
Time Paths
{Ai,t} {·} Ai,t+1 = Ai,t(1 + γAi,t), where γAi,t is the growth rate
of sectoral real value added per hour. Ai,t=1970 = 1.
{Ct} {·} Ct+1 = Ct(1 + γCt), where γCt is the growth rate of
real GDP per capita.
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li
L
=
Ωi∑
j∈I Ωj
.
Since
∑
j∈I Ωj = 1, the initial labor shares for each sector i are given by Ωi. The
initial labor shares values for the U.S. in 1970 are sufficient to account for the param-
eterization of each Ωi so the model and the data match for the first period, by con-
struction. Then, we compute the sectoral labor productivity time paths {Ai,t}2009t=1970
with the observed growth rates of real value added per worker, and the aggregate
consumption time path {Ct}2009t=1970 with aggregate labor productivity growth rates,
measured by the real income per capita growth. Finally, we feed these time paths
in our model to derive predictions for the evolution of the employment labor shares
across sectors as described by equation 2.11. Table 2.4 summarizes the parametriza-
tion of our model.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
There are three sets of predictions that we consider as tests of whether our theory
can successfully account for the structural transformation. First, the labor-share
time paths generated by our model for the U.S. economy should be roughly close
to their empirical counterparts in the data. Second, after recovering the initial pro-
ductivity levels for each of the European economies, the model should be capable
of generating labor shares roughly close for most sectors in the European countries.
Third, the predicted aggregate labor productivity – namely the sum of sectoral labor
productivities weighted by their participation in the labor force – should reproduce
fairly close the relative aggregate labor productivity between the U.S. and Europe
displayed in Figure 2.1.
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2.5.1 Model’s Prediction I: U.S. Structural Transformation
Figure 2.3 compares the predicted labor shares of our model to the U.S. data for
agriculture and manufacturing. The model does a remarkably good job predict-
ing the observed labor share paths for these two sectors during the sample period.
For agriculture, the model predicts almost perfectly the decline in the labor share.
Nonetheless, for 1970 most of the labor in the U.S. economy had already migrated
out of agricultural activities. The model also does a good job predicting the observed
de-industrialization of the U.S. economy since 1970: Whereas the observed decline of
the manufacturing share of employment was from about 30 per cent in 1970 to levels
Figure 2.3: Structural transformation in the U.S. - Agriculture and
manufacturing
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by our model.
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Figure 2.4: Structural transformation in the U.S. - Services
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by our model.
short of 20 per cent in 2009, the predicted decline in the manufacturing employment
share is down to a level of about 21 per cent in 2009.
Figure 2.4 compares the predicted labor shares for the different services in the U.S.
economy. The model does follow the labor share paths fairly close for almost every
sector, including the steep rise in business services as shown in the upper right panel
of Figure 2.4. The two exceptions are wholesale and retail trade and government.
The upper left panel of Figure 2.4 illustrates that for wholesale and retail trade, the
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Figure 2.5: Sectoral labor productivity in the U.S. - Service sector
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Labor productivity is measured as the real value added per hour worked. Initial productivity
levels are normalized to 1.
employment share has remained at a level close to 14 per cent during the sample
period, with an observed decline of only half of a percentage point after 1990. The
model, however, predicts a decline in the labor share of this sector down to a level
of 10 per cent. For government (see the lower right panel in Figure 2.4) the model
underpredicts its labor share’s decline. Whereas the government labor share falls
from above 7 per cent in 1970 to about 3 per cent in 2010, our model predicts that
this share will decrease only by less than 2 per cent for the same period.
To shed more light on the model’s predictions for the structural transformation
within services, Figure 2.5 plots the sectoral labor productivity time paths for each
service in the U.S. for the period 1970-2009. Communications, wholesale and re-
tail trade, financial services, business services, government, and, to a lesser degree,
transportation are the sectors with superior performance in labor productivity. The
productivity in communications has increased by a factor of 8 from 1970 to 2009,
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while the productivity has multiplied its 1970 base more than 3.5 times in wholesale
and retail trade, and financial services. Transportation, business services and gov-
ernment also have multiplied their productivity base by a factor of 2.1, 1.7, and 1.5
respectively. The rest of the service sectors had experienced virtually no growth in
their labor productivity. That is true even for sectors such as health services, whose
participation in the labor force exceeded 18 per cent in 2009.
Can the evidence presented in Figure 2.5 explain why the model is not following
closely the labor shares in wholesale and retail trade and government? We believe
that, in spite of the simplicity of our model, the answer is yes. There are two drivers of
the structural transformation in our model economy: Engel curves and heterogenous
labor productivity growth rates through the price elasticity of substitution. We
already showed that the income elasticity for each sector belonging to services is
statistically superior to the manufacturing Engel curve. Are the income elasticities
in services statistically different from each other? The answer depends on the sector.
The three sectors displayed in the upper left panel of Figure 2.4 have Engel curves
that are not statistically different from each other, but they are statistically lower
than the Engel curves for real estate or business services. Therefore, the differences
in our model predictions between wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels,
and transportation are to be found in the labor productivity differences. The upper
left panel of Figure 2.5 shows that wholesale and retail trade has the strongest
productivity growth among these three services, and therefore, according to our
model, this sector should reduce its participation in the labor force. This prediction
is in contrast with the observed labor shares, suggesting that in the U.S. it is not
necessarily true that the labor productivity growth is shrinking the employment
participation in wholesale and retail trade.
On the other hand, government does have an Engel curve significantly lower than
the rest of the services with the exception of wholesale and retail trade, and it is
experiencing positive productivity growth. These two forces imply in our model
a decrease in the government’s employment share, but both mechanisms are not
sufficient to address the deployment of the labor force out of government that are
evident in the U.S. data. Nevertheless, with important caveats for wholesale and
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retail trade and for government, we consider that our model successfully accounts
for the structural transformation in the U.S.
2.5.2 Model’s Prediction II: Structural Transformation in Europe
Following Duarte and Restuccia (2010), we use our model to measure the initial pro-
ductivity levels in Europe vis-a`-vis the U.S. This in an important accounting step
to overcome the lack of sectoral PPP-adjusted value added data. We proceed as
follows: First, we use the calibrated parameters summarized in Table 2.4 to recover
the productivity levels for each sector and for each European country consistent with
the normalization of productivity levels in the U.S. and with the income level of each
European country relative to the GDP per capita in the U.S. Since the U.S. income
level is equal to 1 in the first period of our model (corresponding to 1970 in the
data), the relative income per capita is simply the ratio of GDP per capita of each
European country to the U.S. in 1970. We use the Maddison Project’s GDP per
capita measures since they are adjusted by PPP’s, thus PPP-adjusting the initial
sectoral productivity levels that our model is recovering. Then, we compute the la-
bor productivity and income time paths with the observed growth rates of sectoral
real value added per hour and real income per capita respectively, just as we did
for the U.S. in the previous section. Last, with the recovered PPP-adjusted time
paths, we compute the model’s predictions and compare the structural transforma-
tion predicted by our model to the European data. This procedure delivers time
paths that are comparable across countries, without the risk of mismeasurement due
to not ideal PPP adjustments at the two digits sectoral level.
Measurement of Sectoral Labor Productivity in Europe. Figure 2.6
plots the average productivity levels measured using our calibrated model in agri-
culture, manufacturing, and services for Europe relative to the U.S. for 1970 and
2009 (the first and last sample periods respectively). These productivity levels are
an outcome from our model needed to compute comparable productivity levels in
absence of PPP-adjusted sectoral output data. First, the agricultural productivity
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Figure 2.6: Relative labor productivity - Agriculture, manufacturing,
and services
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Recovered sectoral labor productivity levels in 1970 and 2009 for Europe relative to the sectoral
U.S. labor productivity level. Europe stands for the average of the eight European countries’
sectoral productivity levels, weighted by their national GDP.
levels recovered from our model illustrate that in 1970 the average agricultural pro-
ductivity level in Europe was 45 per cent of the U.S. productivity. This gap closed
partially during our sample period. By 2009, the European agricultural productivity
level was 55 per cent of the U.S. agricultural productivity level, reflecting a reduction
in the gap of about 20 per cent. Second, during a sample period is also evident a
stronger process of convergence in the manufacturing sector. Whereas the European
manufacturing productivity level was about 21 per cent of the U.S. manufacturing
labor productivity, for 2009 the European manufacturing productivity was 38 per
cent of the U.S. level, which represents an increase of 80 per cent. We believe that
these numbers are relatively low compared to the evidence documented by Lewis
(2005) for some subset of manufacturing industries, such as the automobile industry,
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Figure 2.7: Relative labor productivity - Services
hlt edu res com
0
1
2
3
4
5
fin gov rst trs
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
trd bss per
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1970
2009
Recovered sectoral labor productivity levels in 1970 and 2009 for Europe relative to the sectoral
U.S. labor productivity level. Sectors within services. Europe stands for the average of the eight
European countries’ sectoral productivity levels, weighted by their national GDP.
but the catch up in manufacturing is of similar orders of magnitude when compared
to the findings of Duarte and Restuccia (2010). Third and last, the labor productiv-
ity gap in services – our object of interest – was smaller in 1970 compared to 2009.
Whereas the average level for the labor productivity in the European services was 90
per cent of the U.S. services’ labor productivity, for 2009 the European productivity
in services represented about 86 per cent of the productivity in U.S. services. This
widening is the main reason behind the recent divergence between Europe and the
U.S. due to the ongoing growth of services’ weight in the economy during the late
stages of development.
Figure 2.7 plots the initial and final productivity levels during our sample period
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for each of the sectors within services in Europe relative to the United States. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no independent evidence on labor productivity
levels for all these 11 sector in Europe and the U.S. to compare directly the implied
labor productivity levels of our model. Europe as a whole did lose ground compared
to the U.S. in terms of productivity in services, but one should not infer from Figure
2.6 that all services were less productive in Europe compared to the U.S. Our model
suggests that there are five sectors where Europe had higher productivity levels than
the U.S. in 1970: Communications, financial services, real estate, education (edu),
and health services, and with the important exception of financial services, the U.S.
fell behind even further by the end of our sample period in these services.
Figure 2.7 also shows that the lower European productivity levels in services in
1970 are due to wholesale and retail trade, transportation, restaurants and hotels,
business services, government, and personal services. Moreover, the gap in these
sectors opened even wider by 2009 in wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and
hotels, business services, and also in financial services, where the U.S. did close the
productivity gap and later surpassed Europe by 2009. For instance, the productivity
levels relative to the U.S. in wholesale and retail trade went from 29 per cent in 1970
down to 17 per cent in 2009. For business services the fall was from 20 per cent in
1970 down to 14 per cent in 2009. For financial services, the European productivity
went from 35 per cent above of the U.S. level down to 74 per cent in 2009. Figure
2.7 illustrates the importance of opening services into comparable sectors between
Europe and the U.S. in order to address why Europe has been falling behind with
respect to the U.S. during advanced stages of development, where the service sector
dominates the labor participation in the economy.
Structural Transformation Within Services in Europe. In order to ad-
dress whether our model is successful in explaining the structural transformation in
Europe, Figure 2.8 plots a scatter between the observed labor share for each sector
in 2009 and the prediction of our model for the same period. It also plots a solid
line that represents the 45 degree line starting at the origin of the y and x-axis. The
closer the pair between the observed labor share (y-axis) and our model’s predic-
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Figure 2.8: Structural transformation in the U.S. and Europe
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Sectoral employment shares in 2009, in the U.S. and the eight European countries. Each country’s
coordinates correspond to observed and model predicted levels.
tion (x-axis) to the 45 degree line, the more accurate our model is in capturing the
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process of structural transformation.10 Figure 2.8 illustrates that the model success-
fully generates sectoral employment shares roughly consistent with the data, with a
few exceptions in wholesale and retail trade for the U.S. (as previously documented)
and Belgium, and in personal services for Spain and the Netherlands. Nevertheless,
our model succeeds overall in explaining the process of structural transformation in
Europe.
2.5.3 Model’s Prediction III: Aggregate Labor Productivity in
Europe vis-a`-vis the U.S.
Can our model generate the main motivating fact presented in Figure 2.1? If we
consider the aggregate labor productivity level to be the weighted average of the
sectoral labor productivity levles, where the weights are nothing but the labor shares
of employment in each sector, i.e. the structural transformation, then our model’s
predictions can be compared directly to the evidence on aggregate labor productivity
in Europe vis-a`-vis the U.S. presented in Figure 2.1.11 One can address the capacity
of the model in generating the labor productivity ratios by using our predicted labor
shares for each sector to weight the sectoral productivity levels in order to generate
aggregate labor productivity time paths for each country.
Figure 2.9 compares the model’s prediction to the data for the aggregate labor
productivity in each European country relative to the U.S. and for the European
aggregate productivity relative to the U.S. as well.12 After matching by construction
the initial observations, the model does follow very close the observed gaps in ag-
gregate labor productivity between Europe and the U.S., regardless on whether the
10Unlike the employment share in manufacturing, there are no well-defined hump-shaped pat-
terns in the structural transformation in services. For this reason we consider that the prediction
for the last observation in the sample is sufficient to assess the model’s capacity to generate time
paths consistent with the European structural transformation.
11Recall that we discipline the initial labor productivity in Europe with the relative, PPP-
adjusted, income per capita measures, matching the model and the data by construction for the
first period.
12The aggregate productivity in Europe is computed as the average of the eight European coun-
tries’ aggregate productivity, weighted by their national GDP.
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Figure 2.9: Relative aggregate labor productivity
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Aggregate labor productivity for the European countries relative to the U.S. Europe’s aggregate
productivity is the average of the eight European countries’ aggregate productivity, weighted by
their national GDP. Model vs. Data. The model’s aggregate labor productivity is the weighted
average of sectoral labor productivity, where the weights are the model’s predicted labor shares
for each sector.
country’s convergence stopped, as in France or Germany, or whether the country is
falling behind the U.S., as in Belgium or the Netherlands.
In summary, we judged quantitatively the model’s performance in three dimen-
sions: i) The U.S. structural transformation, ii) the European structural transfor-
mation, and iii) the aggregate labor productivity in Europe relative to the U.S. Our
exercises show that our theoretical framework is successful in accounting the partici-
pation of employment in agriculture, manufacturing, and several services in the U.S.
and Europe, and it also accounts for the aggregate differences in output per hour
worked between these two regions, and for each country individually. These result
are reassuring that our theoretical framework is quantitatively valid, and supports
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the credibility of the counterfactual experiments we expose hereafter.
2.6 Counterfactual Experiments
After illustrating the quantitative success of the theory, we proceed to use our
parametrized model economy to perform a set of counterfactual experiments in order
to understand the role of services sub-sectors in aggregate productivity. Our aim is
to identify which sectors are largely responsible for the slowdown in European labor
productivity during the last two decades relative to the United States.
2.6.1 Europe keeping the Pace with the U.S.
Our first counterfactual experiment asks what would have happened with the aggre-
gate labor productivity in Europe had it experienced the observed sectoral produc-
tivity growth in the U.S. from 1970 to 2009, in a specific sector or group of sectors.
We ask this question for each sector individually, for services as an entire sector,
and for all the sectors simultaneously. More specifically, we use our model to predict
the structural transformation in Europe with the observed U.S. labor productivity
growth rate in each sector and compute the counterfactual aggregate productivity.
Then, we compare this aggregate productivity with our benchmark prediction from
Figure 2.9 to address the differences between our counterfactual scenario and the
benchmark prediction for the aggregate productivity.13 This experiment seeks to
answer which sectors are responsible for the relative aggregate productivity slow
down.
13As Figure 2.9 shows, our model is successful in predicting the dynamics for the aggregate labor
productivity. One can perform this exercise by comparing the counterfactual prediction directly
to the observed aggregate productivity level. We decided to compare the counterfactual scenarios
to our benchmark predictions because our model successfully accounts for the aggregate labor
productivity and because by comparing models’ predictions we can address with certainty that the
differences arise solely due to the numerical experiment. However, if one decides to compare directly
to the actual data the conclusions would not change dramatically.
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Table 2.5: Europe keeping the U.S. pace
(1) (2)
1970–2009 1990–2009
γi = γ
USA
i
agr 0.4 -0.3
man -8.9 -0.3
trd 5.1 3.2
rst -0.5 0.0
trs -0.2 0.2
com -0.9 -2.9
fin 3.8 0.4
res 0.4 0.8
bss 3.0 2.4
gov -0.1 -0.5
edu -0.8 0.1
hlt -5.9 -2.7
per -0.9 -0.4
γi = γ
USA
i,i∈services 3.4 0.7
γi = γ
USA
i,∀i -5.3 0.2
Europe growing at the pace of U.S. in the indicated sector, for the periods 1970–2009 or
1990–2009. Percentage change of the 2009 aggregate labor productivity level. Benchmark
prediction vs. counterfactual.
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Table 2.5 illustrates our findings when we feed the labor productivity growth rates
from 1970 to 2009 (our entire sample period) and from 1990 to 2009 (the period
where Europe lagged behind). The top panel of Table 2.5 shows the results of this
exercise when Europe counterfactually experiences the observed labor productivity
growth rate in the U.S., in order to assess changes in aggregate labor productivity
as a consequence of changes in the productivity of a single sector. Each row of the
top panel represents one of the 13 sectors in our model economy.
Column (1) of Table 2.5 shows that Europe would have had an increase in ag-
gregate labor productivity of 0.4 per cent had it experienced the U.S. productivity
growth in agriculture. These modest results are not surprising. Both Europe and
the U.S. are economies at advanced stages of development, with low levels for the
size of agriculture in the economy even in 1970, and in steady decline since then. On
the other hand, had the European countries experienced the U.S. labor productivity
growth in manufacturing during our sample period, Europe as a whole would have
had a lower aggregate productivity. Manufacturing is not responsible for the Euro-
pean underperformance vis-a´-vis the U.S. On the contrary, it helped Europe in its
path towards convergence during the first half of our sample period.
With regards to services, our counterfactual experiment suggests that the slow-
down in the aggregate labor productivity comes mainly from three sectors: Wholesale
and retail trade, financial services, and business services. It also suggests that Euro-
peans experienced significantly higher productivity gains in health services.14 During
the sample period, wholesale and retail trade alone would have been responsible for
an European aggregate labor productivity 5.1 per cent higher than our benchmark
prediction in 2009. Financial services also would have helped to reduce the labor
productivity gap had the European countries experienced the same labor productiv-
ity growth observed in this sector for the U.S. Europe as a whole would have had
a labor productivity level 3.8 per cent higher than our benchmark prediction. The
labor productivity would have also been higher for the European countries if they
had had the U.S. labor productivity growth in business services. Our results also
illustrate that Europe would have had lower aggregate productivity had it had the
14For the rest of the sectors the results are not large.
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U.S. labor productivity growth observed in health services. It is well known that the
U.S. is the advanced economy with the most expensive health sector, and our simple
model shows that part of these higher costs are captured by its relatively low labor
productivity in this sector.15
The middle and lower panels of Table 2.5 show what would have happened if
Europe had experienced the productivity growth rates observed in the U.S. in all
services and all sectors simultaneously, respectively. Europe would have experienced
some convergence during this period if their services had experienced the U.S. labor
productivity growth; the aggregate labor productivity would have been 3.4 per cent
higher than our benchmark prediction for 2009. However, if all sectors had grown
like the U.S., the gains obtained in services would have been out-weighted by a
poorer performance in manufacturing, yielding an overall loss of the aggregate labor
productivity of 5.3 per cent compared to our benchmark prediction in 2009.
It has been established that the aggregate productivity in Europe was converging
to the U.S. before 1990, while after this year a process of either slowdown or falling
behind started, depending on the country that one is considering. Our second coun-
terfactual experiment asks what would have happened if Europe had continued with
the U.S. labor productivity growth rates after 1990, which is the period when the
process of convergence came to a halt. We followed the same set of exercises from
the previous section, with the only difference that the U.S. growth rates that are
counterfactually fed start in 1990 rather than in 1970.
Column (2) of Table 2.5 shows the results of the numerical experiments for the
period between 1990 and 2009 by comparing the benchmark prediction to the coun-
terfactual aggregate labor productivity in 2009. Whereas the results for agriculture
are still negligible, the sharp drop in the aggregate labor productivity with the U.S.
manufacturing labor productivity for the period 1970-2009 virtually vanishes when
we feed the productivity growth rates only since 1990. This confirms our previous
15Nevertheless, the question of productivity in health services is one of great difficulty. Labor
productivity is measured as the real value added per worker, but without a proper adjustment for
quality it is difficult to address whether more health services per hour reflect more productivity in
the health sector. Still, our model captures reasonably well the idea that the U.S. provides health
services that are much more expensive compared to their European counterparts.
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finding: Manufacturing was responsible for the catch-up observed during the 1970’s
and 1980’s. After these years, the productivity growth in manufacturing is not as
critical as before to understand the aggregate labor productivity, mainly because the
weight of manufacturing has fallen due to the ongoing process of structural trans-
formation. Wholesale and retail trade and business services continue to be of great
importance to account for the European slowdown that took place after 1990. The
aggregate labor productivity would have been significantly higher in Europe had it
experienced the U.S. labor productivity growth in these sectors. On the other hand,
financial services are no longer critical to account for the slowdown, in contrast with
the counterfactual for the whole sample period, suggesting that the U.S. financial
sector had a stronger labor productivity growth than the European one mainly be-
fore 1990. The results for health services are in the same direction compared to the
entire sample period, but the order of magnitude of the result is about half of what
it was for the 1970-2009 period, although it still represents a large distance between
the benchmark and the counterfactual aggregate productivity. In addition, for the
period between 1990 and 2009 a new sector emerges in which Europe appears to have
overperformed the U.S. in terms of labor productivity growth: Communications.
The middle and lower panels of Table 2.5 illustrate that for the period 1990-2009,
the European countries would have been modestly more productive had they had
the U.S. labor productivity growth observed in the service sector. In addition, they
would have been virtually the same had they had the labor productivity growth in
each sector in the economy since 1990.
2.6.2 European Sectors Catching Up with the U.S. Productivity
Levels in 2009
After identifying the sectors largely responsible for the European slowdown, our
second set of numerical experiments ask how much the aggregate labor productivity
would have grown if either wholesale and retail trade, financial services, or business
services had experienced the productivity growth needed to fully catch up with the
U.S. labor productivity level in each sector by 2009. We assume that this convergence
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Table 2.6: Europe catching up with the U.S.
Full catch up in 2009
Counterfactual:
γi s.t. Ai = A
USA
i
trd 25.8
bss 17.1
fin 1.5
Europe catching up with the U.S. sectoral productivity level in 2009, in the sector indicated.
Implied (annualized) growth rates under full catch-up in whole sale and retail trade, business
services, and financial services. Percentage change of the 2009 aggregate labor productivity level
(benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual).
takes place only in one sector at a time to compute the annualized growth rate
consistent with the catch up to the U.S. labor productivity in the sector in question,
while keeping the observed growth rates for the rest of the sectors.
Table 2.6 shows the implied change in aggregate productivity when each of these
three sectors mentioned before converges to the U.S. labor productivity level in
2009.16 Had Europe converged to the U.S. productivity level in 2009 in wholesale and
retail trade or in business services, the aggregate productivity gains would have been
substantial. Europe as a whole would have had an aggregate productivity level 25.8
per cent higher had it converged in wholesale and retail trade, and of 17.1 per cent
had the labor productivity level converged in business services. These two sectors
alone are largely responsible for the European slowdown relative to the U.S. Table
2.6 also shows that financial services is not a critical source of slowdown between
Europe and the U.S. Had Europe experienced a full catch up in the labor produc-
tivity of financial services relative to the U.S. 2009 level, the aggregate productivity
level would have been only 1.5 per cent higher compared to our 2009 benchmark
prediction.
16Our model is suited to perform this numerical experiment for any sector in the economy, but
for the sake of space, we decide to show only the three sectors that we identify as largely responsible
for the European slowdown during the period 1970-2009.
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Figure 2.10: Relative aggregate labor productivity – Full catch up in
wholesale and retail trade
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Austria Belgium France
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Germany Italy United Kingdom
1980 2000
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Spain
1980 2000
Netherlands
Benchmark Counterfactual
1980 2000
Europe
Aggregate labor productivity in Europe vis-a´-vis the U.S. under full catch up in the labor
productivity of wholesale and retail trade sector. Benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual.
Figure 2.10 illustrates the effect of a full catch up wholesale and retail trade on
the aggregate labor productivity over time, from 1970 to 2009. Had the European
countries converged to the 2009 labor productivity levels in wholesale and retail
trade, they would have continued their path toward convergence after 1990, with a
mild deceleration in a few countries. Figure 2.10 shows that every single country
in Europe would have improved its position relative to the U.S. without exception.
Moreover, Austria and France would have virtually closed the labor productivity
gap with the U.S., and Belgium would have surpassed the U.S. aggregate labor
productivity level by 2009. The rest of the countries would have not still closed
the gap, but they would have not fallen behind either, had they closed the gap in
wholesale and retail trade. Europe as a whole would have closed 80 per cent of
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Figure 2.11: Relative aggregate labor productivity – Full catch up in
business services
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Aggregate labor productivity in Europe vis-a´-vis the U.S. under full catch up for the labor
productivity in the business services sector. Benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual.
the gap in labor productivity, if they have closed the labor productivity gap in this
specific sector alone with respect to the U.S. As Lewis (2005, p. 34) puts it, “In the
United States, wholesalers [...] began to consolidate their warehouses and improve
the productivity of the operations in those warehouses. This change was the largest
single contribution to the productivity acceleration in the U.S. economy in the late
1990’s [...] not the efforts of Microsoft and Silicon Valley”.
Similarly, Figure 2.11 illustrates the effect of a full catch up in business services
on the aggregate labor productivity time path between 1970 and 2009. The results
are qualitatively similar to our previous numerical experiment illustrated in Figure
2.10, but the magnitude of the effect from catching up in business services is much
smaller compared to a full catch up in wholesale and retail trade. Still, if Europe
93
Figure 2.12: Labor shares under full catch up
0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20
Benchmark Model
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.21
C
ou
n
te
rf
ac
tu
al
AUT
BEL
FRA
DEU
ITA
NLD
ESP
GBR
trd
0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22
Benchmark Model
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
C
ou
n
te
rf
ac
tu
al
AUT
BEL
FRADEU
ITA
NLD
ESP
GBR
bss
Predicted labor shares in 2009 for whole sale and retail trade and for business services.
Benchmark prediction vs. full catch-up counterfactual from Table 2.6.
had experienced a full catch up in the productivity of business services by 2009,
the aggregate labor productivity would have been higher in every single country,
and, with the exception of Italy, every country would have continued to close the
aggregate productivity gap with respect to the U.S. after 1990, when Europe started
to fall behind. Moreover, Belgium and the United Kingdom would have closed the
aggregate productivity gap by catching up to the U.S. only in business services, and
Europe as a whole would have closed about 60 per cent of the aggregate productivity
gap with respect to the United States.
Finally, Figure 2.12 compares the 2009 labor shares of our benchmark model to
the implied 2009 labor shares when Europe counterfactually experiences a full catch
in either wholesale and retail trade or in business services. The solid line represents
the 45 degree line starting at the origin. The purpose of this comparison is to
demonstrate the importance of considering a structural transformation theory to
deliver endogenously changes in the labor share as a consequence of productivity
changes. This is in sharp contrast to methods of shift-share analysis – widely used
in the empirical literature – where one cannot account for changes in the weight of
a sector (i.e. the labor share) as consequence of a counterfactual change of labor
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productivity. Counterfactual exercises based on a shift-share approach, as opposed
to ours, would miss the change in sectoral labor shares caused by alternative sectoral
labor productivity growth rates.
Figure 2.12 illustrates that if Europe had experienced a catch up in wholesale
and retail trade, the weight of this sector in the economy would have been higher;
The income effect brought by a full catch up in the labor productivity of this sector
would need to have been stronger than the price effect in order to observe such
increase in the labor shares. A shift-share analysis would underestimate the aggregate
implications of this experiment significantly. On the other hand, a full catch up of
the labor productivity in business services would have shrunk the participation of
this sector in the economy significantly; The price effect would have dominated the
Engel curve for this sector, and a shift-share analysis would overestimate the impact
of this sectoral productivity change on the aggregate productivity. Moreover, a full
catch up in either of these sectors would necessarily have had effects on the labor
shares of all sectors in the economy, making our case for considering the general
equilibrium effects of counterfactual changes in sectoral labor productivity stronger.
To sum up, our counterfactual experiments highlight the importance of sectoral
analysis for accounting, through the lenses of a theory of structural transformation,
which are the sectors responsible for the widening labor productivity gap between
Europe and the U.S. After opening the service sector into 11 comparable sectors, we
find that wholesale and retail trade, business services and, to a lesser extent, financial
services are the sectors largely responsible for the aggregate productivity gap. We
now proceed to explain these gaps empirically.
2.7 Empirical Analysis of Labor Productivity Differences in
Services
In the quantitative exercise, we have measured comparable levels of sectoral labor
productivity, relative to the U.S., for eight European countries. We have identified
that the dynamics of labor productivity in the service sector, and in three services in
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particular, had caused the fall in labor productivity, relative to the U.S., that Europe
has suffered since the 1990s. What are the factors behind the differences in the labor
productivity levels of services? The empirical investigation of these factors is the
topic of this section. Our findings in a nutshell are that the fall in the relative labor
productivity of Europe has been mainly driven by total factor productivity. The level
of relative TFP has been especially low in wholesale and retail trade and business
services. In these sectors, which gave the largest contribution to the falling behind,
the relative gap in TFP with respect to the U.S. accounts for most of the gap in labor
productivity. In addition, we document that the increase in services’ employment
has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the level of physical and ICT
capital input. This also had a negative impact on labor productivity.
Labor productivity depends on the level of capital endowment per employment
unit, known as the capital to labor ratio, and on the efficiency in combing capital
and labor into the production process. The latter is usually referred to as total
factor productivity (TFP). Hence, differences in sectoral capital to labor ratios and
TFP levels among the European countries of our sample and the U.S. are likely to
explain the productivity gap in services between the U.S. and Europe. In order to
assess this claim, we start by choosing an appropriate empirical model, consistent
with neoclassical production theory. In the quantitative model previously studied,
sectoral production is assumed to be linear in the labor input, featuring constant
returns to scale, and with a marginal product of labor corresponding to the level of
labor productivity:
yi,t,c = Ai,t,cli,t,c,
where the subscripts i, t, c stand for service type, year, and country, respectively.
Labor productivity Ai,t,c is intended as a synthesis of the deeper factors just men-
tioned: Capital and TFP. One can think at the production function of our model
as a reduced-form representation of a fully-fledged technology, in which capital and
TFP are explicitly captured. Furthermore, we can distinguish between “physical”
capital and “information and communication technology” (ICT) capital17. Let us
17We acknowledge that this distinction is not exhaustive. Another important aggregate to be
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assume that the fully-fledged technology has the standard form of a Cobb-Douglas
production function:
yi,t,c = Mi,t,ck
α
i,t,cs
β
i,t,cl
γ
i,t,c,
where M stands for TFP, k for physical capital, s for ICT capital, and l for hours
worked. At this stage, we assume that the fully-fledged production function is char-
acterized by constant returns to scale, which formally requires α+ β+ γ = 1. Later,
we will consider the instance of departing from this assumption. The concept of
labor productivity studied in this chapter is output per unit of employment. Hence,
labor productivity is formally defined as Ai,t,c = yi,t,c/li,t,c. Within the fully-fledged
technology, this definition implies that
Ai,t,c = Mi,t,c
(
ki,t,c
ki,t,c
)α(
si,t,c
li,t,c
)β
l
(α+β+γ−1)
i,t,c = Mi,t,ck¯
α
i,t,cs¯
β
i,t,c.
The last result formalizes that labor productivity is a function of TFP and the
two distinct capital to labor ratios. Since the focus of the present study is labor
productivity in European services relative to the U.S., we are interested in studying
how differences in TFP and capital to labor ratios between the two regions relates
to differences in labor productivity. We impose the assumption that the production
technology is the same across countries, sectors, and years, and that variation stems
only from input utilization and efficiency18. Therefore, labor productivity relative to
the U.S. is given by
Ai,t,c
Ai,t,USA
=
Mi,t,c
Mi,t,USA
(
k¯i,t,c
k¯i,t,USA
)α(
s¯i,t,c
s¯i,t,USA
)β
or
Aˆi,t,c = Mˆi,t,ckˆ
α
i,t,csˆ
β
i,t,c,
considered is, for instance, human capital. However, the available data about employees’ education
allow us to compute measures of sectoral human capital just for a very short sub-sample of years
(from 2002 to 2009). Hence, due to the scarcity of observations, we restrict our empirical analysis
to physical and ICT capital only.
18See Sa´enz (2017) for a work considering time-varying sectoral capital intensities in production
technologies.
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adopting a new notation for indicating the measures relative to the U.S. ones. As a
final step, we linearize the last equation by means of a logarithmic transformation:
log Aˆi,t,c = log Mˆi,t,c + α log kˆi,t,c + β log sˆi,t,c. (2.14)
From World KLEMS and OECD sources, we build measures of capital to labor
ratios for the eleven service sectors of our study. We decompose capital into physical
(land, transport equipment, machinery, and structures) and ICT (IT, communica-
tion, and software equipment). We obtain an unbalanced panel data set covering
the U.S. and all the European countries of our analysis with the exception of Bel-
gium, for which capital data are not available. The time horizons covered by the
panel also vary by country, due to data availability19. Using the measures of capital
utilization, hours worked in services, and the levels of relative productivity in the
European services from our quantitative analysis, we estimate the following empirical
specification:
log Aˆi,t,c = δ0 + δ1 log kˆi,t,c + δ2 log sˆi,t,c + εi,t,c. (2.15)
δ1 and δ2 are least squares estimators of α and β respectively. However, we con-
cede that unobserved characteristics of country, sectors, years, or combinations of
the latter may have important effects on labor productivity, and thus not controlling
for them may introduce bias in the estimates. To deal with this issue, we include
dummies for fixed effects in the econometric model. We adopt an agnostic approach
about the fixed effect specification to select. We estimate models with various com-
binations of fixed effects and we let the data guide us toward the best one, based
on information criteria which weight both the goodness of fit of the model and its
parsimony. Each of the first five columns of Table 2.7 displays the estimates of a
different model, its fixed effect specification, and both its Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian
(BIC) information criterion.
In a set of nested models, we should select the model specification with the lowest
value of AIC or BIC. This rule leads us in preferring model (2) to model (1), con-
19See Appendix A for more details on the data and the sources used.
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Table 2.7: Physical and ICT capital effects on labor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS SGMM
Physical Capital 0.467∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.037) (0.021) (0.057) (0.039) (0.011)
ICT Capital -0.247∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.026) (0.013) (0.040) (0.026) (0.007)
Fixed Effects
Year X X X X X
Country X X X X X
Sector X X X X X
Country × Sector X X
Year × Sector X
Country × Year X
N 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485
R-squared 0.07 0.77 0.99 0.80 0.77
AIC 5278.17 3322.93 -1500.36 3738.17 3487.76
BIC 5294.08 3630.51 -874.59 5663.22 4267.33
Dependent variable is log sectoral labor productivity, relative to the U.S. Physical capital is log
sectoral physical capital endowment per hours worked, relative to the U.S. ICT capital is log
sectoral physical capital endowment per hours worked, relative to the U.S. Standard errors are
robust.
firming that including some fixed effects improves the fit of the model. Moreover,
using the same rule, model (2) appears superior to models (4) and (5), and inferior
to model (3). Hence, we select the fixed effects’ specification of model (3) as the
preferred one: It controls for unobserved characteristics of each year, country, and
sector, as well as for unobserved characteristics specific of a given sector in a given
country. A further concern is that the independent variables can be endogenous, i.e.
not orthogonal to the OLS residuals. Following Bloom et al. (2012), we check the
robustness of our findings by estimating model (3) using the system GMM method
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The results are shown in column (6): The
coefficient estimates are larger than the ones obtained by estimating model (3) by
OLS, but they are qualitatively similar. We consider the results of column (3) our
preferred coefficient estimates, and the rest of the discussion is based on them.
The estimated coefficients show that both physical and ICT capital endowments
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are significantly and positively associated with services’ relative labor productivity.
Over the years considered, the average level of labor productivity in the European
service sector, relative to the U.S., increases by 0.24 per cent for a 1 per cent increase
in the average level of physical capital per hour worked, relative to the U.S., and by
0.05 per cent for a 1 per cent increase in the average relative level of ICT capital
per hour worked. A standard t-test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficient of ICT
is not smaller than the coefficient of physical capital. This result suggests that the
productivity gain from investing in physical capital is on average greater than the
one obtained from increasing the ICT capital. This seems to partially contradict
previous studies of the determinants of the low productivity of the European service
sector. Indeed, when studying productivity growth instead of levels, and relying
on growth accounting techniques and shift-share analysis, the existing literature has
pointed to ICT production, adoption, and utilization as one of the major reasons of
the widening gap between U.S. and European productivity. For instance, van Ark et
al. (2003) identify the sectoral components of the aggregate productivity growth gap,
distinguishing between contribution stemming from changes in sectoral employment
shares and sectoral productivity levels. They conclude that most of the aggregate
productivity gap is accounted for by so called ICT-producing sectors and ICT-using
services. The former’s employment share increased in the U.S. much more than in
Europe, while the latter’s productivity grew in Europe at a lower rate than in the
U.S., suggesting that the problem of productivity in Europe comes from the fact
that the European economies have not been able to take fully benefit from the ICT
revolution, or at least not as much as the U.S. did. A similar conclusion is reached
by Bloom et al. (2012), which identify larger returns from ICT investments enjoyed
by U.S. multinationals even outside the U.S., and argue that the organizational
structure of U.S. business may favor them in adapting to new technologies. Timmer
et al. (2011) also contribute to the discussion by decomposing productivity growth
into the contributions from changes in TFP and capital to labor ratios. They find
that the productivity growth gap between Europe and the U.S. reflect mainly gaps in
total factor productivity, with an important role played also by ICT capital to labor
ratio. We do not think that the importance of ICT has been overestimated. However,
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our empirical finding is indicative that physical capital should not be overlooked, and
closing gaps also in the level of physical capital endowment can generate an important
improvement in labor productivity.
From the stylized facts of structural transformation, we know that the level of
employment in the service sector increased significantly both in Europe and in the
U.S. over the period studied. Given the importance of capital to labor ratios for labor
productivity, we ask whether the fall in European services’ productivity relative to
the U.S. can have occurred because of an insufficient capital accumulation to match
the new employment levels. For each of the eleven services analyzed, we compute the
average rate of change in employment occurred in Europe between 1990 and 2009.
We compare these changes to the simultaneous average changes in sectoral physical
and ICT capital levels. Figure 2.13 plots these change rates, considering the two
types of capital separately.
In the lower portion of each panel, the bars report the effect on labor productivity
of the difference between the change rates of employment and capital, that is how
the change in the capital to labor ratio has affected labor productivity, given the
estimated coefficients. For almost all the services, both the physical and ICT capital
to labor ratios fell with respect to the U.S. from 1990 to 2009, with a negative impact
on labor productivity. The only exceptions are given by transportation, a sector in
which the physical and ICT capital endowment increased more than the employment,
and by health services and government, with regard to ICT only. In all other services,
the stocks of capital have not been able to keep the pace of growth in the labor
allocation, or they have decreased by a far larger extent than the employment. The
situation appears particularly worrisome for ICT capital. Except the sectors already
mentioned, in all the services the level of ICT capital fell relative to the U.S. over
the 1990-2009 horizon. In the same period, almost all the services increased their
employment levels relative to the U.S. ones. Physical capital has not fallen has much
as ICT, and in some sector its level has even increased. However, also in these cases
the slight increase in physical capital endowment has been generally outsized by
the increase in employment. This occurred to business services, one of the sectors
identified as mostly accountable for the falling behind of European aggregate labor
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Figure 2.13: Change rates in employment and capital stocks
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Change in physical (ICT) capital is the average annual rate of change in sectoral physical (ICT)
capital endowment between 1990 to 2009, averaging over the European countries of our sample.
Change in labor is the average annual change in sectoral hours worked over the same period,
averaging across Europe. The impact on productivity is given by the difference between physical
(ICT) capital and labor rates of change, multiplied by the coefficient estimate of physical (ICT)
capital to labor ratio from column 3 in Table 2.7.
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productivity. Business services as well as wholesale and retail trade appear to have
been particularly hit by a relative fall in their ICT endowment at the time of an
increase in their level of employment. For this reason, they are among the services
whose labor productivity has been mostly harmed by a fall in ICT capital to labor
ratio. This finding is reconciling our analysis with the existing literature. As previous
studies have pointed to ICT utilization as a major problematic area for European
labor productivity, we find evidence that wholesale and retail trade and business
services has suffered a severe reduction in their ICT capital to labor ratios relative to
the U.S., and we have previously identified these sectors as the mostly accountable
for the fall in the labor productivity of Europe.
So far we have studied how services’ relative labor productivity is affected by
different types of capital to labor ratios. Now we turn our focus to the component
of labor productivity given by the efficiency in capital and labor utilization, defined
as total factor productivity (TFP). Consistent with the discussion at the beginning
of this section, we obtain measures of relative TFP, in logs, using the coefficient
estimates from equation 2.14:
log Mˆi,t,c = log Aˆi,t,c − 0.246 log kˆi,t,c − 0.050 log sˆi,t,c.
How much of the gap in labor productivity between Europe and the U.S. can be
accounted for by the difference in TFP, and how much by differences in the physical
and ICT capital endowment per hour worked? Figure 2.14 presents a decomposition
of average sectoral labor productivity levels in Europe, relative to the U.S., based on
our estimates and TFP measurement for the years between 1990 and 2009.
There is a remarkable degree of variation in the weights of each productivity com-
ponent across sectors. However, we quantify that more than half of the average
productivity gap between European and U.S. services is accounted for by differences
in TFP. The weight of TFP is particularly high in wholesale and retail trade, busi-
ness services, and financial services, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of the
relative labor productivity. The decomposition gives a perspective to the discussion
about the compared changes in employment and capital endowments. Although in
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Figure 2.14: Decomposition of relative labor productivity
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light of our estimates there is no doubt that a fall in the capital to labor ratios
have had a negative impact on labor productivity, the role of capital endowments
per hours worked appears secondary to that of TFP differences in accounting for the
labor productivity gap. For most of the services in Europe - and in particular for
the three at the base of the European falling behind - the issue of labor productivity
differences is primarily a matter of differences in TFP.
Figure 2.15 plots the average level of total factor productivity in Europe relative
to the U.S., Mˆi,t,c, computed for each service over the period of the falling behind.
We plot also the average rate of change of these measures over the same period.
Very marked differences across services are evident. On the one hand, we can see
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Figure 2.15: Relative total factor productivity
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the very low average level of TFP in business services and wholesale and retail trade
in Europe, relative to the U.S., a level that also decreased for these services between
1990 and 2009. Given the above mentioned importance of TFP as a component of
labor productivity in these two sectors, this finding clarifies why the productivity of
business services and wholesale and retail trade has performed so poorly in Europe,
dragging down the aggregate productivity of the entire economy. On the other hand,
some services appear to have TFP levels extremely higher in Europe than in the
U.S., and growing over the period of the falling behind.
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2.7.1 Effects of Employment Levels on Labor Productivity:
Decreasing Returns to Scale?
In our opinion, the fact that Europe has outperformed U.S. in some sector is not sur-
prising. However, we quantify some average TFP levels with an order of magnitude
of many times the corresponding U.S. ones, which seems puzzling. We wonder if the
assumption that services’ technology features constant returns to scale may lead to
this unexpected measurement. If we let α + β + γ be, in principle, different than 1,
equation 2.14 changes into
log Aˆi,t,c = log Mˆi,t,c + α log kˆi,t,c + β log sˆi,t,c + (α + β + γ − 1) log lˆi,t,c, (2.16)
where lˆi,t,c denotes the level of labor input in sector i of country c at time t, relative
to the corresponding U.S. level. Using World KLEMS data on sectoral hours worked
in the U.S. and in the European countries of our sample, as well as the data used in
the previous analysis, we can estimate the following empirical model:
log Aˆi,t,c = η0 + η1 log kˆi,t,c + η2 log sˆi,t,c + η3 log lˆi,t,c + i,t,c. (2.17)
The coefficient η3 is a least squares estimator of α + β + γ − 1, and it captures the
average effect that the level of sectoral employment might have on the level of labor
productivity. We estimate equation 2.17 under different specifications of fixed effects,
and, as before, we let information criteria guide us. Table 2.8 contains the findings.
Also in this case, the specification controlling for year, sector, country, and sector
by country effects is the preferred one, and a system GMM estimation of the same
specification returns coefficient estimates in line with the OLS ones. The novelty
in this empirical analysis is the coefficient estimate for the effect of log relative
employment levels: It is significant and negative consistently in all the specifications
considered. This is evidence that services’ labor productivity, that is real output per
hours worked, is negatively associated with the level of hours worked. The result
is also at odds with the hypothesis that α + β + γ = 1 and, instead, favorable to
α + β + γ < 1. Can we conclude that the production of services is characterized
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Table 2.8: Capital and labor effects on labor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS SGMM
Physical Capital 0.321∗∗∗ 0.026 0.108∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ -0.008 0.083∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.032) (0.019) (0.042) (0.034) (0.015)
ICT Capital -0.276∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ -0.051∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.021) (0.011) (0.029) (0.021) (0.010)
Labor -0.394∗∗∗ -1.860∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -2.257∗∗∗ -1.982∗∗∗ -1.771∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.065) (0.029) (0.078) (0.066) (0.025)
Fixed Effects
Year X X X X X
Country X X X X X
Sector X X X X X
Country × Sector X X
Year × Sector X
Country × Year X
N 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485
R-squared 0.11 0.87 0.99 0.90 0.87
AIC 5223.50 2469.60 -1911.35 2646.71 2600.16
BIC 5244.71 2782.49 -1280.28 4582.37 3385.03
Dependent variable is log sectoral labor productivity, relative to the U.S. Physical capital is log
sectoral physical capital endowment per hours worked, relative to the U.S. ICT capital is log
sectoral physical capital endowment per hours worked, relative to the U.S. Labor is sectoral
number of hours worked, relative to the U.S. Standard errors are robust.
by decreasing returns to scale? We do not think we can go that far, although this
empirical result is supportive of this hypothesis. The scope of the present study is
not that of estimating the definite properties of a production function for the service
sector, but rather to empirically assess the relation between labor productivity and
the sectoral inputs’ allocation. However, we think that the evidence we find against
α + β + γ = 1 calls for deeper analysis of this aspect that might lead to further
insights about the returns to scale in services. Moreover, we are not the first ones
in finding empirical evidence that challenges the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale: Bloom et al. (2012) also estimate a significantly negative effect of employment
level on labor productivity.
How would the relevance of the main points discussed above - the impact from
a fall in capital to labor ratios and the importance of TFP - change if we were to
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believe that services feature deceasing returns to scale? The observed reductions
in sectoral physical and ICT capital to labor ratios have an even bigger negative
impact on productivity under decreasing returns to scale. In order to understand
this, we compute the “break-even” change in capital endowment, that is the increase
in sectoral physical or ICT capital necessary to balance off an increase in sectoral
employment, to the point of leaving sectoral labor productivity unchanged. Under
constant returns to scale, the break-even change is exactly equal to the change in
labor allocation: If capital endowment increases as much as employment, the ratio
and labor productivity do not vary. With decreasing returns to scale, instead, capital
must increase more than proportionally with labor. Indeed, it is not enough that the
capital to labor ratio does not fall. The ratio should actually increase to compensate
the negative impact on labor productivity caused by the rise in the level of employ-
ment. Hence, the fact that physical and ICT capital endowments did not match the
change in labor allocation in the European services between 1990 and 2009 looks an
even more serious issue if the service sector were indeed operating under decreasing
returns to scale.
Including the level of employment in the empirical specification clearly changes
the measurement of TFP, which is now given by
log Mˆi,t,c = log Aˆi,t,c − 0.108 log kˆi,t,c − 0.061 log sˆi,t,c + 0.484 log lˆi,t,c
Intuitively, the new measures of TFP are likely lower than the previous ones. Indeed,
the most important difference between the two measurement formulas is given by
+0.48 log lˆi,t,c. The level of hours worked in a sector of a given European country is
most probably lower than the corresponding level in the U.S., by the simple reason
that the labor force in the U.S. is much larger than in any single European country.
Hence, log lˆi,t,c tends to be negative. With some approximation, this means that,
when we allow for decreasing returns to scale, we subtract a potentially relevant
quantity from the level of TFP that we measure under the assumption of constant
returns to scale. In order to verify the soundness of this intuition, we repeat Figure
2.15 with the new measures of TFP.
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Figure 2.16: Relative total factor productivity – Decreasing returns
to scale
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a specification allowing for decreasing returns to scale.
Figure 2.16 shows that, as expected, the average levels of sectoral TFP in Europe
are smaller than the previous measures. This is particularly evident in the services
with an estimated TFP larger than the U.S.. For instance, the current measures
of TFP in European communication and health services are now about 10 per cent
larger than in the U.S., much less puzzling than the four-fold levels previously mea-
sured. However, we want to highlight that the properties of the TFP measures for
wholesale and retail trade and for business services do not seem to differ whether or
not constant returns to scale are assumed. Indeed, also with decreasing returns to
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scale the estimates for these two sectors portray a very small TFP level in Europe,
relative to the U.S., and a reduction in this level during the period of the falling be-
hind. Even with respect to the decomposition of labor productivity, the change in the
assumption regarding the returns to scale does not modify the result that the labor
productivity gap in these two services is mostly a matter of relative TFP (the weight
of this component is approximately 70 per cent for wholesale and retail trade and
business services). The fact that different assumptions about returns to scale lead
to very different findings for some sectors and not so different results for others rises
another interesting question: Are some services characterized by decreasing returns
to scale more than others? We leave also this question open for future research.
2.8 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter, we propose a model of structural transformation that disaggregates
services in order to quantitatively study the labor productivity differences between
Europe and the U.S. We identify wholesale and retail trade, business services, and,
to a lesser extent, financial services as the sectors that principally caused low service
productivity in Europe, and ultimately lead to the divergence of European aggregate
productivity from U.S. levels since the 1990’s. Wholesale and retail trade has always
employed a large share of labor, while business services has experienced an astonish-
ing increase in its employment share over the period of our analysis. These patterns
are similar both in the U.S. and in Europe. However, labor productivity growth
in these sectors has been particularly slower in Europe than in the United States.
High and/or increasing labor shares and underperforming labor productivity growth
in these two sectors are at the core of the outcome uncovered by our quantitative
analysis.
Having established that wholesale and retail trade and business services are the
main culprits of Europe’s lack of catch up with the U.S. in services labor produc-
tivity, we address empirically the components of sectoral labor productivity levels:
Physical and ICT capital to labor ratios and TFP. We find that the European ser-
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vices have experienced a fall in the level of capital endowment per hour worked with
respect to the U.S., with negative consequences for labor productivity. Wholesale
and retail trade and business services have been particularly characterized by an
under-investment in ICT. Also, TFP has a very relevant role in explaining labor
productivity differences. Wholesale and retail trade and business services had the
lowest average levels of sectoral TFP, relative to the U.S., during the years of the
falling behind, and these levels even decreased over the same period.
Which factors have led to the gap in TFP? We suspect that an important role
may have been played by the different regulations of the product, capital, and labor
markets in the U.S. and in Europe. The hypothesis has been discussed also in
previous studies. According to Lewis (2005), stricter market regulations are the key
determinant of the low productivity of services in Europe. His argument is based on
an extensive analysis conducted by the McKinsey Global Institute since the 1990’s,
and it is substantiated by the discussion of case studies that exemplify how specific
sectoral regulations can harm sectoral productivity. The conclusion of Lewis (2005)
is that obstacles to the natural forces of competition are a major blow to productivity
growth, and Europe has been lenient in removing them. The importance of regulation
for productivity is also highlighted by Crafts (2006), who argues that the acceleration
in U.S. productivity in the 1990’s was possible thanks to a more flexible regulatory
environment than in Europe. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) state that aligning the
regulatory stance of Europe to the most liberal OECD countries would substantially
ameliorate European TFP growth. The negative impact of regulation on productivity
has also been evidenced, more recently, by Cette et al. (2016). Unfortunately, we have
not been able to find satisfactory data on the level of regulation to test empirically its
importance in explaining our measures of TFP gaps. Most indexes of regulation are
available only for more recent years, and do not show a significant time variation20.
Moreover, all of them miss the crucial dimension of sectoral variation, a major focus of
this work. Indeed, the available sources report country-based measures of regulation
but do not capture differences, if any, in sector-specific regulation.
20For instance, the OECD product market regulation measures are available starting from 1998,
at a five year frequency.
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Some limitations we face in our chapter, particularly in data availability, highlight
ways in which future research could go in unveiling labor productivity differences
between Europe and the U.S. For instance, we strongly believe that, data permitting,
a deeper analysis of how regulations affected labor productivity differently across
sectors is an interesting topic for future research. In addition, we assume that the
production technology is the same for different service types, and across countries
and years. Estimating sector-specific technologies might be a relevant exercise in
making more precise quantitative statements about labor productivity differences.
Finally, our empirical findings suggest that the service sector might be characterized
by decreasing returns to scale. We think this issue deserves further consideration in
future work.
Our findings, together with the rising importance of services in the economy, imply
that policies aiming at fostering aggregate labor productivity growth in European
economies should be focused on wholesale and retail trade and business services,
promoting investment in ICT and physical capital as well as creating an environment
that facilitates a more efficient use of production inputs in these two key sectors.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RICARDO EFFECT: EVIDENCE FROM
THE MANUFACTURING LABOR INCOME
SHARE IN COLOMBIA
Joint work with Luis Felipe Sa´enz
3.1 Introduction
In the third edition of his On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
(Ricardo (1821)), David Ricardo acknowledges that the replacement of human labor
with machines is typically detrimental to the interests of the workers, although it
improves the efficiency of the production process in general. This point has been
retaken in consideration by both Keynes (1930) and von Hayek (1942)). The latter
has introduced the term Ricardo Effect to denote the old Ricardo’s idea that the
substitution of capital for labor in the production comes at the expense of workers.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide quantitative evidence of the Ricardo
Effect using a unique plant-level longitudinal dataset for Colombian manufacturing
establishments for the period 1982-1998. The data requirements needed for estab-
lishing a relationship between different inputs of production are very stringent. It
must include at least information of labor and capital at the plant level, which is
the relevant unit of analysis, and it must vary across time since this relationship is
dynamic. This is precisely the information available in the Annual Manufacturing
Survey (EAM1) in Colombia.
Colombia is a very interesting case of study mainly for two reasons. First, the infor-
mation at disposal is based on a uniquely rich and representative data for Colombian
1Acronyms in Spanish for “Encuesta Anual Manufacturera”.
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manufacturing plants, derived from yearly plant censuses over the period 1982-1998
with detailed information of physical quantities of inputs. It is the most complete
source of product-level information in a nationally representative plant database in
any country (Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)). Second, the Colombian experience
can be considered as a “natural experiment” of exogenous shocks to the relative
prices of inputs, since during the early 1990s the country underwent countrywide
market-oriented reforms, and thus the data provide a clean base for comparison be-
tween pre-reform and post-reform periods (Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler
(2004)).
This chapter uses the EAM data to test (i) whether there is supporting evidence
of the Ricardo Effect in Colombia and (ii) whether this effect changed under a pe-
riod of market-oriented reforms whose purpose was, among several others, to reduce
distortions in the factor markets. To test for the existence of the Ricardo Effect, we
assume a setup in which production plants operate a technology featuring constant
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The value of this elasticity is
key: The Ricardo Effect is in place if such elasticity is larger than one. Indeed, in
that case, the arrival of newer, cheaper capital induces a substitution for labor and
a consequent decline in the labor income share, i.e. the proportion of income de-
voted to compensate workers. This is exactly the instance described by Ricardo: A
replacement of labor with capital causing an economic damage to the laboring class.
Using different specifications and estimation techniques, we estimate that the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and labor is significantly larger than one. The
preferred estimate equals 1.85. These findings provide evidence of the existence of
the Ricardo Effect in the manufacturing sector of Colombia. The market-oriented
reforms do not seem to have caused any change in the elasticity of substitution be-
tween capital and labor. However, the reforms have accelerated the fall of the cost
of capital relative to the cost of labor. Given our estimates of the elasticity of sub-
stitution, this fact has reinforced the decline in the labor income share. By means of
a simulation exercise, we assess how much of the observed decline in the Colombian
labor income share can be accounted for by the Ricardo Effect, given the observed
decline in the relative cost of capital and our estimates of the elasticity of substitu-
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tion. The conclusion is that the Ricardo Effects explains half of the decline of the
labor income share in Colombia.
Our findings are very close to those of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). They
study the effect of capital and labor substitution on the labor income share using a
production setup with CES technology, similar to what we are doing. They estimate
an elasticity of substitution between these two inputs of 1.25. Based on this parame-
ter value, their model can explain roughly half of the worldwide decline in the labor
income share. The main difference between our research and their paper is that their
estimation is based on cross-country variation, while we are using longitudinal micro
data.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides more details
about the concept of Ricardo Effects and the literature that studied it. Section
3.3 describes the data and provides a brief description of the Colombian context in
light of the evidence. Section 3.4 illustrates the empirical strategy pursued in this
research. Section 3.5 presents the main results of the chapter. Section 3.6 provides
some concluding remarks.
3.2 The Ricardo Effect: A review of the literature
In 1821, for the third edition of his 1817 masterpiece entitled On the Principles
of Political Economy and Taxation, David Ricardo decided to include a whole new
chapter to his bestseller in which he wrote a mea culpa regarding his previous ideas
with respect to the role of machines. Ricardo confessed that before writing “On the
Machinery”, the 31st chapter of his classic, he was not aware of any conflict between
the interests of the laboring class and the arrival of machines to the production
process. In Ricardo’s own words:
(...)I have been of opinion, that such an application of machinery to
any branch of production, as should have the effect of saving labour, was
a general good, accompanied only with that portion of inconvenience
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which in most cases attends the removal of capital and labour from one
employment to another. Ricardo (1821, pp. 466-67)
David Ricardo devoted a whole new chapter in his Principles to reveal his change
of opinion. His new vision was that the application of machinery could reduce labor
demand (Ricardo (1821), Samuelson (1989)).2
Sympathetic with Ricardo’s new chapter, Samuelson (1988) introduced a “sim-
ple classical model”3 in which the invention of robots reduces the demand for labor
permanently, as Ricardo predicted. Contrary to the opinion of several followers of
Ricardo, Samuelson considered chapter 31st as the best single chapter of Ricardo’s
book. He provided a dramatic example to illustrate that the invention of robots
capable of replacing the entire human labor in the production of corn will yield
Ricardo’s prediction: human jobs are replaced by machines. An interesting impli-
cation explained in detail by Samuelson (1988) is that if robots are relative cheaper
compared to labor, even by just a small fraction, no labor will be demanded at all.
Samuelson crafted this overdramatic example of robots replacing humans as a way
of vindicating Ricardo’s reasoning as logically feasible, at a time when his new chap-
ter was in doubt and was considered as a logical fallacy (Samuelson (1988)). Lord
Keynes also contributed in this debate coining a term to describe the unemployment
created by the introduction of machines: Technological Unemployment. According
to Keynes (1930, pp. 196),
We are being aﬄicted with a new disease of which some readers may
not yet have heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal
in the years to come - namely, technological unemployment. This means
unemployment due to our discovery of means of economizing the use of
labor outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labor.
2The interest reader should consult directly Ricardo (1821) to understand the evolution of his
ideas with respect to the role of machines. The discussion of his arguments is beyond the scope
of this article, mainly because a preliminary discussion of the value labor theory is imperative in
order to address Ricardo’s concerns related with the distribution of income.
3As Paul Samuelson called it himself.
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The debate regarding the complementarity/substitutability between labor and cap-
ital goods in the production process today is well and alive. Burke and Rumberger
(1987) compile a series of papers that address the impacts of technology on work
and education in the United States and Australia. The principal questions that are
addressed in the collection or papers are related with the job creation/destruction
due to the increased used of new technologies, and with what kinds of jobs will be
created and what kinds will be destroyed. They conclude that new technologies,
especially those associated with micro-electronics, are capable of further routinizing
and simplifying tasks into repetitive and machine operated-monitored functions, but
also new technologies enhance the decision role of employees and potentialize the
skills and education of the labor force.
Knights and Willmott (1988) consider that as long as economies are expanding,
the substitution of capital for labor due to the dramatic advance in the use of new
technologies is not reflected in unemployment figures instantaneously, but with the
continuum arrival of new technologies, labor demand suffers, specially during times
of recessions where the technological expansion is still supported by governments.
Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000) llustrate that changes in observed
inputs of production can explain most of the variations in the labor skill premium
from 1963 to 1991 in the United States. They identify the following puzzle: The sup-
ply of skilled labor increased significantly during this period but at the same time the
skill premium, defined as the wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor,
has grown considerably since 1980. They argue that with a neoclassical production
function whose technology is capital-skill complementary, the puzzle is explained in
terms on input variations. In short, with the development of better and cheaper
capital equipment the wages of unskilled workers are (relatively) driven down since
unskilled labor is competing not only with skilled employees, but with persistently
cheaper and better machines.
Krusell et al. (2000) found that the substitution elasticity between unskilled labor
and equipment is 1.67 whereas for skilled labor and equipment is 0.67. They also
found that the skill premium is driven by changes in observed factor quantities. The
supply of skilled labor puts a downward pressure to the premium, while the capital
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skill complementarity effect puts an upward pressure which ultimately dominates.
Hanson (2001) considers an exogenous growth model in which machines are com-
plement to human labor when they become more productive, but also machines are
substitutes for human labor by taking over jobs. The conclusion of this modeling
exercise is that in spite of the complementary effects due to increases in productivity,
in the end the substitution effects are dominant.
Acemoglu (2002) contributes to this debate by addressing the direction and bias of
technical change, since in most situations technical change is not neutral: it benefits
some factors of production more than others. He develops a workhorse to understand
why technical change can be skill biased, and why new technologies introduced dur-
ing the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were unskilled biased. This
framework provides analytically the conditions for capital and labor to be gross com-
plements or gross substitutes based on the idea that firms can invest resources to
develop technologies that complement a particular factor. Acemoglu (2002) pro-
vides an explicit micro-foundation to the complementarity/substitutability nature of
technology and production inputs.
More recently, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) proposed a framework called “A Ricar-
dian Model of the Labor Market” in which they explicitly incorporate a distinction
between workers’ skills and job tasks, and they allow the assignment of skills and
tasks to depend on labor supplies, technologies, and task demands. They consider
that the distinction between skills and tasks is critical to understand how the set of
tasks that workers perform responds to changes in supplies or technology. According
to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), a task is a unit of work activity that produces out-
put while a skill is the worker’s endowment of capabilities to perform various tasks.
They argue that “(...) an explicit distinction between skills and tasks (...) will enable
the model to allow for certain tasks to become mechanized.” Acemoglu and Autor
(2011, pp. 1119) Therefore, in the task-based approach, tasks are applied to produce
output, and skills have an influence in output through its relation with tasks.
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3.3 Data
The data used in the estimation come from the project “Plant-Level Price Indices for
Output and Materials” created under a technical cooperation between the Colombian
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE hereafter for its acronym
in Spanish) and John Haltiwanger from the University of Maryland. This database
have the same coverage period and most of the information that was used in Eslava
et al. (2004). The information gathered is taken directly from the Colombian Anual
Manufacturing Survey (EAM hereafter for its acronym in Spanish).
The EAM is an unbalanced panel that has information since 1982 of any industrial
establishment in Colombia that employs ten or more employees, or whose annual
output is worth more than 65 million Colombian pesos (around 35 thousand dollars)
at the reference year. These reports are adjusted each year with the producers
price index created by the Colombian Central Bank. The dataset of Haltiwanger’s
project contains information for each establishment of the manufacturing sector for
the following variables: production, capital (buildings, structures, machinery, and
equipment), employees (production and non-production personnel), hours worked
(average hours worked per employee times number of employees per sector per year),
materials (intermediate consumption), and energy consumption. Production, capital
and materials are in constant thousands of pesos of 1982, whilst energy is in Kw per
hour.
Eslava et al. (2004) and the technical document that accompanies the “Plant-Level
Price Indices for Output and Materials” database provide detailed documentation
of the construction of the variables. However, since the measurement of capital is
critical for our purposes, we will explain briefly the construction of this variable. The
capital stock is constructed recursively based on the following formula:
Kit = (1− δ)Kit−1 + Iit
Dt
where Kit are the units of physical capital for plant i in year t, Kit−1 are units
of physical capital for plant i in year t − 1, δ is the depreciation rate, Iit is the
gross investment for plant i in year t, and Dt is the gross capital deflator for year
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t.4 The capital stock series only includes equipment, machinery, buildings, and
structures. With the information on fixed assets reported by each plant together
with depreciation rates and inflation reported to adjust fixed asset values, gross
investment series for each plant are generated to compute the capital series (Eslava
et al. (2004)).
The “Plant-Level Price Indices for Output and Materials” dataset contains also
demand-shift shocks estimated in Eslava et al. (2004). In the estimation, we use
these shocks as instruments for endogenous input levels. Eslava et al. (2004) builds
these demand shocks as total output measures in downstream industries, which are
industries satisfying two conditions: They buy at least 15 per cent of upstream
production and the purchasing cost from the upstream industry represents no more
than 15 per cent of total costs5.
Other data that we use are the cost of capital and labor, from which we compute
the relative price of production inputs. The webpage of the Colombian Central Bank
provides the historical series for the Producer Price Index (PPI) since 1970 under
several classifications. In particular, under the category “PPI by use or destination
of good” the subcategory of capital goods is available. The cost of capital then is
measured as the capital goods’ PPI relative to the manufacturing PPI, normalized
to a base of 100 for 1982.6 Regarding labor costs, Urrutia and Ruiz (2010) present
real wage series for several sectors and periods in Colombia. They provide the real
wages discriminated by economic activity for the period 1980-2006. We constructed
4See Eslava et al. (2004) and the technical document of the construction of variables of the
“Plant-Level Price Indices for Output and Materials” for the details regarding the depreciation
rates, deflators, the generation of the gross investment series for each plant, and the assumptions
for the initial capital stocks.
5See Eslava et al. (2004) for more details of the estimation of demand shocks.
6There is an extensive literature related with computations of capital costs in Colombia, but
i) they consider the capital cost mostly in terms of the opportunity cost, ii) these calculations do
not vary across plants or sectors in the manufacturing industry, and iii) the PPI of capital goods is
already a major component of the capital costs in the algorithm. For the purposes of this document,
using the PPI solely to construct relative costs of inputs is an approach more clean and tractable
compared to using of any of the algorithms available. See Die´z, Gaita´n, and Valderrama (2011)
for a short literature review and summary of the methodologies related with the computation of
capital costs in Colombia. In particular see the discussion in Die´z et al. (2011) regarding the lack
of consensus to estimate capital costs.
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the cost of labor as the industrial wages from Urrutia and Ruiz (2010) multiplied by
the consumer price index (CPI) and divided by the manufacturing PPI, normalized
to a base of 100 for 1982.
Finally, in the simulation exercise we use data about the labor income share in
Colombia. The source is the Penn World Tables (PWT 9.0). In this database, the
series goes back to 1950. However, before the 1990s the value of the labor share is
constant, suggesting that the compilers has made an extrapolation. Hence, we take
in consideration the data from 1994 onward only.
3.3.1 The market-oriented reforms
In the Colombian context, the early 1990s is a period that deserves special attention.
After the infamous murder of Luis Carlos Gala´n, the virtual winner for the 1990
presidential elections, Cesar Gaviria won the presidency for the period 1990-1994.
President Gaviria was a technocrat who worked in Gala´n’s campaign as Chief of
Staff. During his tenure several episodes marked dramatically the modern history
of the country: Pablo Escobar was killed and his entire drug cartel was dismantled
after years of terror; the most emblematic left-wing guerrilla group, the M-19, signed
an armistice with the Colombian Government, and a new constitution in 1991 cre-
ated a whole new legal environment in every level of the state. Additionally, during
Gaviria’s administration the Colombian economy underwent extensive structural re-
forms whose purpose were to enhance the role of productivity and undermine the
rigidity in factor markets, with special emphasis on artificially imperfect competitive
markets (Eslava et al. (2004)). In particular, dismissal costs on labor were reduced
dramatically, the average tariffs fell significantly, capital markets and banking legis-
lation were modernized, and restrictions on FDI were removed (Eslava et al. (2004)).
Can we see any changes in the time series we are using at the time of the reforms?
Figure 3.1 illustrates the quantities of inputs used by the plants of our database,
relative to the 1982 quantities that are normalized to 100. We can immediately
notice that during Gaviria’s administration both the stock of capital and the usage
of materials increased significantly, at a rate larger than in the rest of the horizon. At
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Figure 3.1: Input quantities
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
capital
labor
energy
materials
the same time, the amount of labor remained substantially constant until 1995, and
slowly declined afterward. These facts are a clue that the reforms shift manufacturing
toward a more capital intensive production form.
In Figure 3.2, we display the cost of capital and the cost of labor over the time
horizon of our analysis. While the cost of capital has been steadily declining since
1986, during the reform period its fall has accelerated. This is consistent with the
fact that after the reform process, the average tariffs fell, the banking sector was
modernized, and the prevailing sectorial restrictions to Foreign Direct Investment
were removed (Eslava et al. (2004); Edwards and Steiner (2008)). At the same
time, the cost of labor jumped up in the early 1990s, after having been rather stable
in the previous decade. This increment can be explained through the fact that in
spite of the policies oriented to enhance the flexibility on hiring labor force as well
as the reduction in hiring costs, the reform period introduced also mechanisms to
provide better protection of the worker’s rights, and protection to the union activity
Edwards and Steiner (2008). Additionally, in 1993 a national reform increased by
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Figure 3.2: Input prices
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13.5 per cent the contributions of payroll to social security, where 75 per cent of these
contributions were paid directly by employers Eslava et al. (2004). In conclusion,
the market-oriented reforms contributed significantly to the reduction of the relative
price of capital.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents the principal descriptive statistics. Capital, total employment
hours, materials, energy, output, and demand shocks7 are in logs, and the cost indexes
are normalized to a base of 100 for 1982. For the period 1982-1998, the number of
observations for all variables oscillates between 90 and 100 thousand, although the
indexes for capital and labor costs are repeated observations of the same sector (or
plant) invariant number per year in the panel. The average of capital is 8.44 with a
standard deviation of 2.12. Its range is from -2.3 to 17.44 log points. The log average
7In section 3.4 we will describe in detail the construction of the demand shocks.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics - Full horizon
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Capital 8.44 (2.12) -2.3 17.44 96,232
Total Emp. Hours 10.96 (1.17) 6.68 17.81 99,102
Materials 9.89 (1.89) -1.11 17.79 90,938
Energy 11.42 (1.93) 0 20.29 99,476
Capital Cost 108.27 (10.07) 93.51 125.32 100,114
Labor Cost 108.83 (18.84) 91.13 153.28 100,114
Materials Price Index 767.47 (962.82) 34.52 58847.97 91,540
Energy Price Index 8,394.5 (1,344,645.04) -10,872.46 373,056,000 100,114
Output 10.68 (1.78) -1.87 18.46 100,114
Demand Shocks 5.12 (2.65) -1.62 32.08 100,114
Capital, total employment hours, materials, energy, output, and demand shocks are in logs, while
indexes are normalized to a base of 100 for 1982.
of total employment hours is close to 11, which is about 60 thousand labor hours
(employees times hours worked), with a standard deviation of 1.2. The averages for
materials and energy are 9.9 and 11.4 respectively.
Regarding cost indexes, the descriptive statistics of Table 3.1 for capital cost and
wages simply reflect the message of Figure 3.2 since they are nothing but time series.
However, for materials and energy costs, the data has information that varies across
plants. The average index for materials is 767 while for energy is 8,394. There is
an important degree of dispersion in the data for these two inputs. The standard
deviation for the materials price index is 962.82 while for energy is 1,344,645. This
excessive volatility in energy prices is possibly explained from the fact that energy
consumption is measured in Kw per hour and the bill of Kw per year, reported
directly in the EAM, and the energy prices per plant can be considered on its own
a measure of capital utilization. Prices of materials (and output) are constructed
with Tornqvist indices where weighed average for growth in prices of materials (or
products) generated by the plant are used.8
Last, Table 3.1 shows that for the full sample, the average output per plant was
about 10.7 with a standard deviation of 1.8 with a minimum of 1.87 and a maximum
8See Eslava et al. (2004) and the technical document of the “Plant-Level Price Indices for
Output and Materials” project for more details on plant level prices.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics – Pre-Reform vs. Post-Reform
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Panel A. Pre-reform Period. 1982-1990
Capital 8.21 (2.05) -2.3 17.22 53,034
Total Emp. Hours 10.97 (1.1) 6.95 16.13 55,055
Materials 9.60 (1.85) -1.11 17.5 51,741
Energy 11.3 (1.88) 0 20.29 54,762
Capital Cost 113.98 (9) 98.44 125.32 55,298
Labor Cost 96.49 (3.83) 91.13 102.04 55,298
Materials Price Index 307.29 (343.94) 40.69 23,109.16 52,280
Energy Price Index 7,506.85 (1,586,504.62) 0.06 373,056,000 55,298
Output 10.49 (1.67) 5.15 18.05 55,298
Demand Shocks 5.08 (2.6) 0.07 31.76 55,298
Panel B. Post-Reform Period. 1991-1998
Capital 8.75 (2.18) -2.13 17.44 43,198
Total Emp. Hours 10.95 (1.25) 6.68 17.81 44,047
Materials 10.25 (1.88) 0.21 17.79 39,197
Energy 11.55 (1.99) 0 20.19 44,714
Capital Cost 101.23 (6.05) 93.51 113.16 44,816
Labor Cost 124.06 (18.84) 95.26 153.28 44,816
Materials Price Index 1,380.27 (1,160.36) 34.52 58,847.97 39,260
Energy Price Index 9,489.76 (966,109.47) -10,872.46 201,600,000 44,816
Output 10.9 (1.88) -1.87 18.46 44,816
Demand Shocks 5.18 (2.72) -1.62 32.08 44,816
Capital, total employment hours, materials, energy, output, and demand shocks are in logs, while
indexes are normalized to a base of 100 for 1982.
18.46 log points. The average demand shock is of 5.1 log points, with a standard
deviation of 2.6. The range for this shocks goes from 0.1 to 31.8.
In order to provide a first snapshot of the differences between pre- and post-
reform periods in the sample, Panels A and B of Table 3.2 splits the sample between
1982-1990 (pre-reform period), and 1991-1998 (post-reform period) and provide the
main descriptive statistics for each period. The capital increased from 8.2 to 8.8 log
points. In 1982 thousand pesos, this is a difference of about 2,633, on average, for
the period after the the reforms. The output increased in the post-reform period on
average about half log point, or 18,000 thousand pesos of 1982. Table 3.2 delivers the
following stylized fact: During the post-reform era, the plants on average increased
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its production and its demand of capital, while the demand of workers remained
stagnant. It is also noticeable that the number of observations between pre- and
post-reform periods was reduced in about 10,000 observations. Even though there
are 9 years in the pre-reform period and only 8 years for the Post-Reform Period,
Table 3.2 suggests that some plants did not survive the new competitive environment
imposed by the market-oriented reforms.
3.4 Setup and Empirical Strategy
In order to empirically investigate the existence of the Ricardo effect, we must follow
a theoretical setup allowing for its existence in the first place. The typical Cobb-
Douglas production function combining capital K and labor L,
Y = AKαL1−α,
fails in this respect. In a competitive equilibrium, firms operating with this tech-
nology respond to a change in the relative input price by shifting the optimal ratio
of input quantities proportionally. This implies that the substitution in input use
leaves the income shares unchanged. Indeed, with a Cobb-Douglas technology, the
income shares of capital and labor are fixed at α and 1− α.
Moving from the existing literature (Krusell et al. (2000), Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014)), we assume that firms produce according to a CES technology:
Y = A
(
αK
σ−1
σ + (1− α)Lσ−1σ
) σ
σ−1
.
The parameter σ captures the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
If σ is larger than one, a change in the relative input price induces a more than
proportional substitution of inputs in the production. Under these circumstances,
the change in relative price has effects on the income shares as well: A larger portion
of income is used to compensate the input that has become relatively cheaper. To
see this, let R and W represent the input price of capital and labor respectively. In
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a competitive equilibrium, the ratio of income shares satisfies the equation
RK
WL
=
α
1− α
(
R
W
)1−σ
. (3.1)
For σ larger than one, a reduction in the relative cost of capital (R/W decreases) gen-
erates a rise in the income share compensating the capital input (RK/WL increases).
Therefore, testing for the existence of the Ricardo Effect amounts to estimating the
parameter σ and verifying it is larger than one.
Using our plant-level data, we proceed to directly estimate a few variants of a CES
production function. The simpler specification we estimate is
log Yit = ai +
σ
σ − 1 log
(
αK
σ−1
σ
it + (1− α)L
σ−1
σ
it
)
+ νt + εit, (3.2)
where the subscripts i and t denote plant and year respectively. Notice that we allow
for plant and year fixed effects. This is equivalent to assume that total factor pro-
ductivity is systematically different across plants by some unobserved characteristics.
Also, in each year there are both a common productivity shock affecting all plants
and an idiosyncratic productivity shock.
In the second empirical model, we introduce also energy consumption (E) and
materials (M) among inputs in the production technology. Since our main concern
is to study the substitution between capital and labor, we add energy and materials
in a parsimonious way. We let the original CES technology in capital and labor nest
an ampler Cobb-Douglas function where the new inputs are also present:
log Yit = ai + (1− β − γ) σ
σ − 1 log
(
αK
σ−1
σ
it + (1− α)L
σ−1
σ
it
)
+
+β logEit + γ logMit + νt + εit. (3.3)
The latter specification is missing a point well discussed in the literature: There
is a strong complementarity between energy consumption and the extent of capital
usage. A given stock of capital can be employed in the production process with
a different degree of intensity. One may think, for instance, at a machinery that
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might be used once per day or continuously over the twenty four hours, depending
on the necessity of production. Most likely, the more intensely capital is used, the
larger quantity of energy is consumed. We design the third specification to take into
account this relation. Let us define effective capital Kˆ as the product E×K: Energy
consumption E serves as a measure of how intensely a stock of capital K is used.
Then, the effective capital replaces capital in the technology:
log Yit = ai + (1− γ) σ
σ − 1 log
(
αKˆ
σ−1
σ
it + (1− α)L
σ−1
σ
it
)
+
+γ logMit + νt + εit. (3.4)
3.5 Results
3.5.1 CES Technology. NLS Estimates
Table 3.3 presents the non-linear least squares estimation of all the specifications.
Columns (1) and (2) correspond to specifications (3.2) and (3.3) respectively. We
estimate specification (3.4) first imposing γ = 0 (no materials in the productions
function) in Column (3), and then relaxing this assumption in Column (4). Looking
at the coefficient of interest, σ, the estimated elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital ranges from 1.15 to 1.80. Given the tight standard errors, for any speci-
fication we reject the hypothesis that the elasticity is below one. Hence, this first set
of empirical findings provides positive evidence about the existence of the Ricardo
Effect in the Colombian manufacturing sector. With regard to the other parameters,
capital weight α falls from 0.50 to 0.06 when the definition of capital is changed into
that of effective capital. This modification does not affect the parameter capturing
materials’ intensity (about 0.55). Finally, when energy is considered as a separate
input, its intensity is estimated at 0.08.
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Table 3.3: NLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
α 0.5093∗∗∗ 0.5141∗∗∗ 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0250) (0.0074) (0.0085)
σ 1.6708∗∗∗ 1.8030∗∗∗ 1.1511∗∗∗ 1.1541∗∗∗
(0.0740) (0.1266) (0.0163) (0.0194)
β 0.0827∗∗∗
(0.0057)
γ 0.5498∗∗∗ 0.5785∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0084)
Obs. 75226 75226 73063 73063
Standard errors clustered at plant level in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All
regressions include plant and time effects. To control for plant fixed effects, the specifications are
estimated in first difference.
3.5.2 CES Technology. 2SLS Estimates
Thinking at a realistic production process, one may acknowledge that the inputs
differ in terms of their predetermination. The stock and the flow of capital are likely
to be given in any period, since investment decision usually have horizons longer
than one year. The extensive margin of labor is quite predetermined, at least with
respect to permanent workers, but this is probably not true for temporary workers.
The intensive margin of labor is definitely not predetermined as well as the usage
of materials and energy consumption. Clearly, effective capital is not predetermined
too. In light of that, the non-linear least squares estimates might be seriously biased
by the simultaneity of productivity shock realization and non-predetermined input
choices.
To address the endogeneity of labor, materials, energy, and effective capital, we
propose an 2SLS strategy in the spirit of Eslava et al. (2004). In the first stage, the
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Table 3.4: 2SLS estimations - First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kˆ L E M
Demand Shock 1.564∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗ 2.575∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.027) (0.039) (0.033)
Demand Shock (Lag 1) 0.749∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.033) (0.048) (0.040)
Demand Shock (Lag 2) 1.353∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.029) (0.043) (0.036)
Energy Price -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Materials Price -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 62335 62335 62335 62335
F 786 284 273 1351
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All variables are in logs. The Energy Price and the Materials
Price are indexes equal to 100 in 1982. Demand Shocks with different sector elasticities come from
Eslava et al. (2004). All regressions include plant and time fixed effects.
endogenous inputs are instrumented by the downstream demand shocks described
in Section 3.3 (current, one lag, and two lags values), the energy price index and
the materials’ price index. Table 3.4 illustrates the estimates of the first stage. As
expected, positive shocks to downstream demand generates an increase in the uti-
lization of all the inputs, and this positive effect persists in time, given that lagged
shocks’ coefficients are significant as well. An increase in the price of materials is
associated with a decline in all inputs’ use, while an increase in the price of en-
ergy reduces the employment of effective capital and energy only (given the scale
of the measures, coefficients are extremely small). The F statistic is large for all
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Table 3.5: 2SLS estimations - Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
α 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.1209∗∗ 0.1236∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0469) (0.0285) (0.0122)
σ 2.4038∗∗ 2.5882∗∗ 1.5489∗∗∗ 1.8483∗∗∗
(1.0535) (1.2822) (0.0706) (0.1384)
β 0.3385∗∗
(0.1464)
γ 0.1960∗∗∗ 0.2828∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0332)
Obs. 53403 53403 53403 53403
Standard errors clustered at plant level in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The
values for the endogenous inputs are those predicted for at the first stage. All regressions include
plant and time effects. To control for plant fixed effects, the specifications are estimated in first
difference.
instrumented inputs, confirming the overall validity of the first stage.
Table 3.5 shows the 2SLS estimation of the CES technology specifications. Com-
paring to Table 3.3, the 2SLS point estimates of σ in specifications (3.2) and (3.3) are
rather larger than the NLS estimates and abundantly above one, ranging between
2.4 and 2.6. However, the standard errors are quite large as well, and in this case
we cannot reject that σ is equal to one. However, when we interpret energy as a
measure of capital utilization, the 2SLS estimates of σ are both larger than the NLS
estimates and significant larger than one. Hence, the estimates of specification (3.4)
provide for evidence in favor of the existence of the Ricardo Effect. While point
estimates of the other specifications are also supporting, they are not statistically
strong enough. Regarding the other parameters, 2SLS estimates are generally lower
than NLS estimates for α and γ, and larger for β.
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Table 3.6: Reform effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-1990 Post-1990
α 0.0695∗∗ 0.0025 0.1663∗∗∗ 0.0668∗∗
(0.0270) (0.0033) (0.0462) (0.0265)
σ 1.7796∗∗∗ 3.5220∗∗ 1.4487∗∗∗ 1.6174∗∗∗
(0.1562) (1.6343) (0.0748) (0.1175)
γ 0.4514∗∗∗ 0.2254∗∗∗
(0.0591) (0.0345)
Obs. 24163 24163 29240 29240
Standard errors clustered at plant level in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Pre-1990: Sample includes observations until year 1990 included. Post-1990: Sample includes
observations posterior to 1990. The values for the endogenous inputs are those predicted for at
the first stage. All regressions include plant and time effects. To control for plant fixed effects, the
specifications are estimated in first difference.
3.5.3 The impact of market-oriented reforms
As discussed in the previous sections, Colombia experienced a deep reform process
between 1990 and 1993, aiming at liberalizing international trade and introducing
flexibility in the labor market. We wonder whether these reforms caused a change in
the production technology with respect to the substitutability of capital and labor.
To verify this hypothesis, we simply split the sample at year 1990 and we repeat
the 2SLS estimation of specification (3.4) over the sub-samples. Table 3.6 displays
the findings. By comparing Column (1) to Column (3) and Column (2) to Column
(4), we conclude that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor did
not significantly change in the years following the reforms. It is the case that the
point estimate of σ in Column (2) is largely above the typical range of the coefficient
estimates found in the previous estimations, but the standard error is also quite wide.
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Hence, we cannot say that this estimate is statistically different from the others.
With these findings, we are not arguing that the market-oriented reforms did not
affect the supply side of the Colombian economy. What Table 3.6 demonstrates is
that the reforms did not change the manner in which capital and labor are optimally
used in the production process, for given input prices. As we saw in Section 3.3,
the relative cost of capital has fallen significantly during the period of our analysis,
and in particular during the reform period. With a CES technology characterized
by σ > 1, the reforms have accelerated the substitution of capital for labor and the
relative decrease of the labor income share.
3.5.4 Simulation
The labor income share in Colombia has steadily declined between 1994 and 2014,
from 74 per cent to 62 per cent of domestic income. How much of this decline can be
accounted for by the Ricardo Effect? In the next paragraphs we try to answer this
question. First of all, we need to make explicit some caveats regarding this exercise.
We are facing limitations in data availability. On one hand, labor income share is
available from 1994 only. On the other hand, our measures of input prices stop in
1998. We need to extrapolate the dynamics of the relative input price from the
period of observation to the future, in order to account for the decline in the labor
income share through 2014. Clearly, this requires strong assumptions of stability in
the price dynamics. A second caveat has to do with the sectoral composition of the
economy. While the information about the labor income share refers to the aggregate
economy, the data used to estimate the CES technology’s parameters belongs to the
manufacturing sector only. All in all, this constraint is not as severe as it appears.
In many developing countries, aggregate statistics face the weakness of missing the
large existing informal sector. Informality is disproportionally present in agriculture
and services, and less so in manufacturing. In this sense, aggregate statistics tend to
be actually more representative of the manufacturing sector than the economy as a
whole.
The simulation exercise we employ to assess the importance of the Ricardo Effect
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is based on equation (3.1), expressing the relative income shares as a function of
the relative input price, given the parameters of the CES technology. The relative
price of capital R/W has fallen on average by 3.6 per cent per year between 1986 and
1998. We assume it kept falling at the same place through 2014. Given the estimated
values of σ, we quantify the implication of this fall for the relative income shares. In
Figure 3.3: Relative income shares
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8 Obs. Pred.
Observed values from PWT 9.0 and simulated values from equation (3.1). The red dashed line is
obtained setting σ = 1.85. The edges of the grey shaded area are obtained setting σ = 1.15 and
σ = 2.58.
Figure 3.3, we plot the relative income share predicted through this exercise. The
red dashed line is obtained by setting σ at 1.85, the value estimated in Column (4) of
Table 3.5. The edges of the grey shaded area are obtained by setting σ at 1.15 and
2.58, the smallest and largest point estimates among all the different estimations
performed. The green dotted line reports the actual observations of the relative
income shares. In 2014, this aggregate was approximately equal to 1.6, about 60 per
cent of its value in 1994. The simulation predicts a relative income share of 2.2 in
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2014, or 80 per cent of the initial value. Based on this result, we conclude that the
Ricardo Effect accounts for half of the decline in the labor income share observed
between 1994 and 2014. If we consider the range of σ values from our estimations,
the actual path of the relative income share is quite close to the one predicted if we
use the largest of our point estimates of σ, and it is captured quite well until 2002.
Notice that for the initial years the assumption that the relative price of capital was
falling at 3.6 per cent per year is probably more accurate.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the ideas of the controversial chapter 31st of David Ricardo’s master
piece were tested using a unique plant level longitudinal database for the manufac-
turing sector in Colombia. After estimating the parameters of a CES production
technology, we found that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
is 1.85 and significantly larger than one. This proves the existence of the Ricardo
Effect, i.e. the substitution of newer, cheaper capital for labor with the concomi-
tant decline in the labor income share. The market-oriented reforms inaugurated
in Colombia between 1990 and 1993 did not change the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, but they induced a stronger fall in the relative cost of
capital and, as a consequence, amplified the Ricardo Effect. Based on a simulation
exercise, we conclude that the Ricardo Effect accounts for half of the decline of the
labor income share in Colombia. As Samuelson (1989) claimed, “Ricardo was Right!”
This chapter is a positive analysis of the Ricardo Effect. Notice that no welfare
consequences are addressed here. However, a class of interesting questions with
welfare consequences arise from the evidence regarding labor replacement when new
units of capital are demanded. Does the Ricardo Effect overall has overall positive of
negative consequences for society? This remains an open question subject to further
research.
This chapter estimated the Ricardo Effect only for the manufacturing sector in
a developing country. Duarte and Restuccia (2010) illustrate that the labor share
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in manufacturing sectors display an inverted U shape over time. It is possible that
the Ricardo Effect provides an explanation for the slippery side of the labor share in
manufacturing industries, but it is important to understand whether there is evidence
of labor replacement in services. In particular, it would be interesting to consider
whether the Ricardo Effect is an important mechanism of sectoral transformation in
which labor is moving from one sector to another.
Last, a proper estimation of the dynamics of integration of the labor force in
the manufacturing sector, taking into account the differences between managers and
workers, could provide some light to the policy debate related with job creation
through corporate tax stimulus towards investment in capital, a debate widely spread
in the Colombian context.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Data sources
Table A.1: Data sources for sectoral physical and ICT capital
Avail. Source Time Horizon
Austria Y EU Klems 2016 (Real Fixed Capital Stock) 1995-2009
Belgium N
France Y EU Klems 2016 (Real Fixed Capital Stock) 1978-2009
Germany Y EU Klems 2016 (Real Fixed Capital Stock) 2000-2009
Italy Y EU Klems 2016 (Real Fixed Capital Stock) 1995-2009
Netherlands Y EU Klems 2016 (Real Fixed Capital Stock) 2000-2009
Spain Y EU Klems 2016 (Real Fixed Capital Stock) 1970-2009
United Kingdom Y EU Klems 2016 (Real Fixed Capital Stock) 1997-2009
United States Y OECD (Net Fixed Capital Stock, Volumes) 1970-2009
A.2 Measurement of Sectoral Labor Productivity in Each
European Country
Figures A.1 and A.2 plot the productivity levels for each sector in each country rela-
tive to the United States for the first and last sample periods. Figure A.1 shows three
different patterns for agriculture, manufacturing and services. First, the agricultural
productivity levels (relative to the U.S.) were either stagnant or relative higher in
1970 compared to 2009 with the exceptions of France and Germany, where minor
improvements were experienced. The productivity levels are surprisingly high for
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the United Kingdom, but still they show an important fall in relative productivity
between 1970 and 2009. However, these differences are do play a minor role in the
aggregate labor productivity because the structural transformation has reduced the
agricultural labor shares dramatically for each of these countries during our sample
period.
Second, European countries have been catching up with the U.S. from 1970 to 2009
in manufacturing productivity without exception, although no country reached the
U.S. labor productivity during our sample period. Whereas Austria, Belgium, France
and the Netherlands experienced about a two-fold increase in manufacturing produc-
tivity, the productivity growth in manufacturing was more modest in Germany, the
United Kingdom, Italy and Spain.
Last, with the notable exception of Belgium, no European country experienced a
significant catch up in services relative to the U.S.; most countries have remained
either stagnant or have experienced a decline.
Figure A.2 plots the relative labor productivity between 1970 and 2009 for each
sector within services and for each European country. Within services, European
countries are in generally more productive than the U.S. in telecommunications,
education, and health services1, but they are significantly less productive in wholesale
and retail trade. Moreover, the productivity levels for this sector have widen out
between 1970 and 2009 in every single European country.
The sector of business services in Europe is also less productive compared to the
U.S. without exception, although the productivity gaps have not widened in every
country. For instance, Germany and Belgium did not experienced a fall in the relative
1It is interesting to note that health services are much less productive in the U.S. than in
Europe. In addition, productivity gap widened significantly during the sample period. The labor
productivity in this sector is a source of major concern for the U.S. as it employed approximately
17 percent of the labor force in 2009. Nevertheless, the finding that Europe is more productive than
the U.S. in health services, as well as in education, should be taken with some caution. Whereas
in the U.S. both education and health are services mainly provided by the private sector, in most
European countries education and health systems are managed by the government, and the labor
hired in these two sub-sectors qualifies as public employment. This fact raises potential concerns on
the extent of comparability of sectoral productivity in education and health between Europe and
the U.S., even though we use our model to correct potential measurement biases in the available
data.
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Figure A.1: Sectoral productivity levels
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Recovered sectoral labor productivity levels in 1970 and 2009 for major European countries
relative to the sectorial U.S. labor productivity level. Agriculture and manufacturing.
productivity, but Italy on the other hand experienced a dramatic increase in the
productivity gap between 1970 and 2009 in business services relative to the U.S. The
employment shares of these two sectors have been relatively large in the years of our
study, hence, the levels of labor productivity in wholesale and retail trade and in
business services do matter significantly for the differences in aggregate productivity
between Europe and the U.S. For the rest of the service sectors the evidence is mixed
across countries. An important case to highlight is financial services. Austria, France,
Italy and Spain were countries with more productive financial services compared to
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Figure A.2: Sectoral productivity levels
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the U.S. in 1970, and in spite of the sharp drop in productivity, they were still more
productive in 2009, except for the case of Spain. Nevertheless, without exception, all
countries in Europe experienced an important reduction in their productivity relative
to the U.S. in financial services.
A.3 Findings of the Counterfactual Experiments for Each
European Country
Table A.3 illustrates our findings when we feed the labor productivity growth rates
from 1970 to 2009. The top panel of Table A.3 show the results of this exercise when
a European country counterfactually experiences the observed labor productivity
growth rate in the U.S., in order to assess changes in aggregate labor productivity
as a consequence of changes in the productivity of a single sector. Each row of
the top panel represents one of the 13 sectors in our model economy, and each
column represents a European country with the exception of the last column, which
represents Europe as a weighted average of the countries in our European sample.
The results for agriculture are not conclusive. Whereas some countries would have
performed better such as Belgium and the Netherlands, for the rest of the European
countries our model predicts that the aggregate labor productivity level would be
actually lower. Nevertheless, with the exception of the Netherlands, these results
have minimal implications for aggregate productivity.
On the other hand, the message for manufacturing is not ambiguous. Had the
European countries experienced the U.S. labor productivity growth in manufacturing
during our sample period, their aggregate labor productivity in 2009 would be lower
regardless of the country. Naturally, Europe as a whole would have had a lower
aggregate productivity. The upper bound of this decline is Italy, with a predicted
drop of 4.2%, whereas the lower bound is Belgium, with an staggering drop of 14.7%.
Manufacturing is not responsible for the European underperformance vis-a´-vis the
U.S. On the contrary, it helped Europe in its path toward convergence during our
sample period.
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With regards to services, our counterfactual experiment suggests that the slow-
down in the aggregate labor productivity comes mainly from three sectors: wholesale
and retail trade (trd), financial services (fin) and business services (bss). It also sug-
gests that Europeans are significantly more productive in health services (hlt). Let’s
discuss the results of each of these four sectors in detail (for the rest of the sectors the
results are ambiguous depending on the country, and the aggregate effect on labor
productivity is not large).
First, during the sample period, the aggregate labor productivity in every single
European country would have increased significantly had the wholesale and retail
trade sector experienced the U.S. labor productivity growth in Europe. The lower
bound for this prediction is for Great Britain, with an increase in aggregate labor
Table A.2: Keeping the U.S. pace
AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA GBR ESP NLD Europe
Counterfactual:
γi = γ
USA
i
agr -0.1 1.3 -1.6 -1.2 -0.2 -0.2 -1.5 6.3 0.4
man -11.0 -14.3 -12.2 -7.6 -4.2 -9.2 -4.9 -7.7 -8.9
trd 4.3 6.5 3.9 3.4 7.7 1.8 6.3 7.1 5.1
rst -0.0 -0.1 -1.6 -1.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5
trs -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.6 0.9 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.2
com -1.2 1.5 -7.0 2.0 4.8 2.6 -7.0 -2.5 -0.9
fin 0.6 1.0 3.7 2.4 17.7 1.0 2.2 1.9 3.8
res -0.3 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 4.8 -0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
bss 1.3 -0.2 4.0 0.6 11.7 2.6 6.6 -2.7 3.0
gov -0.2 0.4 -1.0 -2.8 0.5 -1.8 3.5 0.4 -0.1
edu -1.7 -1.4 0.5 -1.4 -0.9 0.4 -1.7 -0.1 -0.8
hlt -3.7 -10.9 -5.9 -10.1 -7.3 -4.7 3.8 -8.4 -5.9
per -1.0 -2.3 -1.8 -1.1 1.2 0.9 -1.5 -1.3 -0.9
γi = γ
USA
i,i∈services -3.5 -7.7 -6.4 -8.6 44.7 1.2 13.3 -6.1 3.4
γi = γ
USA
i,∀i -14.3 -20.4 -19.5 -16.8 38.6 -8.4 5.9 -7.5 -5.3
Counterfactual sectoral productivity growth is the one experienced by the U.S. between 1970 and
2009.
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productivity of 1.8%, whereas the upper bound is Italy with an increase of 7.7%. The
prediction for Europe indicates that this sector alone would have been responsible
for an aggregate labor productivity 5.1% higher than our benchmark prediction in
2009.
Second, financial services also would have helped to reduce the labor productivity
gap had the European countries experienced the same labor productivity growth
observed in this sector for the U.S. Europe as a whole would have had a labor
productivity level 3.8% higher than our benchmark prediction. Furthermore, every
single European country would have experienced higher aggregate labor productivity
if their financial services were as productive as in the U.S., although the results for
Italy are substantially higher to the rest of Europe.
Third, with the exception of Belgium and the Netherlands, the labor productivity
would also be higher for the European countries if they have had the U.S. labor
productivity growth in business services. Once again, the order of magnitude of this
result is substantially higher for Italy compared to the rest of Europe.
Last, our results also illustrate that Europe would have had lower aggregate pro-
ductivity have they had the U.S. labor productivity growth observed in health ser-
vices. With the exception of Spain, every single European country would have un-
derperformed have they had the U.S. labor productivity growth in the health sector.
Table A.3 shows the results of the numerical experiments for the period 1990-
2009 by comparing the benchmark prediction to the counterfactual aggregate labor
productivity. Among several differences with respect to our previous counterfactual,
we would like to highlight that the results for health services are in the same direction
compared to the entire sample period, but the order of magnitude of the result is
about half of what it was for the 1970-2009 period, although still represent a large
distance between the benchmark and the counterfactual aggregate productivity for
each country, again with the exception of Spain. In addition, for the period between
1990 and 2009 a new sector emerges in which the Europeans would be worse off if they
have had the U.S. labor productivity growth: Communications. With the exception
of Belgium, all countries in Europe would have had lower aggregate productivity
have they had the U.S. labor productivity in communications, and this difference is
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Table A.3: Taking off with the U.S.
AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA GBR ESP NLD Europe
Counterfactual:
γi = γ
USA
i
agr -0.3 1.3 -0.8 -1.5 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3
man -2.8 -1.5 -1.4 -1.3 3.1 0.9 2.5 -1.7 -0.3
trd 4.0 4.3 4.2 2.3 4.2 1.6 3.0 2.4 3.2
rst 0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.7 -0.1 0.0
trs -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.8 -0.4 0.2
com -0.9 1.0 -4.2 -0.1 -3.3 -6.5 -3.0 -5.9 -2.9
fin -1.0 -0.5 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.3 -0.7 0.4
res 0.2 2.2 -0.0 0.0 2.6 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.8
bss 0.9 2.2 2.6 3.1 4.5 2.8 3.7 -0.8 2.4
gov 0.1 0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5
edu -0.4 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 1.5 -2.4 0.4 0.1
hlt -1.9 -3.4 -1.2 -8.1 -1.6 -0.2 0.4 -5.7 -2.7
per -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4
γi = γ
USA
i,i∈services 0.7 5.7 2.6 -2.3 7.4 -0.3 3.6 -11.6 0.7
γi = γ
USA
i,∀i -2.4 5.4 0.4 -5.2 10.6 0.9 6.0 -14.2 0.2
Counterfactual sectoral productivity growth is the one experienced by the U.S. between 1990 and
2009.
Table A.4: Catching Up with the U.S.
AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA GBR ESP NLD Europe
Counterfactual: γi s.t. Ai = A
USA
i
trd 19.0 30.6 15.0 22.1 33.8 22.7 33.8 29.4 25.8
bss 10.3 13.4 17.7 15.1 13.3 24.2 15.3 27.9 17.1
fin -1.9 4.6 -2.3 5.8 -2.5 2.3 1.8 4.3 1.5
Counterfactual sectoral productivity growth is the one insuring full catch-up of the U.S. by the
sector in 2009.
large in France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain and the Netherlands.
Table A.4 shows the implied change in aggregate productivity when the labor
productivity in wholesale and retail trade, business services and financial services
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converges to the U.S. labor productivity level in 2009. No European country would
have experienced a reduction of its observed aggregate labor productivity have their
labor productivity converged to the U.S. by 2009 in either wholesale and retail trade
or in business services. Whereas the lower bound of the prediction is of 15% if France
have had a catch up in whole sale and retail trade, the lower bound of the increase in
aggregate labor productivity is of 10.3% for Austria have they experienced a catch
up in business services.
On the other hand, financial services are not unambiguously a source of slowdown
between Europe and the U.S. The last row of Table A.4 shows that have Europe
experienced a full catch up in the labor productivity of financial services relative
to the U.S. 2009 level, Austria, France and Italy would have had lower aggregate
labor productivity. Moreover, even Germany – the most successful counterfactual
scenario with an aggregate productivity 5.8% higher compared to its 2009 benchmark
prediction – falls short when compared to the lower bound of the predictions for
wholesale and retail trade or for business services.
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